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CONFIDENTIAL.

(9480.)

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F.O. 424/216

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9433.]

216

July to September 1908.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9433.]

[22964] No. 1.

Memorandum communicated by Count Metternich, July 1, 1908.

SIR EDWARD GREY was good enough to say in his Memorandum of the 10th January that His Majesty's Government did not see any objection to Mr. Wönckhaus removing the red oxide which had already been drawn, and which was ready for shipment from the Island of Abu Musa, and that His Majesty's Government would advise the Sheikh of Shargah not to disturb the shipment.

Reports received at Berlin state that only part of the oxide could as yet be removed, as the German ship "Louise," which visited the island in April last, had only room for 1,810 tons.

This quantity has been removed without disturbance from the Sheikh's men.

But the following quantities of oxide drawn and ready for shipment had to be left on the island:—

(*a.*) About 400 tons left from the oxide on the beach, from which the 1,810 tons have been shipped.

(*b.*) A somewhat large quantity in the inner island stored up near the pit where it has been won.

From correspondence that took place on the 18th and 21st March last between the German Consul and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, it appears that the British Consul-General saw at that time some objection in advising the Sheikh to allow the removal of the oxide mentioned under (*b.*).

Major Cox promised to ask His Majesty's Government for further instructions.

July 1, 1908.

[22835] No. 2.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 2.)

3, *Salter's Court, Cannon Street, London,*
July 1, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, copy of a further letter we have received from our Bussorah agents, under date of the 6th ultimo, regarding a threatened attack on the P. S. "Blosse Lynch," and respectfully request that our claim for damages in respect of the recent attack on that steamer should be pressed in Constantinople as the only effective means of putting an end, once for all,

to the present intolerable state of affairs on the Tigris. So long as the local authorities are not mulcted in heavy money damages, this state of things will, in our opinion, continue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

Inclosure in No. 2.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers, Bussorah, to Messrs. Lynch Brothers, London.

June 6, 1908.

THE "Blosse Lynch" arrived here on the 3rd instant, and reported that friction had arisen between Sheikh Haatem and the local authorities at Amarah over a question of renting a property from the Senieh. Owing to the refusal of Haasan Beg to grant the land, Haatem left Amarah, stating that his followers should attack the "Blosse Lynch," and thus attain his end in the same manner as Sheikhs Ghudban and Seyhood have already done.

The gun-boat "Aloos" was to have escorted the "Blosse Lynch" on the downward voyage, but owing to some hitch she was not ready, and our steamer proceeded alone, and passed through the district of Haatem without experiencing any trouble. The reason given for this was that Haatem had not then arrived from Amarah.

While the "Blosse Lynch" was in Bussorah further news was received to the effect that Haatem had arrived and intended to fire at the "Blosse Lynch," which it is impossible to mistake for any other boat owing to her two funnels; we therefore applied to our Consul for protection against the possibility of attack, and he obtained a guard of thirty soldiers from the local authorities, which brought the total number, including those supplied from Amarah for the downward voyage, to sixty soldiers.

We dispatched the steamer on the evening of the 4th instant, and trust she has arrived at Amarah safely.

The "Khalifah" arrived yesterday afternoon, and brought the news from Amarah that Hassan Beg had enticed Haatem back again and put him in chains. It is to be hoped that this action will prevent any disturbance, but we are informed that Haatem has a son who is quite capable of leading his men, and it remains to be seen whether he will take any action or not.

[22219] No. 3.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, July 2, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 6th ultimo on the subject of the "Johara" dhow incident in the Red Sea, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople reporting on the present state of the negotiations regarding the payment of compensation.*

I am to request that you will draw Lord Morley's attention to the penultimate paragraph of this despatch. As his Lordship is aware, the natives in question are, in virtue of Treaties signed in 1888, under British protection, and Sir E. Grey therefore proposes, if Lord Morley concurs, to instruct Mr. Barclay to emphasize this point to the Ottoman Government after the money awarded in the present case has actually been paid.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[23012] No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards

* Mr. G. Barclay, No. 346, June 22, 1908.

herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 28th May, relative to affairs at Abu Musa.

It is requested that the typewritten inclosures, which are sent in original, may be returned to this Office as soon as done with.

India Office, July 3, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Simla, May 28, 1908.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram dated the 21st April last, in which you suggest that inquiries should be made regarding the character of Abdullah-bin-Hassan in connection with a case brought against him by Messrs. Sassoon and Co., with a view to justifying any objection that it may be found necessary to make to his further connection with Abu Musa Island or his employment on the Trucial Coast.

2. In reply, I am to communicate the following facts, which have been ascertained on inquiry from the police:—

On the 4th September, 1902, Mr. R. M. Cohen, an honorary Magistrate, Calcutta, and the Manager of Messrs. David Sassoon and Co., complained before the Northern Presidency Magistrate, Mr. A. Rahim, against Abdullah-bin-Haji Hassan for fraudulently destroying a valuable document, stated to be an original letter, dated the 20th August, 1902, from the accused to the complainant's firm.

Summons was issued by the Court on the 15th September, 1902, and, after several hearings at the police-court, the case was, on the 14th November, 1902, committed to the High Court Sessions under section 477 of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant, however, having offered no evidence, the accused was discharged by the presiding Sessions Judge.

3. In the circumstances, it is not thought desirable to make further inquiries from Messrs. Sassoon and Co.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. B. WOOD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, April 21, 1908.

I RECOMMEND, with reference to concluding clause of my telegram dated the 17th April, that the High Court of Calcutta be requested to furnish Foreign Department with details of the proceedings in which Sassoon and Co. prosecuted Abdullah-bin-Hassan between two and three years ago for stealing from their office a document bearing on some other suit then *sub judice*. It is believed that the papers in case, and inquiries from Sassoon and Co., might lead to useful evidence being produced of Abdullah's bad character, which would strengthen our hands in objecting, if it is necessary, to his further connection with Abu Musa Island or employment on Trucial Coast.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

Major Cox to Herr Listemann.

M. le Consul,

Bouchir, le 2 *Mai*, 1908.

J'AI l'honneur de vous remercier de votre lettre en date du 30 Avril, par laquelle vous me faites savoir que les opérations de chargement du vapeur "Louise" se sont effectuées dans une manière satisfaisante, aussi des remerciements que vous m'avez bien voulu exprimer au sujet des mesures prises pour éviter des difficultés pendant le séjour du "Louise" à Abu Mousa.

A l'égard du matériel et des utensiles employés au chargement dont vous faites

mention, je suis d'accord avec vous dans l'opinion que s'il y a encore 400 tonnes de l'oxyde à mettre à bord il ne vaut pas la peine de les enlever jusqu'à ce que le chargement soit conclu ; et je m'empresserai, en consultant le Cheikh de Shargah, d'arranger quelque moyen pour les sauvegarder.

Je vais partir aujourd'hui pour les ports Arabes, et je ferai de mon mieux en route d'arranger quelque chose convenable en cet égard, soit de la nature indiquée dans votre lettre du 30 Avril, soit de manière analogue.

Je me profite de cette occasion de porter à votre attention que sur le document dans lequel les parties intéressées ont signalé réciproquement leur acceptation du poids de l'oxyde enlevé à 1,810 tonnes Hassan Samaiyeh a signé :—

"Hassen-bin Ali Samaiyeh, wa Shurkahu."

Je crois que vous connaissez bien, M. le Consul, que le droit du dit Hassan de se signer pour les autres concessionnaires est une question en dispute entre eux, et, par conséquent, en acceptant la signature de Hassan sur cet document pour lui-même, il m'a dû vous demander de vouloir bien prendre note que mon acceptation soit sans préjudice à la question du droit du dit Hassan de signer pour les autres concessionnaires.

Agréez, &c.
Le Résident Britannique dans le Golfe Persique,
(Signé) P. Z. COX, *Major*.

Inclosure 4 in No. 4.

Agreement between Parties as to Weight of Oxide shipped by Steam-ship "Louise."

ACCORDING to the statement of Robert Wönckhaus and Co. and of Haji Hassan-bin-Someiyeh and Co., the steam-ship "Louise" has shipped, according to her displacement, about 1,810 tons from that quantity of oxide alone which remained at the eastern shore of the Abu Musa Island, and there are about another 400 tons in the same fixed place.

(Signed) (Per pro. Robert Wönckhaus and Co.)
HERR ROSENFELD.
ABDUL HUSSEIN (Mirza, German Consulate).
HAJI HASSAN-BIN-ALI SOMEIYEH AND Co.

M. Rosenfeld, agent of the firm of M. Robert Wönckhaus and Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Someiyeh, admitted as above.

Witness :
(Signed) BEDR-BIN-MAHOMED AMIN,
Residency Agent at Lingah.

April 17, 1908.

Inclosure 5 in No. 4.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, May 2, 1908.

IN continuation of previous correspondence, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of the correspondence regarding the removal of 1,810 tons oxide from Abu Musa Island by the steam-ship "Louise."

My First Assistant, Captain Trevor, was present in R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" during the operations, and the Residency Agent, Lingah, under his directions, concerted with the Mirza of the German Consulate in supervising the operations and effecting the Agreement between the parties, of which copy accompanies.

Inclosure 6 in No. 4.

Herr Listemann to Major Cox.

M. le Résident, *Bouchir, le* 30 *Avril*, 1908.

AYANT reçu de Lingah la nouvelle que les opérations de chargement du vapeur "Louise" se sont bien effectuées, et que le dit vapeur ainsi que les ouvriers employés à nettoyer et charger l'oxyde ont quitté l'Ile d'Abou Mousa, j'ai l'honneur de vous exprimer mes meilleurs remerciements d'avoir bien voulu prendre les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher tout dérangement des travaux de nettoyage et d'embarquement.

Quant à l'enlèvement de l'oxyde resté sur l'île, la maison Wönckhaus et Cie. n'a pas encore reçu d'instructions de Hamburg à ce sujet.

Le matériel et les utensiles employés au chargement, tels que paniers, seaux, chariots, barques, ânes, &c., appartenant en partie à MM. Wönckhaus et Cie., en partie à la "Hamburg-Amerika Linie," et en partie à Hadschi Hassan-bin-Ali Samaye et Cie., se trouvent encore sur l'île et l'enlèvement de ces objets causerait des frais considérables, et, en même temps—vu la nécessité de les transporter de nouveau à Abou Mousa lors du chargement ultérieur du reste de l'oxyde—inutiles. De l'autre côté, il paraît nécessaire de prendre les mesures efficaces pour que les dits objets soient mis en sûreté, les propriétaires ayant déjà subi des pertes considérables, parce qu'un grand nombre d'autres objets leur appartenant, qu'on avait dû laisser sur l'île lors de l'expulsion des ouvriers mineurs par les gens du Cheikh de Shargah au mois d'Octobre dernier, ont été, à défaut de surveillance, volés ou détériorés.

Le moyen le plus sûr et le plus simple pour sauvegarder les objets susmentionnés serait, à mon avis, qu'un employé de Wönckhaus et Cie. ou de Haji Hassan soit stationné sur l'île jusqu'à chargement du reste de l'oxyde.

En cas que ce moyen ne vous semble pas praticable, il serait peut-être possible de trouver un autre arrangement, par exemple, que vous garantissiez la sûreté des objets susmentionnés, en vous entendant avec le Cheikh de Shargah à ce sujet.

Je vous serais bien reconnaissant d'une obligeante réponse à ce sujet, et je profite, &c.

Le Consul Impérial d'Allemagne,
(Signé) H. LISTEMANN.

[22964] No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the German Ambassador, and, with reference to the inquiry made by his Excellency on the 1st instant respecting the export of red oxide from the Island of Abu Musa, has the honour to state that the British Resident in the Persian Gulf was instructed on the 9th April to make arrangements for transporting all the oxide already mined to the shore, in order that it might be ready for shipment by Messrs. Wönckhaus.

Major Cox reported early in May that he understood from Hassan Samaiyeh, who had been in consultation with Mr. Brown, that Messrs. Wönckhaus had no intention to make any further shipments for the next few months ; and he added that, owing to the season of the year, no serious transport operations on the island were possible for two or three months.

There remain on the beach some 400 tons of oxide, and, according to the estimate of Hassan Samaiyeh, about 3,000 tons of saleable quality near the mine. These amounts are at the disposal of Messrs. Wönckhaus, and Sir E. Grey is disposed to think that it might be advisable for the local agent of the firm to give the British Resident timely notice of any further shipments, in order that arrangements may be concerted with the Sheikh of Shargah for preventing disturbances on the spot.

A detailed statement in regard to the whole question of the oxide mines on Abu Musa will be communicated to the German Ambassador at an early date.

Foreign Office, July 4, 1908.

[23122] No. 6.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 147.)

Gulahek, June 17, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note which I have addressed to the Persian Government, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 107 of the 6th instant, on the subject of the recent cases of irregular proceedings of the Persian Customs vessels in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Mr. Marling to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Gulahek, June 14, 1908.

Your Highness,

I RECENTLY had occasion to bring to the notice of the Administrator-General of Customs the case of a Customs launch from Bunder-Abbas which was found cruising in Musent waters some 60 miles from Bunder Abbas. Since then several farther cases of irregular proceedings on the part of Customs launches in the Gulf have occurred.

The frequent occasions on which vessels under the Administration of Customs have been found cruising outside Persian territorial waters and taking action against vessels not flying the Persian flag, have obliged me to bring to the notice of His Majesty's Government the present irregular practices of the Customs officials in the Gulf, and I have been instructed to remind your Highness that Persian Customs launches have no right to act in the territorial waters of any foreign State unless expressly authorized to do so by Convention with the State in question, and that on the high seas they cannot interfere with any vessels except those flying the Persian flag.

I must earnestly request that these principles of international law may be adhered to, and I have to state that, if incidents such as those which have recently taken place recur, His Majesty's Government will be forced to take measures in order that the danger of retaliatory action on the part of the Arabs may be avoided, and the maritime peace of the Gulf may be preserved.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

[23164] No. 7.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 358. Confidential.)

Therapia, June 25, 1908.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 321 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to forward the following papers respecting the recent disturbances in Samos:—

1. Copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Barnham, based on confidential and reliable information;
2. Copy of a further despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Mare;
3. Copies of six despatches from the French Consul-General at Smyrna, which my French colleague has been good enough to communicate to me very confidentially; and
4. A further statement from the Sublime Porte, communicated to the three Embassies.

It is clear from these documents that what has occurred was not a rising of the people of Samos, but a rebellious outbreak on the part of M. Sofoulis and his followers.

Kopassis Bey, the present Prince-Governor—who, I may mention, was recommended for the post by this Embassy and, I believe, by M. Constans—is by no means the first Governor who has come into conflict with M. Sofoulis and his party, but until the recent crisis the latter have succeeded, by appeals to the Sultan, in ridding themselves

of those Princes who withstood them. In Kopassis they met a Governor who was too strong for them.

I know nothing to support M. Sofoulis' allegation that the Grand Vizier and Kopassis Bey harboured designs against the autonomy of Samos. On the contrary, it would seem clear from the inclosed Reports that the Prince-Governor, up to the moment of calling for reinforcements, did no more than endeavour to assert his rights as the Representative of the Sovereign Power against the tyranny of a faction, the leader of which would brook no interference with the virtual dictatorship to which he had attained. M. Sofoulis had, according to one of M. Mare's Reports, "made it utterly impossible for the Prince to govern." M. Sofoulis himself admits that the Samian Government had decided to summon the Assembly without the Prince's sanction. The power of fixing the date and place for the meeting of this body is expressly vested in the Prince, so that it is evident that a flagrant violation of the Constitution was in contemplation by M. Sofoulis when the two companies of reinforcements, whose arrival led to the outbreak of the disturbances, were despatched from Smyrna.

What happened on the arrival of these troops at Vathy is narrated as follows by Mr. Consul-General Barnham's informant:—

"A number of Sofoulis' men were posted in such a position as to command a clear range of fire upon the soldiers as they advanced up the quay. The Commissary of Police met the troops, shouting to them to go back, and when they took no notice he gave the signal, and the rebels began the fight. The troops gave no provocation, and the statement made by Sofoulis' party that they first killed a boy is not authenticated."

Whether the shooting of the troops really took this treacherous form or not, there is no doubt whatever that Sofoulis' men were the aggressors, or that, while the two companies were being landed, Kopassis Bey was very roughly handled by the insurgents. Mr. Vice-Consul Mare reported that he was beaten; Mr. Barnham's informant states that M. Sofoulis, with a crowd of gendarmes, forced his way into the Government House and dragged him into the public square, and there subjected him to every conceivable indignity; M. Sofoulis himself says that Kopassis Bey was "insulted, spat upon, and slapped in the square of the town by the people." The troops appear to have won their way to the Senate House, where the Prince was detained, and to have succeeded in bringing him back to his Palace, where they remained besieged until relieved by the ships of war and the three battalions of troops sent by the Porte to restore order. Desultory firing seems to have continued during the intervening days between the rebels and the besieged troops.

According to the Reports of the French Consular Agent, the bombardment from the ships of the relieving force which occurred at intervals during the night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th ultimo did little damage to the town. It seems to have been solely directed against the positions of the insurgents, and on each occasion to have been provoked by their fire.

Mr. Mare puts the total casualties during the disorders at thirty-three Samians and thirty Turks killed, and over a hundred wounded on both sides. He reports that during the first two nights after the landing of the three battalions there was a good deal of looting, but on the whole the troops seem to have behaved with remarkable self-restraint considering the treatment their comrades had met with at the hands of the insurgents. The stories spread abroad of large numbers of women and children having been killed by the soldiers are certainly false. Mr. Barnham has reported that local information shows that only two women and three children were killed, whether by the troops or by the insurgents will probably never be known. In view of these stories and Mr. Sofoulis' allusions to the cruelty of the Turkish soldiery, I would call special attention to the Report of the French Consul-General in which he narrates the killing and subsequent mutilation of a number of Turkish soldiers who had surrendered.

I noted from copies of Sir F. Elliot's despatches to your Department, with which he has been good enough to furnish me, that M. Sofoulis, in the vigorous campaign which he has been conducting at Athens with a view to inducing the three Powers to intervene, speaks of what took place on the 25th ultimo and following days as having been inspired, not by a sentiment of insubordination, but by a sentiment of conservative patriotism. It is unfortunate that this sentiment did not find expression in some less violent form. An appeal to the Porte and to the three Powers would have sufficed to secure the liberties of the island, if indeed they were ever in danger.

M. Sofoulis accuses the Porte of abolishing the guarantees of the island, and complains *inter alia* of the replacement of the Samian by the Ottoman flag, of the recruitment of the gendarmerie from outside the island, of the arbitrary removal of Deputies, Mayors, and Judges, of the revocation of Articles of the Civil and Penal Codes, of wholesale arrests, and of the convocation of the Assembly during the military occupation of the island; and he asks that the *status quo* should be at once restored, Kopassis Bey recalled, and the Ottoman troops, including the garrison, immediately withdrawn, and that an amnesty should be proclaimed.

I have already reported that there is no truth in the story of the change of flag or in that of the recruiting of non-Samians for the gendarmerie. The statement that the Prince has revoked by Decree Articles of the Civil and Penal Code seems equally unwarranted. The removal of certain Deputies, &c., was due to their having been implicated in the disorders. As regards the general tenor of M. Sofoulis' communications and especially his complaint as to the arrests which have been effected, and his demand for an amnesty, I would observe that he seems to forget that he and his followers attempted to violate the Constitution by summoning the Assembly at a date and place fixed by himself, and that they have since taken up arms against the Sovereign Power. It can hardly be contended that persons who have been guilty of shooting down the Imperial troops and ill-treating the Sultan's Representative should be allowed to escape with impunity. No doubt a number of arrests—Mr. Mare puts them at 200—have been effected, but I do not know that it can be said that considering the circumstances the restraints of the Constitution have been unreasonably relaxed. In any case, it should not be forgotten that the Charter of 1832 was only granted to the island subject to the islanders remaining loyal subjects of the Sultan. Despite M. Sofoulis' protestations of loyalty, it is obvious that this condition has not been observed by him and his party.

The Embassies of the three Protecting Powers, whose special position the Porte has never ceased to recognize throughout the recent troubles, have received formal assurances that the persons implicated in the rebellion shall be tried, not by court-martial, but in the Civil Courts, that the *status quo* shall be respected, and that the troops sent to restore order shall be withdrawn as soon as possible. As a matter of fact, the Special Commissioners, Raouf Pasha and Constantinides Pasha, have already left, as well as most of the ships of war. Two of the three battalions have returned to Salonica, and, as already reported, it has been decided by the Sultan to leave only two companies in the island. The Powers have for several decades acquiesced in the presence of a small garrison, so that it may now be regarded as part of the *status quo*. After the recent occurrences it is obviously not the moment to ask for the suppression of this small force.

Nor can I see any reason at present why we should demand the recall of Kopassis Bey. Believing him as I do to be innocent of designs on the autonomy of Samos, I cannot think that his removal, as the result of disturbances caused by one party in the island, would be in the general interests of the inhabitants.

I shall, in concert with my colleagues, if the necessity arises, press for the complete restoration of the *status quo*: so far, I see no sign of any attempt to alter it—and I lose no opportunity of recommending the use of circumspection in punishing the guilty. Those arrested must stand their trial, though, unfortunately, the persons really responsible for the bloodshed which has occurred have succeeded in effecting their escape. I notice Mr. Mare recommends the proclamation of an amnesty, but I cannot think it would be wise; I cannot think it would be fitting that the ringleaders should escape without punishment, and until some of these have been sentenced I think it would be premature to talk of pardon. It would certainly be most undesirable in the interests of peace in the island that M. Sofoulis and his companions now in Athens should be allowed to return to Samos.

The question of an international inquiry has been mooted. I do not know that this would add materially to our information, and it would certainly tend to encourage the agitation conducted by M. Sofoulis, who, it must not be forgotten, only speaks for one party in the island. The encouragement of this man's agitation at Athens is obviously to be deprecated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S. *June* 30.—Since writing the above, I have learned from Mr. Mare that he hears that members of Parliament have been obliged by the Government in the island to request the Sublime Porte to station one battalion of infantry. I have reminded the

Grand Vizier of the decision, which I have already reported in my telegram No. 147 of the 19th instant, as having been taken by the Sultan that only two companies are to be left in the island, and his Highness has assured me most positively that this decision will be adhered to, though he added that these two companies will be kept up to full strength.

I should mention in this connection that at the time Kopassis Bey called for reinforcements the garrison of the island was by no means at its full strength. Instead of the 250 men usually stationed there, there were at that time less than 200.

G. B.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Consul Barnham to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 59. Confidential.)

Sir, *Smyrna, June* 15, 1908.

IN view of the delay in obtaining from Samos a full and comprehensive Report upon the recent disturbances, I have ventured to draw up the following statement showing, from a confidential and very reliable source, the origin and course of those events.

My informant, who has had the advantage of long residence in the island and an intimate acquaintance with successive Governors, states that in order to find the cause of the revolt we must go back to the time when Caratheodory Effendi governed the island. He describes Caratheodory as a weak man, who allowed the Senate through Sofoulis, its most active member, to encroach upon his rights and form a ring which exploited the people and committed every form of illegality. Under the régime of Caratheodory Effendi Vathy had become a centre for the smuggling of arms and explosives carried on in broad daylight. The gendarmes, of whom the Commissary was a man who had been sentenced to six years' imprisonment for attempted murder, were men mostly drawn from the criminal classes, and were in the entire control of Sofoulis and his party. The public conscience at length revolted against this state of things, and a certain Hadjiyanni Carlovanni, having been wantonly shot at by a gendarme, went to Constantinople and succeeded in obtaining the Prince's recall.

Georgiades Effendi, the next Prince-Governor, found the task of government beyond his strength and soon resigned.

Kopassis Bey is evidently a man of finer, stronger mettle. It is evident that he came to the island fully alive to the difficulties he would have to encounter but determined to carry out radical reforms. He made a tour through the island before the Greek Easter and satisfied himself that Sofoulis had no friends in the interior, where the villagers were law-abiding and full of respect for the Prince-Governor as such.

With a view to purify the Courts of Justice, which seem to have only existed for the purpose of acquitting the guilty and punishing the innocent, Kopassis Bey decided that he must make a clean sweep of the existing gendarmerie and as a preliminary step he applied to the Porte for additional troops.

Some time before the arrival of the troops there had been an open rupture between the Prince and Sofoulis, the latter insisting that the Prince should at once convene the Assembly, and the Prince maintaining his right to do so when he thought fit.

When the steamship "Dikili" entered the port of Vathy on the morning of the 25th May, the Prince sent his guards with bugles playing to assist in the disembarkation of the troops. At the same time, Hadji Manoli, the Police Commissary, and Agostino, Chief of the Forest Guards, forced their way into the Palace, revolver in hand, and called upon the Prince to come out and prevent the landing; but Kopassis Bey took his revolver and drove the men out. A few minutes later Sofoulis, with a crowd of gendarmes and others forced their way in and they dragged the Prince out into the public square where they subjected him to every imaginable indignity and finally placed him in the Senate House, where he remained four hours. He afterwards escaped to the Palace by himself and from that time took command of the firing upon the rebels from the Palace windows. In the meantime the landing of the troops had commenced, the "Dikili" having anchored exactly opposite the Austrian and French Vice-Consulates. These two houses form practically one block, on either side of which are streets leading up-hill, and in those streets a number of Sofoulis' men were posted in such a position as to command a clear range of fire upon the soldiers as they advanced up the quay. The signal for hostilities was given by the Commissary of Police, Hadji Manoli, who came

down to the quay shouting to the soldiers to go back, and when they took no notice he gave the signal by sounding the tocsin from a church close by.

The rebels began to fight; the soldiers gave no provocation. The statement that the soldiers first killed a boy is not authenticated.

In the course of the fighting the two Vice-Consulates became a target for the fire of the troops, who seem to have been under the impression that some of the insurgents were quartered there, and these buildings suffered considerable damage.

When the firing began there were some women and children in the streets, and it appears that two women and three children were killed. The fire of the rebels was very destructive, and several soldiers were shot close to the Vice-Consulates.

On the 25th May the rebels took possession of the telegraph office and threatened to blow up the place if any telegrams were sent. This applied to all telegrams, official or private.

In the report from which I am quoting it is stated that some thirty soldiers who had surrendered and were confined in a house near the custom-house were afterwards killed and mutilated. It is stated that their noses and ears were cut off and their eyes gouged out. A similar statement was made to me a few days ago by an English gentleman who had just come from Samos and was told the story by a Turkish naval officer on the Admiral's ship.

I have written to Vice-Consul Mare to ask whether he confirms the statement.

Firing appears to have been kept up in a desultory fashion on the 26th, 27th, and 28th May.

There was considerable panic, and the people fled to the Greek monasteries outside Vathy or to the Consulates and French convents inside the town.

On the 27th May the steam-ship "Bukovina" of the Austrian Lloyd Company arrived, but the firing was too heavy to permit passengers to land or embark, and the steamer soon left.

The same day the little Turkish stationnaire, the "Messoud," entered the harbour, but was driven out by the fire of the rebels. The "Messoud" then took up her station outside the harbour and occupied herself with watching the movements of suspicious Greek craft, and prevented their entry into port.

On the 28th May the Imperial yacht "Izzedin" arrived at Vathy, having on board the High Commissioner, his Excellency Raouf Pasha, Governor-General of Salonica. The "Izzedin" was followed by the torpedo-boats "Aintab" and "Bafra."

On the 29th May arrived the cruiser "Abdul Hamid," flying the flag of Admiral Halil Pasha, and the torpedo-boat "Peik-i-Shevket."

All this time the firing on the Palace continued. On the night of the 29th May the "Abdul Hamid" and the despatch-boat "Marmarice" began a bombardment upon the positions held by the rebels. The bombardment lasted an hour and a-half, and about 200 shells were fired.

On the 30th May the Messageries Maritimes steamer "Saghalien" arrived with provisions for the French Consulate, and, acting under instructions from the French Embassy, took on board a large number of fugitives for Rhodes.

The same afternoon two transports arrived with about 4,000 troops. To cover the landing the hills were again bombarded, and then these troops marched up and occupied the positions formerly held by the insurgents, who had incontinently fled.

That night Sofoulis, his cousin, Anastas Sofoulis Hadjidakis, Orologas, the Chief of Gendarmerie, and Hadji Manoli, Chief of Police, escaped in a sailing-boat to Amourgos, a point on the mainland from which they gained Syra and ultimately the Piræus.

As regards the number of persons killed and wounded on both sides, every one seems to hesitate to give a plain statement. In any case, the total was not large; and that given by Vice-Consul Mare in his telegram of the 12th instant is probably as accurate as any, viz., 33 natives, 30 Turkish soldiers, and 100 wounded on both sides.

During the bombardment thirty rebels were seen in a house adjoining the tobacco warehouse of Della Grazie, an Austrian subject of Smyrna. The house was destroyed by the bombardment and the warehouse burnt. The troops in some places got out of hand and pillaged houses and shops.

A person who held the office of Greek Consul was largely responsible for the disturbances. He identified himself with the insurgents and sought the intervention of the Greek Government. It is understood that he will be expelled. Many arrests have been made at Samos and elsewhere in connection with the disturbances; but of course those who are in prison have been the tools of the men who have made good their escape to Greece.

My informant knows nothing about the alleged circulation for signature of a Petition to the Sultan begging his Majesty to resume the direct administration of Samos.

The island is now tranquil, and life has resumed its normal course.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

P.S.—Since writing the above, Mr. Barnham has received a despatch on the same subject from the British Vice-Consul at Samos, dated the 13th instant, in which he speaks of Turkish boats patrolling outside the island; and another from the Vice-Consul at Scala Nuova, dated the 14th instant, which states that two boats containing fugitives had been fired upon and sunk.

H. D. B.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Vice-Consul Mare to Consul-General Barnham.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Samos, June 20, 1908.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 15th instant, asking for a detailed Memorandum on the last troubles of the island, I have the honour to report to you as follows:—

The Constitutional Charter which was granted to the inhabitants of the Island of Samos in 1832 and guaranteed by the Protective Powers describes in the second and third Articles that the internal administration of the isle belongs to the Senators, who manage the administrative affairs under the presidency of the Prince-Governor. In spite of the meaning of the above-mentioned Articles, the explanatory Charter drawn up by the Turkish Government in 1850 states that the Prince has absolute power to appoint and destitute all Government officials except those who are elected by vote.

This contradiction of the two Charters was chiefly the origin of the last conflict between the Prince and M. Sofoulis, Senator and chief of the governmental party.

The Prince-Governor, owing to the way that M. Sofoulis and his colleagues were lately acting, willing to govern the island themselves according to their interests and opposing to all acts of the Prince in favour of the Opposition party, was obliged, not being able to govern the island impartially, to ask for certain reinforcements of the troops here. The rumour also that M. Sofoulis, having the majority of Deputies, intended of sending him away, has strengthened his intentions, and was willing to convoke the General Assembly before the arrival of the troops.

To my opinion, Kopassis Bey wanted to use the Turks in order to replace the local gendarmerie and certain Government officials by persons of the Opposition, and, by so doing, to bring a confusion in the Deputies, and thus the decomposition of the governmental party. This is also proved by the occupation of the telegraph office by the Turkish soldiers.

Sofoulis' people, seeing this unexpected arrival of the troops at a time of the General Assembly, and the telegraph office occupied by the Turks, got very excited, proceeded at once to the Prince's house and forced his Highness to come out to prevent the Turkish soldiers from landing, saying that this act of the Imperial Government was a great infringement of the privileges of the island.

The Prince, as I have been told, was trembling of fear, and acceded at once to their proposal; but before being able to communicate with the chief of the troops, certain native gendarmes, with some persons of the party in power, opened fire at the Turks, and in a few hours the rise was general.

The Turks retired at once to the Prince's house, whilst in the meantime Kopassis Bey was shut in the Senate House, from which place he escaped by the assistance of the chief of the local gendarmerie.

His Highness was then blockaded with about 200 soldiers in his house, as also the Turkish barracks with about 150 men, and 35 soldiers surrounded and taken prisoners. Fire from both sides lasted till the 30th May.

A Consular meeting was held in the morning of the 26th May, but unfortunately without result, as there was no authority here to communicate with. The telegraph communications were also cut down from the first day, on account of the abandonment of the telegraph office by the Director and his own employés as soon as the Turks were turned out from there by the insurgents.

I am glad to say I have done all that I could for the establishment of the tranquillity and for Kopassis Bey personally.

I have succeeded to send him during his blockade, although I had 120 persons in my house and was in need of provisions, 300 okes of bread, a sack of rice, half a sack of olives, a few okes of cheese, and a few okes of sugar and coffee. From what I was told by an employé of the telegraph office who was also in the Prince's house, 200 persons therein were for about forty-eight hours without food. I also understood that the Turks intended at that night to break the nearest shops or houses for the purpose of finding food—an act which would have resulted in bloodshed.

Two general attacks were made on Friday night on the Prince's house from a very short distance, for the purpose of killing, I suppose, his Highness, but fortunately without result.

During these attacks the insurgents were repulsed by the war-ships, which fired continually on them, and by the heavy fire of the Turks. Fortunately the inhabitants were not in town, otherwise there would have been many killed. Before the landing of the troops which arrived at Vathy on the 30th May with Reouf Pasha, Governor-General of Salonica, the war-ships have also bombarded the surrounding mountains and certain houses outside the town.

With the exception of the two houses from which a shot wounded a certain Pasha, and were totally destroyed, the town sustained no very important damages from the said bombardment.

It is very difficult to find out the exact number of persons killed, as there are a lot of persons missing, and do not know if they have left Samos or not.

Till to-day 33 Samians were found killed; about 30 Turks, including 7 prisoners and 3 killed by knife, having, as it is said, attempted to escape; and more than 100 of wounded from both sides.

Detachments of troops guided by native gendarmes are now searching for the insurgents in the different villages, whilst war-ships are cruising round the island to prevent their escape. From what I hear a great many of these persons escaped to Greece by sailing vessels.

As I have already reported to you tranquillity has been re-established, but the state of affairs here is not favourable at all, as all the Government officials have been replaced by persons of the Opposition party, and they are only imprisoning persons of M. Sofoulis. About 200 men have been arrested till to-day, among whom two Senators, a few Deputies, and certain Mayors, on the pretext that they were seen holding rifles or taken part in certain alleged meetings of M. Sofoulis. To my opinion, order will only be re-established by a general amnesty, and this must be strongly recommended to the Imperial Government, as, if they will strictly and impartially investigate into the matter, they will, I am sure, imprison at least one-fifth of the inhabitants of Vathy. If such is not the intention of the Imperial Government and these persons are tried before the Courts here, which are composed of their political rivals, they will undoubtedly be condemned to certain imprisonment and to the loss of their political rights—a question which sooner or later will create grave disturbances and probably lead to bloodshed.

From what I hear, about 1,000 troops are leaving to-morrow for Salonica.

These troops, during the first two nights of their arrival, opened and plundered many houses and shops, and caused great damage to the inhabitants.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GREGORY D. L. MARC.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Despatches communicated by M. Constans to Mr. H. Barclay.

(1.)

M. Blanc to M. Constans.

Smyrne, le 10 *Juin*, 1908.

J'AVAIS demandé à M. Missir de me renseigner exactement sur les causes réelles du conflit qui a éclaté entre le Prince et le Gouvernement Samien et qui a provoqué les désordres qui ont ensanglanté cette île turbulente.

Je viens de recevoir de notre Agent un très long rapport, dont je vais extraire tout ce qui peut être de nature à jeter la lumière sur ces incidents.

Conformément à ce que j'avais supposé et à ce que j'avais indiqué à votre Excellence dès le début, "ces tristes événements," suivant l'expression même de M. Missir, "sont dus uniquement aux agissements du parti au pouvoir, qui avait pour grands chefs les Sieurs Sofoulis et Hadjidakis, Sénateurs, gens ambitieux, méchants, et malhonnêtes, qui faisaient cause commune avec tous les malfaiteurs, les brigands, et les contrebandiers, dont ils se partageaient, dit-on, les larcins."

Notre Agent ajoute que ces deux despotes étaient encouragés dans leurs projets par le Consul de Grèce, Zolounis, homme sans aucune éducation et qui a cru, sans doute, pouvoir se mettre en évidence, par l'ex-Prince Caratheodory, qui ne pouvait se consoler de son rappel, et par la femme et les filles de ce haut fonctionnaire Ottoman, qui continuaient à entretenir une correspondance suivie avec les Sénateurs Samiens.

M. Missir ajoute que ces deux Sénateurs avaient organisé un Comité de gens sans foi ni loi, qui ne faisaient que terroriser le pays par des assassinats, des vols, des larcins, des injustices de toutes sortes. Dans ces derniers temps les sujets étrangers qui avaient eu l'imprudence de se plaindre des exactions des Gouvernants Samiens avaient été l'objet des mesures encore plus vexatoires, et les négociants Français, Italiens, Allemands, Autrichiens restaient livrés sans défense aux injustices et aux spoliations des Gouvernants Samiens, qui, méprisant les ordres que les Ambassades faisaient expédier au Prince par la Sublime Porte, refusaient d'exécuter les décisions prises par le Prince en faveur des étrangers.

Nous savons nous-mêmes, par l'affaire Doupsi, actuellement en suspens, la conduite scandaleuse tenue par les autorités Samiennes et le Consul de Grèce à l'occasion de l'attentat dont notre administré a été victime.

D'après M. Missir, l'ex-Prince Georgiades, homme consciencieux et sage, avait cherché à apporter un peu d'ordre dans les affaires de Samos. Mais voyant que les Sénateurs émettaient la prétention ridicule de lui retirer le droit de nommer ou de destituer le moindre employé, qu'on rendait ainsi son pouvoir et son autorité absolument illusoires, il préféra, vu son grand âge, donner sa démission plutôt que de prendre l'initiative des mesures nécessaires pour le rétablissement de son autorité.

La faiblesse témoignée par le Gouvernement Ottoman lors de l'agression commise il y a quelque temps par les gendarmes Samiens contre la garnison Ottomane, lors des affronts infligés au Prince Vithynos Effendi au moment de son départ, et de l'affront encore plus sanglant infligé au Prince Georgiades Effendi au moment de son arrivée, ont enhardi Sofoulis et sa bande et leur ont fait croire que tout leur était permis.

Quand Kopassis Effendi arriva à Samos il fit au parti au pouvoir les plus grandes avances et crut opportun de procéder avec la plus grande douceur. Cette modération fut prise pour de la faiblesse, et les agissements de la bande n'en devinrent que plus violents :—

"Dans leurs Conseils," dit M. Missir, "présidait toujours et sans cesse l'homme néfaste, le Consul Grec, Zolounis, qui encourageait cette bande à commettre les plus grands forfaits leur promettant l'appui de la Grèce. Vous en avez un exemple dans l'attentat Doupsi, où ce dernier a failli trouver la mort. M. Barré de Lancy vous a mis au courant des agissements du Sénateur Sofoulis, du Consul Zolounis, et de tous les autres fonctionnaires, qui ont également travaillé à altérer la vérité; je ne crains pas de dire et d'assurer que la somme volée chez Doupsi a dû être partagée par ces tristes sires, attendu qu'on ne donne aujourd'hui l'assurance que sur tous les vols, les actes de contrebande qui se commettaient, ils prélevaient la part du lion. Des caboteurs Grecs faisaient chaque semaine des voyages entre le Pirée, Syra, et Samos, et y débarquaient de la contrebande au vu et au su des autorités communes."

Malgré tout, cette tyrannie, dont profitaient seulement les gens de Vathy à la solde de Sofoulis, commençait à peser lourdement sur le pays, et le Prince, Kopassis Effendi, se rendit compte que la population en était excédée. Il comprit alors le parti qu'il pourrait retirer de cette situation, et il entreprit une tournée dans le pays, où il visita tous les villages.

Partout il reçut le meilleur accueil de la population, qui, par l'entremise de ses Maires et de ses Députés, le supplia de mettre un terme aux souffrances que leur faisaient subir les gens de Vathy.

Kopassis Effendi écouta toutes les plaintes avec la plus grande bienveillance et promit de faire le nécessaire, mais connaissant le caractère mobile des Grecs il réclama que cette adhésion des Députés et des Maires lui fût donnée par écrit. C'est ainsi que sur trente-neuf membres dont se compose l'Assemblée Samienne il réussit à recueillir vingt-six signatures, et qu'il eut vingt-huit signatures de Maires et Conseils Municipaux faisant partie des trente-deux municipalités de l'île.

Fort de cet appui de la population, Kopassis Effendi jugea qu'il pouvait entrer en lutte avec Sofoulis et qu'il pouvait rétablir l'autorité du Prince, sans laquelle l'anarchie qui régnait dans l'île depuis deux ans allait achever son œuvre de ruine.

Informé de ce qui venait de se passer, voyant qu'il allait perdre la majorité dans l'Assemblée, et que, d'autre part, le Prince n'avait pas l'intention de jouer entre ses mains le rôle de marionnette, Sofoulis comprit que la partie était perdue pour lui et il voulut jouer sa dernière carte.

Suivant le vieux jeu qui lui avait réussi autrefois, il télégraphia au Sultan pour demander le rappel du Prince et, en même temps, il augmentait la gendarmerie Samienne et faisait venir à Vathy tous les contrebandiers et les repris de justice, qu'il arma de pied en cap.

Cette force rassemblée, il mit le Prince en demeure d'avoir à convoquer immédiatement l'Assemblée à Vathy, menaçant, en cas de refus, de la convoquer lui-même sans son assentiment. C'était la révolte ouvertement déclarée.

Son but était d'amener à Vathy tous les Députés et de les forcer, en les terrorisant par les menaces des gens sans aveu qui étaient à sa solde, de se joindre à lui pour réclamer le rappel du Prince. S'il réussissait dans son plan il consoliderait ainsi son autorité pour plusieurs années.

Mais il avait compté sans son hôte. Kopassis Effendi, comptant sur l'appui que le pays lui avait promis, ne répondit pas à cette injonction et laissa, au contraire, entendre qu'il serait plus disposé à déférer au vœu que lui avait exprimé la population en réunissant l'Assemblée dans une localité autre que Vathy. D'autre part, le Prince, en présence de la mutinerie de la garde Samienne, qui refusait d'exécuter ses ordres, même ceux que la Porte lui envoyait sur la demande des Ambassadeurs, et en présence du refus des Sénateurs d'assurer l'exécution de ses Décrets de destitution et de remplacement concernant les gendarmes révoltés, fit savoir à son Gouvernement qu'il ne se sentait même plus en sécurité dans son Palais, et il demanda le renforcement de la garnison Ottomane, dont il avait besoin pour rétablir son autorité, maintenir l'ordre dans le pays, et assurer la sécurité des étrangers qui y résident.

La Porte lui envoya 200 hommes de la garnison de Smyrne, et votre Excellence sait par mes rapports précédents comment des soldats furent fusillés à leur débarquement par les Grecs de Sofoulis, qui n'attendaient pour ouvrir le feu que le signal que leur donna le Commissaire de Police de la ville en mettant en branle la cloche d'une petite église voisine de la maison de M. Missir. Ce Commissaire de Police, homme de confiance de Sofoulis, était un ancien repris de justice condamné à dix années de prison, qui n'ont jamais été purgées.

Le rapport de M. Missir contient encore de très longs détails sur les avanies qui ont été faites au Prince par Sofoulis et sa bande, sur les brutalités qui ont été exercées sur sa personne, sur son emprisonnement dans la Chambre du Sénat et son évasion périlleuse.

J'ai donné toutes ces informations à votre Excellence dans mes rapports précédents en même temps que celles concernant le danger que M. Missir et sa famille ont couru au commencement des hostilités, puisqu'ils étaient entre le feu des Turcs et celui des Samiens. Je crois donc inutile de revenir sur tous ces incidents.

Il en est un cependant que j'apprends pour la première fois et que je crois devoir signaler à l'attention de votre Excellence.

Le 26 Mai le Consul de Grèce, Zolounis, se rendit chez M. Missir pour le prier de convoquer les autres Agents Consulaires ainsi que le Maire de Vathy à une réunion dans laquelle on examinerait les mesures à prendre pour arrêter le combat des rues.

Cette réunion eut lieu l'après-midi, et M. Missir ainsi que ses autres collègues supplièrent le Consul de Grèce et le Maire de Vathy, qui exerçaient une influence très grande sur les révoltés de les exhorter à cesser les hostilités et à attendre pacifiquement les décisions qui seraient prises au haut lieu sur le conflit existant entre le Prince et le Gouvernement Samien. Quel ne fut pas l'étonnement des Agents Consulaires d'entendre le Consul de Grèce et le Maire de Vathy leur déclarer que c'étaient les soldats Turcs qui devaient les premiers déposer les armes, et que ce ne serait qu'à cette condition que les révoltés cesseraient le feu. En présence d'une prétention aussi inacceptable et d'autant plus étrange s'il était avéré que les soldats Turcs n'avaient tiré que pour se défendre, la réunion fut dissoute sans amener aucun résultat quelconque. Le Consul de Grèce fit courir le soir même le bruit que des navires de guerre Grecs et des volontaires Hellènes allaient arriver pour soutenir la révolution. De son côté, le Maire fit vider de force toutes les boulangeries et expédier hors de Vathy les sacs de farine qui y étaient déposés.

La fin du rapport de M. Missir contient le détail des opérations militaires que j'ai portées à la connaissance de votre Excellence par mes précédents rapports.

Quelques arrestations ont déjà été opérées par les Turcs, mais il est certain aujourd'hui que les principaux fauteurs des troubles ont réussi à se réfugier en Grèce.

Sofoulis, Hadjidakis, le Commissaire de Police de Vathy, le Commandant de la Gendarmerie, ne sont restés à la tête des insurgés que pendant les quelques jours qui ont précédé l'arrivée des troupes Ottomanes de renfort. Après avoir été la cause, par leurs agissements véritablement criminels et leurs ambitions personnelles, de l'obligation que cet état imposait à la Porte de recourir à la force pour rétablir l'autorité de son Gouvernement; après avoir fait ouvrir les prisons de la ville et mettre en liberté les criminels détenus; après avoir fait sacrifier tant de vies humaines, non pour la réalisation des aspirations nationales du peuple Samien, qui ne demandait que le repos, mais pour la satisfaction personnelle de leurs intérêts personnels et de parti, Sofoulis et consorts se sont bien gardés d'organiser la défense de leur pays et de rester au milieu des insurgés qui avaient répondu à leur appel.

Ceux-ci, ou du moins quelques-uns d'entre eux, ont déjà été arrêtés et sont sous verrous; mais Sofoulis, Hadjidakis, et les autres chefs ont mis la mer entre eux et les colonnes Turques, dès que celles-ci ont débarqué.

Quand on les a interrogés à leur arrivée à Syra et qu'on leur a demandé les raisons de cette désertion et de leur abandon de leurs compagnons, ils ont, paraît-il, répondu avec une assurance imperturbable qu' "ils avaient considéré comme un devoir d'aller porter aux Représentants à Athènes des Puissances Protectrices la protestation du peuple Samien contre la violation de ses privilèges."

Une lettre, il me semble, aurait suffi pour transmettre cette protestation, qui, d'ailleurs, n'a jamais été faite par la population Samienne; et j'avoue d'un côté, que j'ai été un peu surpris de cette fuite rapide des agitateurs Samiens, parce que j'avais été autrement habitué jadis par les chefs Crétois, qui savaient combattre à la tête des gens qu'ils appelaient aux armes, et qui se faisaient parfois tuer à côté de leurs compagnons.

A Samos on est plus opportuniste, et on se réserve pour l'avenir.

(Signé) PAUL BLANC.

(2.)

M. Blanc to M. Constans.

Smyrne, le 10 Juin, 1908.

La presse d'Athènes a fait tellement de bruit autour du bombardement de la ville de Vathy, que je crois devoir communiquer à votre Excellence les informations spéciales que j'ai recueillies à ce sujet dans les rapports de M. Missir.

Je dirai tout d'abord que, d'après l'aveu même de notre Agent, les résultats en ont été "insignifiants," et l'on ne parle jusqu'à présent que de la destruction d'un café et d'un magasin de tabac situé à proximité de ce café.

Le bombardement a été effectué à trois reprises différentes et a toujours été provoqué par des actes d'hostilité des révoltés Samiens.

Les premiers obus furent tirés le 29 Mai à 10 heures 20 du soir sur les hauteurs avoisinant la ville, à la suite de coups de fusil tirés sur le croiseur "Hamidié." A onze heures le feu cessa.

Il fut repris à minuit et dura trois heures à la suite d'une attaque dirigée contre le Palais du Prince, dans lequel les révoltés cherchaient à jeter des bombes de dynamite.

Le lendemain, 30 Mai, eut lieu le troisième bombardement qui dura deux heures. Il commença au moment du débarquement des troupes et alors que les derniers révoltés tiraient sur les navires en rade et venaient de blesser le Général Ismaïl Mahir Pacha. C'est alors que furent détruits le café et le magasin d'où étaient partis des coups de fusil. Quand les hauteurs eurent été ainsi dégagées par le feu des croiseurs, les troupes escaladèrent la montagne et, après avoir couronné les crêtes, se rabattirent sur la ville.

Voilà en quoi a consisté le bombardement de Vathy.

(Signé) PAUL BLANC.

(3.)

M. Blanc to M. Constans.

Smyrne, le 10 Juin, 1908.

M. Missir vient de me communiquer un numéro du "Journal Officiel" de la Principauté de Samos contenant différentes Proclamations du Prince et du Haut Commissaire Impérial, Réouf Pacha.

Dans une de leurs Proclamations chacun de ces deux hauts fonctionnaires proclame l'intention formelle du Gouvernement Impérial de respecter les privilèges accordés à l'île par les Firmans antérieurs.

Il est certain que ce n'est pas la Constitution Samienne qui est mauvaise et qui est cause de l'état d'anarchie dans lequel cette malheureuse île se trouve plongée depuis plusieurs années. Ce qui a provoqué cette situation devenue réellement intolérable, c'est l'interprétation vicieuse donnée aux stipulations de cette Charte et la mauvaise application qui a été faite de ses dispositions.

Il faudra une certaine habileté et une grande prudence aux autorités Ottomanes pour remettre les choses au point et pour faire fonctionner la machine administrative Samienne de façon à rétablir l'autorité du Prince, sans porter atteinte aux privilèges contenus dans la Charte Samienne.

C'est affaire de doigté, et il est à espérer, dans l'intérêt même des étrangers établis dans l'île, que les autorités Ottomanes sauront en montrer et ne négligeront pas cette occasion unique qui s'offre à elles de rétablir dans cette Principauté toujours agitée un état de choses régulier qui ait quelque chance de durée.

(Signé) PAUL BLANC.

(4.)

M. Blanc to M. Constans.

Smyrne, le 10 Juin, 1908.

Je dois porter à votre connaissance un épisode des troubles de Samos qui n'est pas à la louange de la population Chrétienne de la ville de Vathy. Il a causé une grosse émotion à Smyrne; d'où les victimes étaient originaires, et les Musulmans ont été tellement surexcités que je n'ai pas été, à un moment donné, sans appréhender des représailles.

Voici les faits. Au moment du débarquement une quarantaine de soldats Turcs furent surpris par la fusillade qui faisaient rage de tous côtés avant qu'on leur eût fait une distribution des cartouches qui se trouvaient encore à bord du transport qui les avait amenés. Ne pouvant riposter aux coups qu'ils recevaient de tous côtés et ne pouvant rester sur les quais, devenus intenables, ils s'engagèrent sous la conduite d'un sergent dans une ruelle et cherchèrent refuge dans un enclos voisin. Quelque temps après arrivèrent des gendarmes Samiens qui leur racontèrent que leur officier venait d'être blessé et que, jugeant toute résistance impossible, il leur faisait donner l'ordre de déposer les armes. Le sergent, ne connaissant pas la ville et voyant que ses hommes aussi bien que lui n'avaient pas une seule cartouche pour essayer de se frayer un chemin, eut le tort d'ajouter foi à ces propos et il se rendit.

Le détachement, après avoir remis ses armes, fut conduit dans le local du Tribunal et y fut enfermé. La nuit, des révoltés encore inconnus vinrent chercher les soldats et, après les avoir garrottés, les conduisirent dans un endroit désert, où ils en égorgèrent au moins une quinzaine—plusieurs eurent le nez et les oreilles coupés, d'autres les yeux crevés. Vingt-trois soldats parvinrent cependant à briser leurs liens et à s'échapper. Quelques uns finirent par découvrir la caserne, d'autres trouvèrent refuge dans des maisons particulières. M. Missir ajoute que l'on prétend que l'un de ces soldats a été mutilé par un prêtre Grec.

La barbarie et la sauvagerie ne sont donc pas toujours le propre des Turcs, et je souhaite, pour l'honneur du peuple Chrétien de Samos, que l'on puisse établir que cet acte lâche et féroce a été commis par quelques-uns de ces malfaiteurs auxquels Soloulis et sa bande venaient de donner l'essor en ouvrant les portes de la prison.

(Signé) PAUL BLANC.

(5.)

M. Blanc to M. Constans.

Smyrne, le 10 Juin, 1908.

J'avais déjà lu dans les journaux Grecs la nouvelle donnée avec tant de bruit au sujet du remplacement du drapeau Samien par le drapeau Ottoman, lorsque m'est arrivé le télégramme de l'Ambassade m'invitant à tirer au clair cet incident.

Cette information était publiée avec une telle assurance que je la croyais fondée et, sans aller aussi loin que les journalistes Grecs qui prétendaient y trouver la preuve de la volonté bien arrêtée du Gouvernement Impérial de fouler au pied les privilèges Samiens, je m'étais expliqué le fait par la présence à Vathy du Haut Commissaire, Réouf Pacha, qui avait bien pu arborer son pavillon sur la maison qui l'abritait.

Toutes ces suppositions étaient aussi dénuées de fondement que la nouvelle elle-même. M. Missir, invité par moi à me renseigner sur cet incident, m'a télégraphié: "Pour pavillon, absolument faux; privilèges intacts." C'était plus que je ne lui en demandais, et j'ai donc pu rassurer de suite votre Excellence sur l'émotion causée par ce fait divers mensonger et tendancieux.

Notre Agent m'informe que des perquisitions ont été opérées dans certaines maisons et que des armes et des matières explosibles y ont été découvertes et saisies.

Les troupes ont établi leurs campements sur les hauteurs qui dominent la ville.

Dimanche prochain auront lieu les élections pour le remplacement des Députés en fuite ou démissionnaires. Un certain nombre de fonctionnaires faisant partie de la bande de Sofoulis ont été révoqués et immédiatement remplacés.

Le calme est complet dans l'île tout entière.

(Signé) PAUL BLANC.

(6.)

M. Blanc to M. Constans.

Smyrne, le 13 Juin, 1908.

Une lettre de M. Missir confirme le démenti formel donné à la nouvelle tendancieuse du remplacement du pavillon Samien par le pavillon Ottoman sur le Palais Princier. Notre Agent ajoute, en ce qui concerne les nouvelles publiées par les journaux d'Athènes, qu'on y lit des mensonges monstrueux auxquels aucune foi ne doit être prêtée.

Le Prince et les autorités militaires continuent à prendre des mesures sévères: personne ne peut quitter l'île ou y rentrer sans un sauf-conduit; aucun voilier ne peut prendre la mer sans autorisation; des perquisitions ont été faites dans certaines maisons suspectes et elles ont amené la saisie d'armes et de matières explosives.

Les troupes Ottomanes campent actuellement sur les hauteurs; des patrouilles mixtes de soldats et de gendarmes Samiens, recrutés en hâte, circulent la nuit dans les rues. Bon nombre de fonctionnaires appartenant à la bande de Soufoulis ont été destitués et remplacés. Dimanche prochain auront lieu des élections pour remplacer des Députés en fuite ou démissionnaires.

La présence des troupes Ottomanes a exercé, sans aucun doute, une action sédative sur les dispositions des gens de Vathy, qui se montrent actuellement fort calmes, mais qui appréhendent la prolongation indéfinie de cette occupation militaire.

Le Consul de Grèce et son fameux cuvos, qui a joué un rôle si odieux dans l'attentat contre notre protégé, Doupsi, n'ont plus reparu au Consulat de France depuis le 30 Mai. On prétend que le Prince lui a signifié qu'il n'entendait plus avoir la moindre relation avec lui.

Il est impossible de pouvoir fixer le chiffre des victimes faites au cours des derniers événements et M. Missir croit, en raison des faux bruits mis à chaque instant en circulation et démentis par les faits, qu'il sera difficile d'être jamais complètement édifié à ce sujet.

Le Prince a témoigné quelque ennui à M. Missir des informations qu'il n'avait données au sujet du pillage de plusieurs magasins. Notre Agent lui a répondu que son devoir était de me renseigner avec toute l'impartialité désirable. Cet ébruitement, d'ailleurs, a eu son bon côté, car des ordres sévères ont été donnés de Constantinople aux autorités militaires pour leur enjoindre d'arrêter ces pillages, qui, depuis lors, ont pris fin.

Une colonne de 500 hommes a été embarquée pour une destination inconnue, mais

que l'on croit être Maratheccampo. Son but serait, suppose-t-on, de poursuivre plusieurs individus ayant joué un rôle actif dans les derniers troubles et qui y seraient réfugiés.

Le Prince et Réouf Pacha se sont transportés à Carlovassi, ville principale de l'île, où de grandes manifestations de loyalisme envers le Sultan ont été faites par la population. Des prières publiques ont été dites pour le Souverain, que l'on a remercié d'avoir délivré le pays de la tyrannie de Sofoulis et consorts.

A Vathy même des manifestations semblables ont eu lieu Dimanche dernier et la population a acclamé le Sultan, les Pachas, et le Prince.

M. Missir ne me dit rien au sujet de la sincérité de ces manifestations. Je croirais volontiers à celle des manifestations de Carlovassi, qui a toujours été le centre de l'opposition faite au parti Sofoulis; mais en ce qui concerne les manifestations de Vathy, je serais porté à croire que la présence des troupes a beaucoup contribué à l'éclosion de cet enthousiasme populaire.

En tout cas, comme on le fait observer très judicieusement M. Missir, le Gouvernement doit s'être rendu compte maintenant que l'île de Samos n'a jamais été en état de révolution ou d'insurrection, comme on a pu le supposer à la suite des nouvelles publiées à Athènes, et qu'il ne s'est agi que d'une simple rébellion d'une poignée de gens détenant le pouvoir et voulant s'y maintenir par la terreur.

M. Missir achève son rapport en m'indiquant les réformes qu'il jugerait nécessaires d'introduire dans le régime administratif du pays si l'on veut empêcher le retour de troubles semblables à ceux qui viennent d'ensanglanter l'île et si l'on tient à assurer dans l'avenir le maintien de la tranquillité publique.

N'ayant pas reçu mandat de votre Excellence d'étudier cette question, je me borne à copier textuellement les propositions de M. Missir, en m'abstenant de tout commentaire à leur égard et en faisant même les réserves expresses sur l'utilité ou la possibilité de certaines d'entre elles.

Elles sont ainsi énumérées :—

1. Désarmement de la population.
2. Nomination des Sénateurs par le Prince.
3. Recrutement de la gendarmerie parmi les indigènes : mais Commandant, officiers, et cadres devront être étrangers à l'île, sujets Ottomans, de religion Grecque.

1. Procureur-Général et Procureur de la Cour d'Assises devront également être étrangers à l'île, sujets Ottomans, de religion Grecque.

5. Nomination des Maires par le Prince.

6. Pouvoirs de l'Assemblée limités à la discussion du Budget.

7. Modification du système électoral, en adoptant de nouveau le suffrage restreint avec vote plural.

8. Allemagne des dommes et suppression de toutes les commissions de port et autres, à englober dans les services publics de la Principauté.

9. Respect des Traités et Capitulations.

(Signé) PAUL BLANC.

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

Statement communicated by the Ottoman Government to the Three Embassies at Constantinople.

GRACE aux mesures prises, l'ordre et la tranquillité ayant été complètement rétablis à Samos, les quelques habitants qui par suite des événements avaient quitté l'île ont commencé à regagner leurs foyers. Ils rencontrent auprès du Prince toute la protection et l'assistance voulues.

On procède actuellement, en conformité des prescriptions des Firmans Impériaux, à la réorganisation de toutes les branches de l'Administration sur des bases qui assurent à l'avenir la régularité des services publics.

Comme d'après les dispositions des Firmans Impériaux les membres du Sénat et de l'Assemblée Générale doivent être choisis parmi des personnes honorablement connues, Nicolas Frangli, condamné précédemment à six ans de travaux forcés pour avoir eu des relations illicites avec sa mère, ainsi que deux autres membres de l'Assemblée qui ont participé, avec Frangli, aux derniers événements, ont été déchus de leurs mandats. Il a été procédé, conformément aux prescriptions des statuts de l'île, à l'élection de leurs successeurs et de ceux des sept membres de l'Assemblée Générale qui ont donné leur démission.

Les opérations se sont passées dans toutes les circonscriptions avec l'ordre le plus parfait. Ce sont les Sieurs Manolaki, Nicholaidi, et Yordanidi, qui ont été élus à Vathy. Les électeurs, après avoir voté en toute liberté, se sont rendus au Conak Gouvernemental pour exprimer leur satisfaction et leurs remerciments.

Des poursuites judiciaires seront exercées contre Sofoulis, Haljidakis, et leurs deux collègues du Sénat, qui avaient commandé en personne le feu dirigé sur les soldats et cherché à soulever la population.

L'Assemblée Générale est convoquée pour demain.

Le Tribunal qui procédera au jugement des fauteurs des troubles a été institué et les sentences qu'il prononcera seront mises à exécution dans les formes prescrites par la loi.

Les gendarmes nouvellement recrutés accompagnent les détachements militaires chargés d'arrêter les agitateurs et d'obtenir la restitution des armes appartenant à l'Etat. Tout se passe avec calme sans qu'aucune violence soit commise.

Les habitants désignent eux-mêmes les endroits où se cachent les meneurs, ce qui démontre que l'action des fauteurs des désordres est réprouvée par la population.

Le soin avec lequel les troupes Impériales maintiennent l'ordre et la tranquillité réconforte les habitants, qui ne cessent de manifester leur satisfaction et leur reconnaissance.

Une partie de l'escadre a quitté l'île et les troupes ne tarderont pas à être graduellement retirées.

Le 16 Juin, 1908.

[21354] No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 265.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 6, 1908.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 328 of the 12th ultimo, inclosing two despatches from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Diabekir reporting on the oppression of Christians by the Kurds in that vilayet.

I have to request, if you see no objection to such a course, and if you have not already adopted it, that you will draw the attention of the Grand Vizier to the action of Minas Effendi Hamalopoulo, and urge that in future petitions addressed to the Acting Vali shall not be intercepted by the Muavin.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[21783] No. 9.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 8, 1908.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd ultimo, inclosing papers relative to a proposal to abolish the Government coal depôt at Bushire and to create one at Koweit.

I am to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn the views of the Government of India on this proposal in due course; but I am to add that it does not appear to Sir E. Grey to be necessary to request an expression of those views by telegraph.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[23654] No. 10.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of correspondence

received from the Government of India relative to the protection of Bahreinese and dependants of the Trucial Chiefs in Persia.

It is requested that these inclosures, which are sent in original, may be returned to this Office as soon as done with.

India Office, July 8, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, March 8, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copies of communications addressed by me to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, on the subject of our right to protect dependants of the Trucial Sheikhs while in Persian territory.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Major Cox to Mr. Marling.

Shiraz, October 9, 1907.

IN continuation of the telegraphic correspondence ending with my telegram dated to-day, I have the honour to attach, for your information, a précis of voluminous Memoranda received from my First Assistant in connection with the present troubles at Lingah.

I merely send it for your information, as by the time the communication reaches Tehran action will probably have been taken on the telegraphic correspondence.

I have the honour to draw attention to the fact that M. Waffelaert, Director-General of Customs, Bushire, in the course of correspondence with my Assistant, wrote that, "by virtue of Tehran Circular of the 4th February, 1905," he declined to accept British intervention in two cases concerning subjects of the Sheikhs of Abu Thabi and Shargah.

Both these Chiefs are under British protection, and I request the favour of your indicating the fact to the Persian Government, and calling upon them to issue the necessary instructions to M. Waffelaert advising us that they have done so.

Although he quotes the number of the circular under which he acts, he has expressed his inability to furnish a copy. It may be possible for this to be done at Tehran.

Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

Memorandum respecting Disturbances at Lingah.

THE Ali-es-Sultan, a Bakwardi of Fars, who is understood to have been last employed at Enzeli, took up the post of Director or Mudir of Customs at Lingah on the 1st July, 1907.

In a Report, dated the 5th September, the Residency Agent, Lingah, forwarded copies of correspondence with the Agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company, who complained that the Director had refused to take cognizance of a requisition written to him on the Company's business in accordance with previous custom in English, and had sent for him and abused him as an unpatriotic Persian and bad Mussulman for using the English language. On the Residency Agent intervening in the British India agent's behalf, the Director refused to accept his mediation, and denied his right to intervene in his favour. In the same Report it was stated that the Director had assembled the Persian merchants and tried to get them to form a standing Medjliss for the trial of cases and discussion of matters of public importance.

During August he treated with harshness two dhows belonging to subjects of Trucial Arab Chiefs under British protection, namely, Abu Thabi and Shargah. One of them he is believed to have arrested on the high seas and towed into Lingah, where he took all the cargo out of her, notwithstanding that a correct jowaz was

found with the owner of the cargo in Lingah. On the Director-General of Customs, Bushire, being asked to state the correct facts, as the action of the Customs was apparently unjustifiable, he expressed his inability to accept any official intervention in regard to "subjects of the Oman Coast" [*sic*].

In a Report dated the 12th September it was reported that, contrary to usage, the Director had insisted on examining the baggage of a party of pilgrims. On being remonstrated with by the Mullahs he treated them with contumely, and in consequence the inhabitants closed the bazaars in protest. Subsequently a disturbance occurred, in which the Director was mobbed and beaten.

In a communication dated the 11th September it was reported that the Director, having fallen out with the Shia Mullahs, held a meeting of Sunni merchants, with whom were the Sadeed-es-Sultaneh, Russian Agent and a notorious rascal; the French Consular Agent, a Persian of shady character; and the *soi-disant* Turkish Consular Agent, of whom I have several times complained.

In the case of the British Indian steam-ship "Nuddea" the Agent asked for special permission to work on Fridays and holidays, allowable under Article 113 of the "Règlement," and always freely accorded hitherto. No notice was taken of the Agent's note, but eventually verbal permission was given through the hamel-bashi. In the case of the "Madura," the following week, the same delay in the accord of permission occurred, and the ship lost a day thereby. In the first case the Director, after ignoring the Agent's civil written request, discourteously sent a "tufangchi" to fetch him, taunted him with being in the employ of a British firm, and made disrespectful remarks about the English language and the use of it.

On the 16th a telegram was received *viâ* Henjam from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, saying that the Director had closed customs, and the forwarding and handling of British merchandize was suspended at inconvenience and loss to the owners.

On the 17th September another telegram was received, saying that the Director had held another meeting of the Sunnis and persons above referred to, and told them that he had been beaten because he had joined them, and that as he had closed the customs they (the Sunni) must stop trading and support him.

At this and another similar Medjliss the Director made several other foolish speeches, in which he pronounced, among other things—

1. That British certificates of naturalization are useless, and should be given up.
2. That the British Government has no right to protect Omanis, as Oman belongs to Persians.

On the 8th October the mail brought news that the entire Customs' staff had resigned, and the Director of Customs dare not leave his house.

September , 1907.

Inclosure 4 in No. 10.

Major Cox to Mr. Marling.

Bushire, March 8, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the third paragraph of my despatch dated the 9th October, 1907, in which I drew your attention to the fact that the local Customs authorities refuse to accept our intervention on behalf of the subjects of the Sheikhs of "Trucial Oman."

Recent events have brought our protectorate over these Sheikhs into some prominence, and I hope it may be considered that we are now in a more favourable position for obtaining a formal recognition of it from the Persian Government.

Inclosure 5 in No. 10.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, May* 18, 1908.

MR. MARLING telegraphs, dated the 17th May:—

"Following from Foreign Office, telegram No. 100:—

"'Protection of Bahreinis. Persian Government should be pressed by you to send amended note without delay, but we are reluctant to raise general question for

the present unless the note contains any expression which can be construed as disputing our rights and unless further cases arise.

"' Protection of subjects of Trucial Chiefs: Assurances given to His Majesty's Consul-General by Governor of Bushire appear sufficient if carried out to meet needs of case in question.' "

Inclosure 6 in No. 10.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, May* 18, 1908.

FOLLOWING sent to Tehran:—

" Please see your telegram No. 78.

" Governor has given no assurances in regard to actual case of Bahreini, but has several times told Resident that he has instructions from the Persian Government to treat Bahrein as Persian territory, *vide* Resident's telegram of the 1st May. Deputy Governor of Lingah, who arrived here three days ago, has been suspended in connection with this and other cases. One of the Lingah factions, aided by Brown, the Lingah agent of German firm, and by Russian Consular Agent, is trying to get him reinstated. I am endeavouring to get Governor to recover compensation for Bahreini from him, none having been paid as yet. In view of attitude of Persian Government, I fear that we shall not be able locally to obtain adequate redress.

" It is instructive to note that, while the Financial Department of the Persian Government considers Bahrein a foreign port and levies customs duties against it, the Foreign Department treat it as Persian territory."

Inclosure 7 in No. 10.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Sir, *Bushire, May* 5, 1908.

WITH reference to my covering letter dated the 8th March, 1908, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of Mr. Marling's reply to my letter of the same date on the subject of our right to protect subjects of the Trucial Chiefs when in Persian territory.

I have, &c.

(For Political Resident in the Persian Gulf),

(Signed) A. P. TREVOR, *Major.*

Note.—The draft of this letter was approved by Major Cox before he proceeded on tour.

Inclosure 8 in No. 10.

Mr. Marling to Major Cox.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Tehran, April* 3, 1908.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 8th March respecting British intervention on behalf of the Sheikhs of Trucial Oman. Our right to insist on the Persian Government accepting such intervention is unassailable in view of our published Treaties of 1892. It seems likely that His Majesty's Government will now insist on final recognition by the Persian Government of our rights respecting Bahrein and Bahreinis also. I am inclined to think that these matters will best be dealt with simultaneously.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

[22073]

No. 11.

Memorandum communicated to the German Ambassador.

HIS Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the situation which has arisen in connection with the export of red oxide from the Island of Abu Musa, and which formed the subject of a communication made by the German Chargé d'Affaires on the 31st December, 1907.

The subject is so intricate in nature that it proved necessary to transmit all the documents forwarded by the German Embassy to the Government of India and to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. This officer lost no time in instituting the requisite inquiries, but, owing to the absence of telegraphic communication with Shargah, and the necessity of subjecting the several documents bearing on the case to detailed examination, it has not been found possible to reply to the communication in question at an earlier date.

The result of this examination tends clearly to establish that the statements of fact upon which the complaint of Messrs. Wönckhaus is based are inaccurate.

For convenience of exposition the substance of each particular count of this complaint is set forth under a separate heading and printed in italics: the observations of His Majesty's Government are subjoined in ordinary type.

Copies of the documents referred to are annexed in the Appendix.

1. *The mines on Abu Musa are owned by Salim-bin-Sultan, the uncle of the ruling Sheikh of Shargah. They were leased by Salim in* 1898 *to a Company for a fixed yearly rent.*

The Island of Abu-Musa, with the mining and all other rights, is, and can be proved to be, the property of the ruling Sheikh of Shargah, Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khaled. This is established by a letter dated the 21st February, 1908, in which Salim-bin-Sultan categorically disclaims all right of ownership, and declares that, in granting the lease of 1898, he merely acted as proxy for the ruling Sheikh, then absent on a pilgrimage to Mecca (see Appendix, No. 1). The two men were at one time at enmity, Salim having been the ruling Sheikh till April 1883, when he was deposed by his nephew, Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khaled, who has ever since been the ruling Sheikh. Relations between them now depend on an Agreement concluded in 1889 (see Appendix, No. 2). The ruling Sheikh has, ever since his uncle was deposed in April 1883, made the latter an allowance, in which, solely in virtue of oral and personal arrangements, the revenue of the island, together with that of the mines, has been included (see Appendix, No 5).

When Salim has resided on the island, he has done so only on sufferance, a circumstance which is corroborated by two letters addressed in 1884 by the ruling Sheikh to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf (see Appendix, Nos. 3 and 4).

The Island of Abu Musa is shown by its history, as recorded in the accompanying Memorandum (see Appendix, No. 6), to be an integral part of the dominions of the Sheikh of Shargah, who in recent years has regularly sent his own live stock there for purposes of grazing.

It thus appears that Salim did not conclude the lease of 1898 in the capacity of owner, but in that of Regent, a contention which is further supported by a letter, dated the 11th October, 1902, from the ruling Sheikh to the British Resident (see Appendix, No. 7).

2. *The lease of the Company appears to be legally constituted; this was recognized by the ruling Sheikh of Shargah, since he himself was, for a time, a partner in the Company.*

The use of the word "lease" rather obscures the true nature of the rights granted to the partners by the document of 1898 (see Appendix, No. 9). The document was not an absolute grant to the partners of the right to mine oxide on the island for an undetermined period. It was a mere permit to the partners terminable on either side at any time.

That the partners were entitled to terminate the Concession is shown by the words, "for such a period as they may wish to hold them," but the only effect of these words is to give the partners the right to surrender the mines and escape from the liability to pay 250 dollars a-year when they please. They do not imply that the right to terminate the contract is with the partners alone, and that the owner is

bound for ever, and can under no circumstances escape from the contract, however valuable the mines may become.

That the lessor retained the right to determine contracts of this character is shown by the penultimate paragraph of the document: "I have perhaps made out certain Agreements previous to this. They do not hold good, and this Agreement is to be acted on."

In these circumstances the lease appears to have been no more than a permit to work these mines, determinable by notice on either side, the owners receiving 250 dollars a-year so long as it was in force.

The action of the ruling Sheikh in becoming a partner in the concern for a few months in 1899 cannot affect his right to cancel the lease granted in his behalf, no matter what complexion the Company might in future assume. Were there any question at issue as to the genuineness of the lease granted in 1898 by Sálim, the fact that the Sheikh had subsequently become a partner would be of importance, but as he approved the lease no such question arises, and his temporary partnership is an incident having no direct bearing upon the points at issue.

3. In October 1907 Hassan-bin-Ali Samaiyeh, one of the original lessors, sold his share in the Company to the British subject Thomas Brown, of Lingah, who, a few days later, transferred the share to the German firm R. Wönckhaus and Co., of Lingah. The Company of lessors now apparently consists of three British subjects and the German firm R. Wönckhaus and Co. . . . . It appears that an absolutely legitimate commercial business is concerned.

In a letter dated the 21st February, 1907 (see Appendix, No. 8), the ruling Sheikh of Shargah addressed a communication to Hassan Samaiyeh withdrawing the document of Concession and informing him that, the contract of 1898 being terminated, he had no longer any right of enjoyment in regard to the mines on Abu Musa. In these circumstances, Messrs. Wönckhaus, if they purchased without notice of the fact that the Concession had been terminated, have been misled either by Hassan Samaiyeh or by the intermediate vendor, Mr. Brown; in either case, their appropriate remedy would appear to be an action at law against the vendor for damages.

If, when they purchased the share in the Concession, they were already aware that it had come to an end, they have no cause for complaint at the action of the Sheikh either in terminating the Concession or in enforcing his action by the removal of the workmen from the island, for they bought with full knowledge of the position. In either event, Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. do not appear to have any *locus standi* in their capacity as partners to question the Sheikh's action.

4. In October 1907 the Sheikh sent armed men to the island, who expelled the miners and prevented the mines being worked. The boats with the Sheikh's armed men were towed to Abu Musa by the British man-of-war "Lapwing," on board of which is said to have been Lieutenant Gabriel, British Vice-Consul at Bunder Abbas.

The Sheikh had recourse to forcible measures within his own jurisdiction in consequence of the persistent refusal of Hassan Samaiyeh to desist, in accordance with the Sheikh's repeated injunctions, from working the mines.

As the expulsion of British subjects was in contemplation, and the British Resident in the Persian Gulf had been duly notified of the Sheikh's intention, it was considered prudent that one of His Majesty's ships, with a British Consular officer on board, should accompany the armed force to the island, in order to prevent the use of unnecessary violence. It was probably owing to this precaution that all bloodshed and loss of life were prevented. The Sheikh's boats were towed to the island in order to insure their simultaneous arrival with His Majesty's ship "Lapwing," and to enable the British officers to control the action of the Sheikh's retainers more effectively.

5. By the forcible measures and illegal conduct of the Sheikh of Shargah the Company have been prevented from enjoying the lease granted to them by the proprietor of the mines.

The rights of the Sheikh of Shargah in regard to the disposal of his own property are absolute, since, apart from such general control as, in virtue of Treaty relations, is exercised by the Government of India, he is subject to no external control, and is bound only by such laws as he himself may decree.

In the case of the particular lease or permit in question, it has already been shown that the Sheikh was entitled to determine it at his discretion. In no sense of the word does the conduct of the Sheikh appear to have been illegal.

6. The Company is thereby suffering losses, since they have entered into contracts to deliver fixed quantities of iron oxide at a fixed price. In particular, the managing partner has entered into a contract dated the 1st June, 1906, with the German merchant Herr Robert Wönckhaus, of Lingah (partner in the above-mentioned firm R. Wönckhaus and Co.), to deliver certain fixed quantities for four years.

There is nothing in the documents in the possession of His Majesty's Government to indicate that Hassan Samaiyeh occupied the post of managing partner, and for reasons which will appear more fully below there seems every reason to believe that Hassan Samaiyeh had no right as against his partners to enter into any such contract without their knowledge, and that, had they been aware of its terms, they would have refused their consent. It is clear that when the document was disclosed and the terms of the contract became known to the other partners they declined to approve it.

The abrogation of the lease or permit has certainly rendered it impossible for either the Company in whose name Hassan contracted, or for Hassan himself, to carry out the contract. His Majesty's Government are not fully aware of the relations between Hassan and the firm of R. Wönckhaus and Co., but they recognize that it is possible that Hassan's action in making a contract which he was unable to fulfil may have rendered him liable to Messrs. Wönckhaus in substantial damages. This, however, is a matter between Messrs. Wönckhaus and Hassan.

7. The information in the possession of the German Government leads them to certain conclusions in regard to the motives of the Sheikh of Shargah.

These motives may conveniently be discussed under two headings, (*a*) the objections of Esáin-Abdul Latíf, one of the partners in the Company formed to work the Concession granted in 1898, and (*b*) the objections of the Sheikh himself, to the terms of a certain contract entered into by the aforesaid Hassan Samaiyeh with Herr Robert Wönckhaus on the 1st June, 1906.

By this contract (see Appendix, No. 10) Hassan Samaiyeh, who is described as "owner and holder of Bu Musa Concession," gives "the entire monopoly of Bu Musa oxide to Robert Wönckhaus during the terms of the contract" (saving certain small amounts duly specified), and, on the expiry of the contract, reserves to Robert Wönckhaus the preferential right of renewal.

With regard to point (*a*), the German Government states:—

It does not appear to be the case that the contract was concluded without the agreement of Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, as the managing partner, Hassan Samaiyeh, immediately on the conclusion of the contract informed Esa's father, Abdul Latif, who represented his son in all matters pertaining to the Company, and Abdul Latif approved the contract in his reply. According to a later letter of the father, the son appears to recognize the contract as legally valid, although he would have liked to have seen it before its conclusion, as he describes its observation simply as "preferable," and in a subsequent letter the father says definitely that he had originally approved the contract on behalf of his son.

The documents referred to in the foregoing statement form Inclosures 6, 8, and 10 in the note from the German Embassy, but the translations of these documents in the possession of His Majesty's Government (see Appendices, Nos. 12, 16, and 17) differ materially from those forwarded by the German Embassy, and further letters of considerable importance are omitted from the German case.

The 1st June, 1906, was the date of execution of the deed of contract between Hassan Samaiyeh and Mr. Robert Wönckhaus. When, on the 11th June, 1906 (see Appendix, No. 11), Hassan Samaiyeh reported the Agreement to Esa's father, Abdul Latif, he concealed the existence of what was virtually a monopoly and of the preferential right of renewal. In his reply, dated the 14th June (see Appendix, No. 12), Abdul Latif comments upon the transaction in guarded language, and expressly requests Hassan Samaiyeh to "refrain from entering upon any arrangements whatever in the nature of leases or deeds of contract, from which there will arise difficulties and quarrels."

On the 26th June, 1906, Mr. T. Malcolm, a British-protected subject, with whom

the concessionaires had engagements, requested Hassan Samaiyeh to furnish him with a copy of the Agreement, inquiring whether other European firms could enter into similar contracts. Both points were evaded by Hassan Samaiyeh in his reply of the 13th July (see Appendix, No. 13), in which he alleged that the original contract had been drawn up in German; and in a further letter of the 14th October (see Appendix, No. 14) to Mr. Malcolm he refused to send a copy of the Agreement, and said that secrecy of the transaction had been enjoined by Herr Robert Wönckhaus. It was not until the 16th December, 1906 (see Appendix, No. 15), that he sent a copy of it to Abdul Latif, who, on receipt of the document, wrote on the 23rd January, 1907 (see Appendix, No. 16), to Hassan Samaiyeh stating that his son Esa did not agree to the execution of such an Agreement, which had been concluded without any consultation among the partners, such as should undoubtedly have taken place. The phrase which, in Inclosure 8 of the German case, is translated "the cessation of this contract would be preferable to its continuance" is more accurately rendered by "the nullification of this contract is better than its acceptance." This employment of the comparative is, in Arabic epistolary form, a customary euphemistic manner of expressing a definite resolution. In the present case this interpretation is confirmed by the whole tenor of the letter in question. It does not appear, as contended in the German case, that Abdul Latif definitely says in his letter of the 27th March, 1907 (see Appendix, No. 17), that he had originally approved the contract on behalf of his son Esa.

It is clear that the main ground of Esa-bin-Abdul Latif's objection to the contract was that Hassan Samaiyeh, improperly describing himself in inaccurate terms as "owner and holder of Bu Musa Concession," had, without consulting his partners, formed a contract with Herr Wönckhaus which tied the hands of the Company, not improbably for an indefinite period, in regard to practically the whole amount of red oxide excavated at the island, and bound them to sell it at a fixed price, so that they would derive no advantage from any increase in the price of oxide. It is obvious that a contract of such far-reaching import should, before being concluded, have been submitted to all the parties interested. Esa-bin-Abdul Latif has expressly denied that he gave any power of attorney to Hassan Samaiyeh, and maintains that it was incumbent upon the latter to act in regard to every transaction in communication with him, according as was agreed in the deed drawn up on the admission of Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh to partnership in the Company (see Inclosure 2 in the note from the German Embassy).

If the contract had in reality been submitted to and approved by Abdul Latif on behalf of his son Esa, it is difficult to see the reason for which Herr Wönckhaus enjoined secrecy on Hassan Samaiyeh (see Appendix, No. 14).

As will be seen from the accompanying Petition (see Appendix, No. 18) from Nejef, the son and heir of Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh, now deceased, Esa-bin-Abdul Latif is not the only partner in the Company who takes exception to the proceedings of Hassan Samaiyeh. His Majesty's Government understand that the dragoman of the German Consulate, Bushire, has been in communication with Nejef-bin-Nakhoda in regard to his attitude towards the contract of the 1st June, 1906.

With regard to (*b*) (the objections of the Sheikh of Shargah himself to the contract of the 1st June, 1906), the German Government are of opinion that—

The Sheikh's fear that he might lose possession of the mines and island is senseless, while the fact that there was no provision in the lease of 1898 allowing the whole export of the mines to be transferred to a foreigner without the Sheikh's approval is no more conclusive than the omission of a prohibition against such a transfer, and, in view of the recognized liberty of trade in the Persian Gulf, it is to be inferred that the conclusion of contracts with foreigners was within the powers of the Company.

The principal motive of the Sheikh of Shargah in cancelling, in accordance with the exercise of his sovereign rights of jurisdiction, the lease granted in his behalf by the Regent in 1898 was evidently a proper and natural desire to administer justice as between the partners of the Company, and to render nugatory the unauthorized action of Hassan Samaiyeh. Moreover, on learning how far the terms of the contract with Herr R. Wönckhaus went, conferring as they did a preferential right of renewal for an indefinite period, the Sheikh may well have felt that his own pecuniary interest in the mines would not, in view of the increasing market value of red oxide, be properly safeguarded by a payment limited indefinitely to a sum of 250 dollars a-year. In

these circumstances the Sheikh would not unnaturally have deemed it advisable to protest against the contract with Herr Wönckhaus so soon as he became aware of its purport, rather than to allow this gentleman to acquire, with the lapse of time, a vested interest in the output of the mines.

The position at the present time appears to His Majesty's Government to be that Herr Robert Wönckhaus has entered into a contract with Hassan Samaiyeh, who, having acted without authority from his partners, is unable to carry out his contract, and is consequently liable to Herr Wönckhaus in damages. If, therefore, further steps are taken they should be of a legal character, and it will be at the discretion of Herr Wönckhaus whether they are taken or not.

His Majesty's Government appreciate the friendly manner in which the German Government have dealt with the case, and, pending a final decision of the whole question, they are prepared to use their good offices in order that temporary arrangements may be made whereby Messrs. Wönckhaus will be enabled to procure a limited amount of red oxide to place them in a position to fulfil such contracts as they may have entered into before the cancellation of the lease. Instructions have accordingly been issued to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to ask the local representative of Messrs. Wönckhaus to give due notice when the firm intend to resume operations in order that the necessary arrangements may be made.

His Majesty's Government are, however, informed that, for climatic reasons, no serious operations are possible during the next three or four months for transporting the accumulated minerals from inland to the beach.

Foreign Office, July 10, 1908.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

Sheikh Sultan-bin-Sultan to Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.

(After compliments.) 18*th Moharrum*, 1326 (*February* 21, 1908).

I WRITE to inform your honour that whereas I have come to know that Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samaiyeh and the friends who advise him assert that the oxide mines which are in the Island of Abu Musa are my personal property, and that the lease which was issued by me to Haji Hassan and his partners was given by me in my own right, and not by proxy, in your behalf. I fear that this statement may become a cause of ill-feeling between us; I have therefore thought it necessary to apprise your honour of it, and to acquaint you with what is in my mind, namely, that I absolutely made no such claim as that which interested parties allege; and I hereby admit that when I came before you in the presence of the British Agent on the 4th Shaaban, 1301, I had no pension or means of subsistence, and you were kind enough to place the Island of Abu Musa under my supervision, so that I might cultivate therein and reap from it the means of subsistence, and you did so conditionally that I showed loyalty and concord and obedience to you in all respects; and I am well aware that the island in question and the mines which are in it belong to your honour, and that you might at any time decide to take the island from my charge—it is at your disposition to do so, and I have no status or power to gainsay you; and when I leased the mines of Abu Musa I was officiating on your behalf, and the Concession was given by proxy for you; and I was well aware that on your return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, if you considered that my action in the matter of the Concession was good, you would confirm what I had agreed to, and if in your opinion it was objectionable, you could annul it either at the time or at any other time; and I altogether disapprove of the proceedings of Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh in regard to this lease; and in respect of whatever action you took in this connection, that is, in cancelling the document, I was acting in accord with you, seeing that your action was taken in consultation with me and for the interests of us all, and in no respect have I any view contrary to yours; and it is in order to dispel doubt from your mind and as an evidence of my singleness of view with you that I have written this, so that you may have cognizance.

(Signature and seal of Sultan-bin-Sultan.)

No. 2.

Agreement of 1889.

Sagar-bin-Khalid to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments:) 2 *Shauban,* 1306 (*April* 3, 1889).

With reference to the matters in reference to which you acted as intermediary between me and Salim-bin-Sultan with a view to his being reconciled to me, and the meeting which we had, I hereby take upon myself the oath of God and of sincerity, so that he who fears may feel secure. There shall be no deceit and no duplicity in the fulfilment of the conditions which I gave to Sheikh Salim in regard to the display of honour and liberality towards him and in my exchanging views with him in matters affecting our interests, and in the payment to him of the amount of his fixed pension, namely 400 French dollars, and I will not give any one's opinion preference to his, and he can live where he pleases from among the following particular places: Shargar, or Khan, or Hijri. And I hope that God will prosper relations between us and will make the result auspicious both for him and me. This is what had to be written.

(Seal of Sagar-bin-Khalid.)

Agreement of 1889, *dated* 5 *Shauban,* 1306 (*April* 6, 1889).

This is what we have assembled to arrange. We have come to an agreement in the fame of God and in all sincerity, without trickery and deceit, we the Sheikhs Salim-bin-Sultan and Sagar-bin-Khalid through the mediation of Abdul Latif-bin-Abdurrahman, the Agent of Government. What I, Sheikh Sagar, have bound myself to do in regard to Sheikh Salim is that I will continue the payment of the pension fixed at 400 dollars per annum, and will show him honour and complete magnanimity, and will exchange views with him in regard to matters needing consultation and expression of opinion; and in these which are needful in our own interests, and I will not put any one's opinion before his, and he can live where he likes—from Khan to Hijra.

And what I, Sheikh Salam, have bound myself to do in regard to Sheikh Sagar is to fulfil the obligations of docility and obedience and the display of energy in advising him in matters affecting our interests inwardly and outwardly. And if we came to know of anything in the way of misunderstanding that might tend to cause soreness in our minds one against the other, then we will explain it to one another with a view to the removal of misunderstanding and the suppression of the efforts of the mischiefmakers and intriguers to make misunderstanding between us. And of our own wish and pleasure we have bound ourselves to the British Government to the effect that in the event of any violation on the part of either of us of what is outlined in this deed in the way of conditions, he will be worthy of being held responsible, and will accept what results to him in the way of punishment and revenge from the aforesaid Government as a recompense for his breach. This is what was arranged and settled peaceably. We hope that God will prosper the results of it between us in the direction of prosperity and happiness.

Executed and written 5th Shauban, 1306.

(Signed) SAGAR-BIN-KHALID (by his own hand).
SALIM-BIN-SULTAN (ditto).
IBRAHIM-BIN-SULTAN.

No. 3.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Resident, Persian Gulf.

(After compliments.) *January* 21, 1884.

Previous to this I wrote to you a letter, but received no reply. I hope nothing untoward has prevented you from doing so. You are acquainted with the arrangements which were effected between me and Sheikh Salem, through the medium of

Sheikh Hamid-bin-Abdullah and Hashar-bin-Maktoom. At present the above Sheikhs met at Shargah, and desired Salem to stand by the agreement and arrangement effected by them between me and him. But he did not wish to do so, consequently they have absolved themselves of all responsibility, and revoked their guarantee which they had tended on our behalf, and the arrangements effected between us have been dissolved.

At present you are aware that Salem resides at Abu Musa, which is an island dependent on Shargah, and we cannot spare it to others. Perhaps Salem may create some disturbance which may break the maritime peace. I beg therefore to request that you will kindly warn Salem, and inform him that if he is desirous of living at Abu Musa, he must do so with peace, giving you as a guarantee that nothing wrong will be done by him which will disturb the maritime peace. But should he not choose to do so, it will be your choice either to remove him from the island or leave us to settle the matter between us; and we should not be called to answer in the event of our attacking each other. I leave the matter to your disposal.

No. 4.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Resident, Persian Gulf.

(After compliments.) *February* 14, 1884.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 2nd February, 1884, per Mirza Abdul Kasim, and I understand its contents to the effect that anyone attempting to break the maritime peace, whether he be Salem or any other people, shall be duly repressed. There is no doubt about this. But according to what I have already said, I beg to tell you that Bu Musa is our island and a dependency of Shargah. If Salem wants to live in it and guarantees that he will not commit anything which would interfere with my affairs or disturb the maritime peace, it matters not, because I cannot dispense with the Island of Bu Musa, as it is of great use to me. I beg therefore you will plainly write to me on the subject, and inform your agent of the same.

No. 5.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid's Explanation of the Position in regard to Abu Musa, dated February 22, 1908.

In reference to the Island of Abu Musa, it is well known to everybody that it is the property of the Sheikhs of the Bowasim of Oman, and on that point there is no doubt. As to the residence of my uncle in it, the facts of the matter are as explained below:—

From olden days, from the time of my ancestors Sheikh Sultan and others, it was their habit in the days of spring, after a fall of rain and the sprouting of vegetation, to send their live-stock to the Island of Abu Musa for grazing, and also a number of our subjects from Shargah and Khan habitually sojourned on the island during the winter for fishing purposes, and had houses and huts there. In the year 1300 Hijri Sheikh Salim, who was then ruling Chief of Shargah, after sending his live-stock there as usual, went over to the island, and by the fate ordained by God the populace called upon me to become their Ruler in place of Sheikh Salim, and I accepted their call and occupied the post of the Sheikhdom. It was then open to me to expel Sheikh Salim from Abu Musa Island, and I addressed the Resident in the Persian Gulf on the subject in letters which must be available on your records; the first was dated the 22nd Rabi-ul-Awal, 1301, and the second the 14th Rabi II, 1301, but the Resident pressed me to make a peaceable settlement so that there might be no cause for a breach of the maritime peace. Accordingly we agreed that I would set apart for Sheikh Salim a pension for his subsistence—every year 600 dollars. That settlement afterwards became void by my not being able to pay the amount fixed, and subsequently a second agreement was come to between us under which I was to pay him yearly 400 dollars and also the income derived from the Island of Sir Abu Nuair, which was expected to approach 200 dollars. This agreement also became void, and in the year 1306 we made a third agreement with Sheikh Salim by the mediation of the Government Agent, and in view of the fact that up to this agreement no income

had been obtainable from Sir Abu Nuair for Sheikh Salim, mention of the island was omitted and his pension remained at the previous figure of 400 dollars, but I now agreed to the return of Sheikh Salim to Shargah, and I took him into my service. Then, later on in the year 1315, I went on the Mecca pilgrimage and appointed Sheikh Salim to act for me in the Shargah Government, and on my return Sheikh Salim informed me that he had been afforded an opportunity, and had seen it to our interest, to lease the mines of Abu Musa to three persons subject to the British Government. I did not repudiate it, and saw nothing objectionable in it, and so I acquiesced in it; and seeing that Sheikh Salim had ceased not to complain that the sum of 400 dollars was not sufficient for his subsistence, I voluntarily set aside the amount of this rent for him, that it might make up his subsistence, so that the total of what came in to him yearly might be 600 dollars as before, and over, and that no cause of soreness might be left to him on account of the paucity of his allowance. I have absolutely not given him any deed in connection with the island nor in regard to the mines therein; all I did was to relinquish the income to him, in the way of financial assistance from me to him, and it was done voluntarily and at my own discretion. And I have not ceased in the days of spring in years when there has been rain and herbage to send my live-stock to the island for grazing purposes, as has been our custom from of old; and my flag ceases not to fly there.

Such are the facts of the matter, and I have recorded them for your information.

(Signature and seal of Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid-bin-Sultan.)

No. 6.

Memorandum showing the connection of the Jowasim Clan, the Ruling Chief of Shargah, and Sheikh Salim-bin-Sulton, respectively, with Abu Musa Island, as indicated by the Archives of the Bushire Residency.

More than a century and a-half ago the Chiefs of the Jowasim Clan of Arabs, at that time paramount in authority on what was known as the "pirate coast" of Oman, with head-quarters at Ras-el-Khaima and Shargah, crossed over to the Persian Coast with their war craft and captured the port of Lingah and other places on the coast. There they remained in occupation for upwards of a century, one of the ruling family from Ras-el-Khaima acting as Chief of the branch of the tribe which remained on the Persian Coast; having its seat of Government at Lingah, but remaining subject to the overlordship of the ruling Chief of the head-quarters of the tribe, then at Ras-el-Khaima.

At that time as now practically all the islands in the Gulf were permanently or at certain seasons tenanted by Arabs tribes; and several of them, including Abu Musa, by the Jowasim. In the pearling season the tribal fishing-boats would have recourse to these islands for water or for refuge from stress of weather; in the spring, after rain, the various Sheikhs would send their horses and flocks for grazing, and in the winter parties of their subjects habitually sojourned in the islands for fishing purposes. Time went on and the sections of the Jowasim on the Persian Coast after some generations became as it were permanent settlers there and quarrels began to arise between parties of them and their kinsmen from Oman sojourning on the islands, when their grazing interests clashed. In order to put an end to this recurrent friction the Chiefs of the Clan came to a friendly understanding under which particular islands were henceforth to be used exclusively by different portions of the tribe. Under this understanding Abu Musa fell to the Shargah branch, and the arrangement then made has never been disturbed.

While not ordinarily intervening in the internal politics of the Jowasim or other Arab tribes in Treaty relations with them, the British authorities have in practice recognized this position, and, in pursuance of their time honoured policy of maintaining the "maritime truce," the principles of which, as we have specifically notified to the tribes, are held to apply to the islands of the Gulf as well as its waters, we have interfered in the present instance in so far as that when alien tribesmen from Dubai and elsewhere have attempted to send their flocks for grazing, or otherwise to meddle with Abu Musa Sir Bu Nuair Islands, they have been directed either to desist or first obtain the acquiescence of the ruling Sheikh of Shargah in their proceedings.

It is true that on one or two occasions the Persian Government, apparently from ignorance or misconception of the history of these islands generally, have attempted

to insinuate a claim to Abu Musa, but in 1888, when this claim was first asserted, in conjunction with a similar one in connection with Sirri, Colonel E. C. Ross, for eighteen years Resident in the Persian Gulf, writing to Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, on the 28th April, 1888, observed: "The claim now put forward to the Island of Abu Musa has no justification whatever and any attempt to assert Persian authority there in a practical form would lead to disturbance."

Again in April 1904 when an over zealous Belgian Customs official proceeded to the island and incontinently hauled down the Shargah flag and hoisted the Persian emblem in its place, the Persian Government was called upon to repair the unwarranted affront, and a British man-of-war was sent to see that it had been done and that the Arab flag was replaced with due ceremony. Thus, as far as the Jowasim are concerned the position which existed from time immemorial has been maintained up to the present moment, and every year in the spring, when and after rain has fallen and vegetation made its appearance, the ruling Sheikh of Shargah and his immediate relations have been in the habit of sending their live-stock to graze on the island.

So much for the abstract history of Abu Musa as an appanage of Shargah. We may now turn to the aspects brought into relief by the present misunderstanding in connection with the grant of a Concession for mining oxide on the island.

In the year 1883, the ruling Chief of Shargah was Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan. He had held the reins of tribal Government for about eighteen years, but his régime was a weak and unpopular one.

This Sheikh had taken a particular and enterprising interest in Abu Musa and had planted some date groves and built himself a rough residence there. In the spring of 1883 he was according to his habit spending a few weeks there with the tribal horses and flocks and had left his nephew, Sagar-bin-Khalid, a young man of about 25 years of age, in charge of his head-quarters at Shargah.

Among these Arab Chieftains the principle of "might is right" prevails, and Sagar-bin-Khalid, finding that the majority of the tribesmen of the principality were tired of his uncle's rule, and ready to support himself in a *coup d'état*, seized the government and proclaimed himself Sheikh on the 4th April, 1883, informing the Resident of his action.

The British authorities leave these questions of personnel to the will of the tribes concerned, and usually do no more than recognize the individual whom the support and choice of the tribe puts in a position to handle the reins of government; and in this case Sheikh Sagar received recognition in due course. As soon as he had made sure of his position he addressed the Resident (on the 17th May, 1883) saying that he now proposed to expel Sheikh Salim from Abu Musa. In reply he was reminded that the Residency had in former years specifically notified to the Trucial Chiefs that the principles of the maritime truce must be held to apply to the islands as well as the seas of the Persian Gulf, and that he should consequently endeavour to arrange a peaceable settlement with his uncle.

Simultaneously Sheikh Salim left Abu Musa for Lingah, and thence wrote to the Resident asking his good offices. He in turn was advised to remain in Lingah (it being more convenient for purposes of communication) until he could come to an understanding with Sheikh Sagar.

Being in the weaker position Salim soon came to terms and a settlement guaranteed by the Sheikhs of Ras-el-Khaima and Dubai was arrived at in July 1883, under which Sheikh Salim was to receive a pension of 600 dollars per annum for his maintenance.

A copy of the settlement is attached. Sheikh Salim, however, found it difficult to refrain from intriguing against his nephew, in the hope, no doubt, of getting back the Sheikhdom.

Thus, on the 21st January, 1884, Sheikh Sagar complained to the Resident of his uncle's conduct, and in the course of his letter he wrote:—

"At present you are aware that Salim resides on Bu Musa, which is an island dependent on Shargah, and I cannot spare it to others, and perhaps Salim may create some disturbance which may break the maritime peace. I beg, therefore, that you will kindly warn Salim and inform him that if he is desirous of living at Abu Musa he must do so peaceably, you being his guarantee that nothing wrong will be done by him of a nature to disturb the maritime peace. But should he not choose to obey it will be your choice either to remove him from the island or to leave us to settle the

matter between us, and in that case we should not be called to account in the event of our attacking one another. I leave the matter to your disposition."

In reply the Sheikh was informed that if either party broke the maritime peace he would be promptly repressed.

About this time the Sheikhs of Ras-el-Khaima and Debai also complained to the Resident against Sheikh Salim's violation of the Agreement, guaranteed as it had been by themselves.

On the 14th February following Sheikh Sagar again wrote to the Resident, politely urging that it was all very well for him to say that whoever broke the maritime peace, would be repressed, but reminding him that Abu Musa was his—Sheikh Sagar's property—a hereditary appanage of Shargah. He added:—

"If Salim wants to live there and guarantees that he will not commit anything which would interfere with my affairs, or disturb the maritime peace, so be it; but I cannot dispense with this island, which is of the greatest use to me. I beg, therefore, that you will plainly write to me on the subject, and likewise instruct your agent."

On this letter was recorded an office note to the following effect:—

"Sheikh Sagar seems to insist that if Salim continues to live on Bu Musa he should give a guarantee through the Resident that he will not do anything to disturb him, Sheikh Sagar, or the maritime peace."

On the 5th April Sheikh Sagar wrote the Resident another letter pressing for a reply to the above. He added that he had communicated his precise object in writing to the Residency Agent, who would explain it. This was that now that spring had arrived he wished to send his horses as usual for grazing, and was not sure whether Sheikh Salim would leave them and their caretakers in peace. If the Resident would not allow him to make his own arrangements for ensuring safety of life and property on the island he wanted an assurance from the Residency that his stud would not be molested by Sheikh Salim.

Sheikh Salim, however, who was now getting into financial straits, solved the difficulty himself. He made an appeal to the Residency alleging that Sheikh Sagar and the guarantors of the Agreement of 1883 had not stood by the terms of it; that they had taken away the State horses which as Sheikh of Shargah he had with him on the island when his nephew ousted him from the Sheikhdom, that he, Sheikh Salim, had had to sell all he possessed to maintain himself and now had nothing left, and that he had now come to beg his nephew to provide him with the wherewithal for a bare living. He declared that if he got this he would remain in peace and quietude. Finally he begged our Agent to intercede for him, and to induce Sheikh Sagar to act up to the Agreement.

By the advice of the Residency Agent, Sheikh Sagar, who had found the 600 dollars somewhat too much for his purse, consented to pay his uncle a reduced allowance of 400 dollars annually, half of which only was to be paid in cash and the other half in grain and other articles. He also promised to assign to Sheikh Salim the revenue of the Island of Sir Abu Nuair, which contained some salt deposits and was expected to bring in about 200 dollars more. A document in the above sense was drawn up at a meeting at Ajman and there ratified. When reporting the conclusion of this Agreement the Residency Agent mentioned that Sheikh Salim was at present going on a visit to Ras-el-Khaima and that his family would spend the hot weather there and the winter on Abu Musa. Things went on smoothly after this for a time, but the two Sheikhs eventually got at loggerheads again and in April 1889 our Agent reported that Salim had endeavoured to raise an attack on Shargah. On getting wind of his uncle's intentions Sheikh Sagar, as usual, asked the advice of the British Agent and the latter soon succeeded in bringing about a friendly meeting between the two resulting in the framing of a third Agreement in supercession of the preceding ones. This was to the following effect; Sheikh Sagar bound himself to pay his now aged uncle the 400 dollar pension regularly and to permit him to return to the mainland of Oman and to live where he pleased within certain limits. He also offered to take Sheikh Salim into his service as Vizier or chief adviser and to consult him in all matters affecting the interests of the State. Sheikh Salim in turn undertook to serve his nephew in obedience and loyalty.

No mention was made of Sir Bu Nuair in this Agreement because it had hitherto disappointed previous expectations and had not brought in anything.

The above has held good and no further documentary agreement has since been necessary. On the conclusion of it Sheikh Salim came to live in Shargah as his nephew's adviser and for some years past the two have been the best of friends, so much so that when Sheikh Sagar leaves his head-quarters, which he not infrequently does, he always leaves his uncle to officiate in the Government of Shargah, as he did, for instance, on his departure for the Mecca pilgrimage in 1897-8.

It was on return from the said pilgrimage in 1898 that his uncle informed him of the grant of the Abu Musa Oxide Concession; when, in view of the fact that since the reduction of his pension from 600 to 400 dollars, Sheikh Salim had always been complaining of the paucity of his income, Sheikh Sagar as an act of generosity decided to let his uncle enjoy the 250 dollars annual rent fixed for the Concession and thereby cease to have cause for further discontent.

From first to last, however, Sheikh Sagar's acquiescence in his uncle's enjoyment of the produce and income of the island in question, has been purely a personal and verbal arrangement which Sheikh Sagar might, at any time, have terminated had he chosen to do so. No deed whatever, according to the statements of the two Sheikhs themselves, has ever been given by Sheikh Sagar to his uncle in regard to this island, although the Island of Sir Abu Nuair did find mention in the second Agreement as above mentioned, dropping out again in the third and last because it had never brought in any income.

Stronger proof of the status of the island could hardly be wanted than the declarations furnished by the two Sheikhs themselves.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

February 28, 1908.

No. 7.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball.

(After compliments.) *7th Rajab*, 1320 (*October* 11, 1902).

I have the honour to state that I have received your letters of the 10th March and 30th June, 1902, regarding the mines of salt and red oxide in the island of Sir Bu Nuair. No Agreement between us and Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh took place, and no document in writing was executed upon that subject. With regard to Abu Musa, my uncle Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan cultivates in that island, and in the year in which I went on the Hajj, my aforesaid uncle was acting as my regent ("kaim mutqam") in Shargah, and he saw fit to lease the mines of Abu Musa to Hassan-bin-Samayich, a British subject, and Abdallah-bin-Hassan and Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, and the lease has remained up to now. I think your agent Abdul Latif must have informed you about it. This is what had to be written.

No. 8.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Hassan Samayieh.

[Inclosure 12 of German Case.]

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) *9th Moharrum*, 1325 (*February* 21, 1907).

I have to inform you that Esa-bin-Abdul Latif has preferred a complaint to me in connection with the red oxide mines on Abu Musa, which for some years have been leased in the names of yourself and Esa-bin-Abdul Latif and your son Abdullah, according to the deed executed on the 18th Zilkaideh, 1315 (21st April, 1899). He has sent me a copy of the deed of contract in operation between you and M. Woncklians, and complains that you executed this contract without consulting him, and that he does not agree to the conditions written in the contract now that he has come to know them. I, too, do not agree to this contract at all, and as for you, you had no right to give a contract in this fashion and bind yourself to give away possession of the whole output of red oxide to others for a long period and without consulting us or making the slightest reference to us. And, according to our view, harm will accrue to us from the continuance of this Concession in your hands in connection

with Abu Musa; and your conduct in the present case is a violation of your duty towards us.

Accordingly it appears to us advisable to withdraw the document of Concession from you, and we now inform you accordingly by this letter, so that you may realize that the contract between us has terminated. You have no longer any right of enjoyment in regard to the mines of Abu Musa.

(Seal of Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.)

No. 9.

Translation of the original Agreement.

Be it known to all who may see this that I, Salem-bin-Sultan-bin-Sugger-el-Kasemi, let on lease all the red oxide mines situated on the Bu Musa Island to Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samaiyeh, Abdulla-bin-Hasan, and Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, from the present date for such a period as they may wish to hold the mines, provided that they should pay me 250 French dollars per annum. I have likewise arranged with them that if they wished to land "Muhar" and "Zenni" oysters in the island for commercial purposes, they should pay me landing fee at the rate of 100 dollars per mensem. I have also given them permission to dig wells to supply water to their men who are working on the red oxide mines, and I will pay considerations and respects to their men who are working on the mines.

I have perhaps made out certain Agreements previous to this. They do not hold good, and this Agreement is to be acted upon.

Written in duplicate on the 18th Zilkedah, 1315 = 10th April, 1898.

SALEM-BIN-SULTAN.

No. 10.

Contract between Mr. Hassan C. Semey, Lingah, owner and holder of Bu Musa Concession, and Mr. Robert Wonckhaus, Lingah.

Hassan C. Semey agrees to deliver to Mr. Robert Wonckhaus, Lingah, during 4 years (four years) beginning with 1st June, 1906, every year 2,000 to 5,000 tons of 20 cwts. oxide of iron of the Island Bu Musa, same quality as the 700 tons shipped by Mr. Robert Wonckhaus in March 1906. Mr. Robert Wonckhaus agrees to take at least every year 2,000 tons, and if he wants so and there is sufficient good stuff on the island of which he approves up to 5,000 tons yearly.

The price is fixed at 15*s.* 6*d.* (fifteen shillings and six pence) per ton of 20 cwts., usual weight conditions, freight and charge free on board steamer Bu Musa, to be weighed on board.

Hassan C. Semey gives the entire monopoly of Bu Musa oxide to Robert Wonckhaus during the terms of the contract; he is not allowed to sell or dispose of otherwise any quantity of Bu Musa during the term of this contract, but it is agreed upon that Hassan is permitted to export to India for his account during this year what he has sold already to India, and which he gives as 700 tons (seven hundred) and besides that every year from 1907 about 5—6,000 bags of 1 cwt. (four thousand to five thousand).

Hassan Semey has to deliver daily alongside if in bags 200 tons or in bulk 150 tons, weather permitting. Payment for every lot which is to be shipped, half the amount when the lot is ordered, and the other half when the lot is being shipped.

Advance to be paid by Mr. Robert Wonckhaus to Hassan 2,000 rupees (two thousand) whenever Hassan calls for it and receipt to be taken for it. This advance to remain with Hassan until the end of this contract.

Whenever this contract comes to an end, Mr. Robert Wonckhaus has the preference for a new contract of Bu Musa contract if he desires so, at same price and

conditions or at any rate at the price of other serious buyer. Alone the English text of this contract will hold good.

Lingah, the 1st June, 1906.

ROBERT WONCKHAUS.
W. E. KIRKPATRICK.

(Seal.)

HASSAN-BIN-ALI SAMAIYEH
and his partners.

Copied by—
SHEIKH HOOSAIN,
Sub-Postmaster, Lingah.
(Signed) SHEIKH HOOSAIN,
Sub-Postmaster.

No. 11.

Hassan Samagieh to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 18th Rabi II*, 1324 (*June* 11, 1906).

I had previously sent you a letter viâ Dubai. I trust it has duly reached you.

As regards the agreement which we have made with Wonckhaus, the German, for the sale of red oxide, I have to tell you that we settled with him that 2,000 tons should be shipped every year, and that if we got out more than that he would be a taker of it. I have settled the price with him at 15*s.* per ton, and we have to bear all the expenses and deliver the oxide on board the steamers. Praise be to God, this is a godsend, and will make up for the past. The arrangement will continue for four years, and I have taken from him an advance of 2,000 rupees. He has made conditions with us for the shipment of 200 or 150 tons per diem.

The work begins from the 1st June, 1906, and I have written to my son Abdullah to settle his affairs (in India), at any rate, and to come and supervise the work. I have sent labourers to the island, and we shall have in any case to buy more donkeys for transportation.

I hope that, once begun, the work will go on regularly.

No. 12.

Abdul Latif to Hassan Samagieh.

[Inclosure 6 of German Case.]

(After compliments.) *Shargah, 21st Rabi II*, 1324 (*June* 14, 1906)

I have received your former and later favours and was glad to hear of your welfare.

As to your remarks on the subject of the red oxide in regard to which God decreed that you sold it to the German Wonckhaus at 15*s.* per ton, and whereas it was arranged that you should excavate 2,000 tons per annum, all the charges to be defrayed by you, and he to receive the oxide net. Very good; I hope it is auspicious. It will be good fortune after trouble. In any case, our brother Abdullah must reach there to supervise the work, because I think the operations cannot be regulated without him. Please, however, refrain from entering upon any arrangements whatever in the nature of leases or deeds of contract from which there will arise difficulties and quarrels which will lead to complaints and claims, because this will be difficult for our over-lords and they will not consent to it; and you are by God's grace wise and will not commit any negligence or hesitation likely to entangle you, because in these days everyone is making a trap with which to entangle people. I hope you will not be neglectful in this regard.

At any rate I am glad to hear this news, if we are safe from this world's tricks more than before.

No. 16.

Hassan Samayieh to Mr. T. Malcolm.

Lingah, July 13, 1906.

(After compliments.)

I have received your esteemed letter dated the 26th June and perused it gladly and understood what you had stated.

You had acknowledged receipt of my letter the contents of which you had understood.

As regards the sale to the German, it is satisfactory, and I hope it will be fortunate. You had understood the details regarding the sale, shipment, and boat-hire, but you did not let me know about the commission; is it to be charged by us from them or by them from us? You had written that I should send you a copy of the agreement. Very well, but the agreement has been written in German, and there is no one with us who can write such a hand. The purport of the agreement is accurately the same as I have written to you.

You had written to me whether we had contracted with the German for 2,000 tons per annum. Yes, we have contracted with him that the quantity should be 2,000 tons at least, and he can, according to the agreement take any more quantities which we may be able to obtain from the mines.

You had written whether we can obtain more than this quantity, and if so, whether we can contract with other Europeans, so that you may negotiate with them. I have understood this, but I cannot give the accurate quantity unless the mine is worked for two or three months when I will be able to form an idea.

I dispatched forty-five workmen to the island in the beginning of June, but little work is done, it being summer and the days being hot. If more than 2,000 tons are obtained, the German is bound to take it from us. We can therefore make no other contract.

I beg also to inform you that my son Abdulla has sold about 400 tons more or less at Calcutta. Only the freight is to be paid by us, every maund will be 1 r. 9 a. delivery at Calcutta. I have been trying to procure a vessel since a long time. I have now-a-days chartered "Alinghir," the vessel belonging to the sons of Khoja (to ship red oxide) at 10 rupees per ton. It is now several days that she has gone to the island to ship (the oxide).

Thank God my son Abdulla has freed himself from the dispute at Calcutta. He has compromised with them. He has come to Bombay, and I will receive his letter from Bombay by this mail, if God pleases. I hope he will not be detained there, and that he will settle his case with Jeita Bania and come to our parts soon.

No. 14.

Hassan Samayieh to Mr. T. Malcolm.

Lingah, 23rd Shaban, 1324 (*October* 14, 1906).

(Translation.)

I have received your letter dated the 20th December, 1906, and was glad to hear of your well-being. I have understood what you stated. Regarding my son Abdulla, I beg to say that after settling the case at Calcutta he has arrived at Bombay, where he has some easy matters to settle with the Bania. He will settle his account and will leave for our parts in two or one and a-half months. You had remarked that you had asked some one in the post-office to take from me a copy of the document, which is in German. Let it not be hidden from you that the German, when the bargain was concluded with him, said to me that this transaction should be kept secret ("Yekoon Mastoor"), and so I did not wish that any outsider should come to know of it, and I fear that if news of the copying of the document reaches his ears he will be annoyed. In truth, it is not my intention that anyone should come to know about it except myself and you. What you wanted, namely, the details of the sale which had taken place, I have already communicated to you in a previous letter. Procedure will be according to that letter, neither more nor less, in pursuance of what is written in the document.

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No. 15.

Hassan Samayieh to Abdul Latif.

Lingah, 27th Shawwal, 1324 (*December* 16, 1906).

(After compliments.)

I wrote to you previously. I hope the letter reached you, and that you are well. Now I forward, inclosed in this letter, a copy of the Agreement regarding the sale of oxide to Wonekhaus, a copy made according to the original. Please acknowledge receipt.

Our news is quiet. I have nothing deserving of mention except to say all well.

Inshallah, in these days we expect Abdullah to arrive Bombay in safety, and on his arrival I will apprise you.

No. 16.

Abdul Latif to Hassan Samayieh.

[Inclosure 8 of German Case.]

8th Zilhijjah, 1324 (*January* 23, 1907).

(After compliments.)

I have received your esteemed letter and understood what you stated. I have understood the copy of the Agreement concluded by you with the German for the sale of the Abu Musa red oxide. My son Esa does not agree to the execution of an Agreement to this effect, and you had neither consulted with, nor referred to him, nor did you send him a copy of the Agreement before the settlement with the German of the affair concerning the red oxide, so that views might be exchanged between you both, and that you might adopt a recognized, obvious, and evident course, because it is obligatory for the partners not to undertake a matter except after a general consensus of views, so that no difficulties may occur, and you have undertaken this affair without my consultation.

Therefore, my son Esa does not agree to the Agreement concluded between you and the German, because he fears difficulty will result from foreigners concerning themselves in the matter. The nullification of this Agreement is better than its acceptance.

You had previously received a letter (from me) saying that you should not involve yourself into difficulties with the German in regard to the red oxide, because he (Esa) fears an untoward result. I communicate to you what my son Esa says.

No. 17.

Abdul Latif to Hassan Samayieh.

[Inclosure 10 of German Case.]

12th Safar, 1325 (*March* 27, 1907).

(After compliments.)

Your esteemed letter has reached me in due course, and I have noted its contents. When your communication reached me saying that you had sold to the German before mentioned oxide from Abu Musa, every year 2,000 tons of oxide at 15*s.* per ton, I sent you back an answer, dated the 21st Rabi II, 1324, which purported to convey acquiescence, but in the course of the same letter I cautioned you against entering into any agreement in the nature of a leasehold or into any relation likely to result in dispute, on the grounds that the overlords of our affairs would not agree to it. I asked you to give us immunity against the complications of the world (time). My letter in question is no doubt with you. Since writing it I have never received from you the copy of the deed of agreement existing between you and the German until the 5th Zilkaadeh, 1324, when it came in English after I had asked you for it time after time. I mentioned its arrival to you in my letter of the 6th Zilkaadeh, 1324. And when we got a translator and translated the English document, it became plain to us that you had launched yourself into the very thing against which we had cautioned you and had tied yourself up by giving a lease. Consequently, my son Esa does not agree to

this document which does not leave you any power of control or modification in regard to the oxide mines of Abu Musa. And previous to this present communication I communicated to you in my letter dated 8th Zilhijjeh a translation of the deed for your information and said that you would perceive that the question was not one of mere sale as stated by you, but one of leasehold, against which I had warned you. Moreover, Sheikh Sagar does not agree to the lease of the oxide to outsiders from foreign Powers and claims that the agreement (with him) was that you should do the work yourselves and not farm it out. This is what had to be explained.

No. 18.

Rough purport of a Petition from Nejef-bin-Ali, Persian subject, of Bunder Abbas, to Lieutenant Gabriel, dated February 16, 1908.

(After compliments.)

My father for some years performed service for the British, and as Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, of Lingah, is a British subject, I therefore petition to you as follows:—

Concerning the Abu Musa oxide, for which there were four concessionnaires, among whom I hold the deed of partnership of my father. My father had no other heir but myself, and therefore after his death Haji Hassan-bin-Ali acknowledged my right of partnership as acquired through my father. At the time when Hassan entered into the agreement with Messrs. Wonckhaus he gave me no information whatever on the subject. Subsequently I made an arrangement with Haji Amin-ut-Tujjar to sell him oxide and sent word to Hassan to this effect. Hassan then wrote me that he had made a contract elsewhere, and would inform me regarding it later. As proof that I did not in any way agree to this contract made by Hassan, I point to the fact that it did not bear my signature, and when, some months later, Abdullah-bin-Hassan and the German Munshi came and asked me to sign it in token of assent, I refused to do so, as I had not been consulted in the first place. As further proof of my right in the Concession, I may mention that in 1901 Abdullah-bin-Hassan had a case in Calcutta against Messrs. Sassoon concerning the Abu Musa oxide, but seeing that the oxide had been sold in the name of my father, the case could not be proceeded with until I had furnished a power of attorney for the Calcutta Court—a copy of this is doubtless on your Consulate records. (Note by His Britannic Majesty's Consul: The Consulate fee-book shows that Nejef paid 5*s.* fees for the execution of a power of attorney on the 20th October, 1901.) Now I complain that from the time that Hassan has been actively engaged in the oxide work of Bu Musa, I have not received 1 dinar of the proceeds, although all the work on the island formerly devolved upon my father, who himself found the implements, &c., for working the oxide, which implements are even now at the island.

Besides all this, there were 250 carpets which belonged to my father, and which were sent to Calcutta for sale. Abdullah-bin-Hassan wanted to settle up the account for them in Calcutta, but until I gave a power of attorney they would not settle with him. Hassan subsequently collected all the money, but I have never been able to recover any of it from him.

Now I pray you of your goodness to look after my rights and to obtain me justice against Hassan.

[20603] No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to the Marquis di San Giuliano.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Italian Ambassador, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Excellency's communication of the 16th ultimo, intimating the consent of the Italian Government to postpone any definite decision regarding the appointment of an Italian Consular Agent at Muscat until the result of the Brussels Conference, in so far as Muscat is concerned, is made known.

The courteous action of the Italian Government in consenting to this course, and the friendly terms in which their intention is conveyed, are a source of gratification to His Majesty's Government; and Sir E. Grey would be glad if the Marquis di San

Giuliano would convey to Signor Tittoni an expression of the appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the readiness with which their wishes have been met.

With regard to the final paragraph of His Excellency's communication, Sir E. Grey has the honour to state that His Majesty's Government intend to maintain their policy as defined therein, and to make it their first aim to secure its adoption.

Foreign Office, July 10, 1908.

[24024] No. 13.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 366.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 1, 1908.

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 669 of the 22nd October, 1907, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Major Ramsay, containing a record of a journey made from Bagdad to Aleppo in the Bagdad-Aleppo Carriage Company's vehicle.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Consul-General Ramsay to the Board of Trade.

Sir, *Bagdad, May* 28, 1908.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 11th February last, I have the honour to inclose a Memorandum written after my recent journey from Bagdad to Aleppo in one of the carriages of the Bagdad-Aleppo Carriage Company.

2. The carriages of this Company are no longer running: the floods have interfered with them, the season is not suitable for travelling, and I understand that the losses which have been sustained have been the cause of some differences of opinion among the partners in the business.

I am not yet in a position to state whether the Company will be wound up or whether it will again start work at a more suitable season.

In my Memorandum I have stated that in many places the road is good.

This term is only used comparatively, and means that wheeled traffic can pass along the road without danger or difficulty. There is no made road in the proper sense of the term.

3. I believe that a motor car would have no serious difficulty in getting from Aleppo to Ana, and from Bagdad to Falluja in ordinary weather, but even on these portions of the road, which are practically flat, there would be difficulty in wet weather as the roads are not metalled.

At Falluja the River Euphrates is crossed by a most rickety old bridge of boats, on which, I think, it would be difficult to cross even a light motor. From Falluja to Ramadi a number of small canals and irrigation cuts have to be crossed; the difficulty caused by these would be considerable, but probably not insuperable. Between Ramadi and Ana there are many places where I think it would be impossible to get a motor car, except with the assistance of drag-ropes.

At these places there are steep, rocky, and sometimes tortuous ascents and descents, which would be very difficult to negotiate. On this same section between Ramadi and Ana where the road runs over high ground there are many stones, both loose and fixed, which would be likely to cause much damage to pneumatic tyres.

I do not personally believe that motor cars along this road could be made to pay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Note of a Journey made in March 1908 from Bagdad to Aleppo in one of the carriages of the Bagdad Aleppo Carriage Company by Major Ramsay.

N.B.—The Managers of the Company had sent orders that I was to be well treated. I travelled at the best time of the year, when the days are fairly long and yet not distressingly hot for the ponies; our carriage was lightly laden, and so was the baggage cart that went with us.

2. At a khan the only accommodation available is a small bare room in a caravanserai. Arab bread, good water, chickens and eggs, are always obtainable on the road, and in the spring and early summer excellent milk.

3. A carriage and baggage cart always go together, and in any circumstances the cart delays the carriage slightly. If, therefore, economy is not a great object, it is a good thing to engage the whole cart, and thus insure a light load.

4. In the following notes, when two times are given, the upper time, in hours and minutes, refers to my journey, the lower time refers to a journey made in the opposite direction by an Austrian gentleman (also see tabular statement):—

March 5, 1908.

Place.	Time.	Description.
	Hrs. min.	
Bagdad to Abuddir	2 50	No difficulty of any kind.
	3 0	
Abuddir to Fallaja on left bank of the Euphrates	2 25	Ground a mixture of sand and gravel; rather heavy, but not difficult.
	4 50	
Fallaja (right bank) to Ramadi	1 35	My time included 45 minutes for preparing tea.
	6 25	

For the first 1 hour 45 minutes the road crosses a number of irrigation cuts, mostly with switch-back bridges of no strength; the jolting is very trying. After that the road is generally near the river and rather heavy with sandy soil. I should think it would be submerged during a high flood. (This part of the road was badly flooded during the spring of 1908.)

Total time between Bagdad and Ramadi 11 hours 30 minutes.

There is a decent khan at Ramadi.

March 6, 1908.

Ramadi to Kalu Shuriya Abu Rayat	2 15	
Shuriya Abu Rayat to Hit..	3 5	At 1 hour 5 minutes from Abu Rayat there is a steep stony ascent and descent. After this the road to Hit is over undulating ground, but heavy, owing to sandy soil. Time from Ramadi to Hit, 5 hours 55 minutes.
	9 hours.	
Hit to Jubba	3 30	At 1 hour 45 minutes from Hit there is a bad stony descent. At 3 hours 15 minutes from Hit there is a very bad stony and steep descent into the Bagdadi Plain. At Jubba there is no khan, but one is being built at Baghdad by the Carriage Company.

Total time from Ramadi to Jubba 12 hours 15 minutes.

March 7, 1908.

Place.	Time.	Description.
	Hrs. min.	
Jubba to Hadisa..	5 20	At 2 hours 40 minutes from Jubba there is a bad stony descent and a very bad stony ascent. At 3 hours 40 minutes from Jubba there is another rather bad descent and ascent. At 4 hours 40 minutes from Jubba there is a very bad descent. This is the most difficult stage on the road.
Hadisa to Fahima	2 30	
	8 15	
Fahima to Ana	6 0	My last hour was done in the dark. My coachman said he took us by the shorter road. At 25 minutes from Fahima there is a very awkward descent. At 1 hour 10 minutes from Fahima there is a narrow, but very bad, bog, which has been filled up and overlaid with boulders; it looks as if the horses' legs and carriages must be broken. At 1 hour 20 minutes from Fahima there is a very steep stony ascent. At 2 hours 45 minutes from Fahima there is a steep descent. There is a decent khan at Ana.
	14 15	

Total time from Jubba to Ana, 14 hours 15 minutes.

March 8, 1908.

Ana to Nahiya	4 50	No difficulty on the road.
	4 0	
Nahiya to Al Kaim	4 30	Including half-an-hour wasted in changing a horse that went lame soon after starting. No difficulty; road fair.
	8 30	
Al Kaim to Abu Kamal	2 25	Road good. At Abu Kamal a good khan is being built by the Company; already there is a decent room available.
	5 0	

Total time from Ana to Abu Kamal, 11 hours 55 minutes.

March 9, 1908.

Abu Kamal to Salahiyeh	3 10	Flat road over alluvial soil. No khan at Salahiyeh.
	3 5	
Salahiyeh to Miyadin	6 5	A few minutes from Salahiyeh the road rises to the uplands by a made road. After 2 hours over very stony ground it descends to the river level. The khan at Miyadin is a disgustingly dirty place.
	9 0	

Total time from Abu Kamal to Miyadin, 8 hours 55 minutes.

March 10, 1908.

Miyadin to Deir..	4 50	The road is very flat, but would be very heavy after rain. About half-an-hour before Deir there is an awkward crossing of a ravine with gravelly and sandy bed. One horse fell here. Very good khan at Deir.
	5 0	
Deir to Tibni	5 30	(Excluding a halt of 45 minutes for tea.) At 15 minutes from Deir there is an awkward crossing of a ravine, over which a bridge is being built. At 2 hours from Deir there is a steep descent into the plain. Within the last half-hour there were three steep and awkward places, but not long or really serious. Good khan at Tibni.
	10 30	

Total time from Miyadin to Tibni, 11 hours 40 minutes.

March 11, 1908.

Place.	Time.	Description.
	Hrs. min.	
Tibna to Sabkha..	8 50	There is an awkward descent just outside Tibna, but a bridge is being made. For 3 hours 20 minutes the road is over high ground; road hard and fairly good. After 3 hours 45 minutes halted at river for half-an-hour to feed horses; from here to Sabkha the road is on the river level. There is a fair khan at Sabkha.
	8 40	

NOTE.—It had rained on the night of the 10th, and it rained the whole of the 11th. The road was very heavy. The Company are thinking of building a khan at the place where the horses were fed.

March 12, 1908.

Sabkha to Hamam	8 5	(Including 40 minutes halt for tea.) First 2½ hours through a tamarisk forest; after that the road rises to higher ground. Three hours after starting a halt of 40 minutes to feed horses. The road is good, and there are no difficulties, but the going was very heavy owing to recent rain. Miserable khan at Hamam.
	7 45	

March 13, 1908.

Hamam to Abu Herera	3 45	Good road all the way, over undulating land; it would not be bad even after rain. Halt at Abu Herera for 1 hour 15 minutes to feed and rest horses.
	4 0	
Abu Herera to Meskeneh . ..	4 15	The first 1 hour 40 minutes over heavy flat country, a good road in dry weather. The next 1 hour 40 minutes are over higher and harder ground. Road good, except one steep descent at 3 hours 20 minutes from Abu Herera. There is a lot of clay and gypsum here which might be heavy and slippery in wet weather. There is a decent khan at Meskeneh.
	3 40	

Total time from Hamam to Meskeneh, 9 hours 15 minutes.

March 14, 1908.

Meskeneh to Deir Hafir	4 10	The road is good, but heavy after rain.
	4 35	
Deir Hafir to Aleppo	6 55	(Including 35 minutes halt for tea and to rest horses.) At 45 minutes from Deir there is a bad stream to cross. We broke a pole. The road is good in dry weather; after rain it is very heavy.
	6 20	

Total time from Meskeneh to Aleppo, 11 hours 40 minutes.

Bagdad to Aleppo.			Aleppo to Bagdad.	
	From—		To—	
Hrs. min.				Hrs. min.
2 50	Bagdad		Abumisir	3 0
2 25	Abumisir		Falluja..	3 0
5 30	Falluja		Ramadi	8 25
2 15	Ramadi		Shariya Abu Rayat	0 0
3 15	Shariya Abu Rayat		Hit	0 0
5 30	Hit		Jubba (Bagdadi). Halted at Bagdadi instead of at Jubba	5 45
5 20	Jubba..		Haditha	5 45
5 30	Haditha		Fihemi..	3 15
5 0	Fihemi		Ana	5 15
4 5	Ana		Sahiya..	4 0
4 30	Nahiya		El Kaim	3 70
2 25	El Kaim		Abu Kamal	3 0
3 10	Abu Kamal		Salahiyeh	3 5
5 5	Salahiyeh		Mindin..	5 0
4 50	Mindin		Der-ez-Zor	5 0
5 30	Der-ez-Zor		Tiona	5 0
8 50	Tibna..		Sabkha..	8 40
8 5	Sabkha		Hamam	7 45
3 45	Hamam		Abu Herera	1 0
4 15	Abu Herera		Meskeneh	3 45
4 10	Meskeneh		Deir Hafir	4 35
6 55	Deir Hafir		Aleppo..	6 20
100 40*				105 55†

* These times were recorded on a journey from Bagdad to Aleppo in March 1908. Both carriages and cart were lightly loaded. After Tibna the roads were heavy on account of rain.

† These times were recorded by a traveller from Aleppo to Bagdad in January or February 1908.

[24025] No. 14.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 367.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 4, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Colonel Surtees, Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on the condition of the Dersim region.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Colonel Surtees to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 4, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following information derived from a reliable source:—

It will be recollected that the raiding of certain villages last autumn was participated in by only a few of the various Dersim Kurd tribes.

This spring, however, certain of the Kizil-Bash Kurds belonging to tribes not then implicated ordered a large quantity of wheat from the Vilayet of Diarbekr in order to replenish their low stores.

Whilst this wheat was being transported to the Dersim, the authorities of the Vilayet of Mamouret-el-Aziz seized the same, and so made—what now appears to have been—a most serious blunder.

The tribes for whom this wheat was destined, and who had hitherto been neutral, now joined with those hostile to the Government; thus the task presented to the Government of reducing these people into submission has been rendered vastly more difficult, and to do so by diplomatic methods appears almost impossible.

In retaliation for the seizure of the wheat, and for the operations of the troops

last autumn, the Kizil-Bash Kurds have plundered many villages in the districts of Chimaskazek, Perteg, Khozat, and other points in that vicinity.

The authorities now aroused to the serious aspect of the situation are hastening troops into the disturbed districts.

Two battalions have recently arrived from Diarbekr, and a third has now probably joined them.

The reserves from Kharput and Arabkir have been called out, and it is stated that a force of some eighteen battalions will take the field.

The Kurds claim to be able to mobilize 50,000 men, chiefly armed with Martinis or Mausers; 25,000 however is probably a more correct figure; but with the advantage which always accrues to those fighting on the defensive, and that the country which is likely to become the theatre of hostilities is exceptionally well suited to guerilla tactics—in which the Kurds are adepts—it seems reasonable to believe that the contest which seems inevitable, will attain important proportions.

It is reported that Fuad Pasha, now Liwa of Redifs at Mamouret-el-Aziz, will be sent to the Dersim as Mutessarif, and also to direct the operations of the troops.

There seems little reason to anticipate that the Kurds will be eventually successful in a struggle with the Imperial troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES.

[24063] No. 15.

Mr. Goodhart to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 104.)
Sir,

Athens, July 7, 1908.

WITH reference to Sir F. Elliot's despatch No. 93 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a letter, addressed by M. Sofoulis to His Majesty's Minister and received by me yesterday, protesting against any increase of the number of troops stationed in Samos and recapitulating some of his arguments concerning the illegal status of the present Samian Assembly.

In a postscript, dated the 30th ultimo, to his despatch No. 358, Confidential, of the 25th ultimo, Mr. Barclay mentions this question of keeping a battalion permanently in the island, and states that the Grand Vizier assured him that there was no intention on the part of the Sublime Porte to increase the garrison above its ordinary strength of two full companies.

M. Delyannis has returned to Athens from Samos after completing his mission of inquiry, and M. Ch. Simopoulos, First Secretary of the Consulate-General at Constantinople, has been temporarily appointed Hellenic Consul in the island; and has already arrived at his post. The supersession of the former Greek Consul would seem to go far to prove that the charges brought against him by Turkey were not without foundation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERON GOODHART.

Inclosure in No. 15.

M. Sofoulis to Sir F. Elliot.

Athènes, le 6 Juillet, 1908.

Excellence,

J'APPRENDS que Capassi Effendi a soumis à l'Assemblée Générale des Samiens un projet de dépêche adressée à la Sublime Porte par laquelle celle-ci est priée de laisser définitivement un bataillon d'armée Turque à Samos.

Me référant à mes derniers Mémoires, je me permets de répéter de nouveau que les décisions ou vœux émanant de cette Assemblée ne peuvent avoir aucune légalité pour les raisons suivantes :-

1. L'Assemblée, convoquée contrairement aux ordonnances formelles et fondamentales de la Constitution et aux lois en vigueur de la Principauté, n'a aucune existence légale, puisque les représentants légaux du peuple Samien ont été destitués arbitrairement, et que leurs successeurs ont été élus sans autres candidats et sous la terreur des armes Turques.

45

2. Les décisions de cette Assemblée illégale ne sont même pas l'expression de la libre pensée des représentants du peuple, mais des décisions forcées par la violence et les menaces, des décisions d'une Assemblée sous la domination des armes Turques.

Du reste, suivant les informations absolument sûres, à la protestation de deux représentants, MM. Z. Boutzalidis et Ch. Georgiades, les organes de Capassi Effendi ont été introduits dans la Salle des Séances pour étouffer toute autre protestation.

3. L'établissement permanent ou plutôt la présence des soldats Turcs à Samos constitue une violation flagrante à l'Article 5 de la Charte de 1832, dont la vigueur ne peut être atteinte par aucun acte de l'Assemblée. Il est évident que toute décision de l'Assemblée qui n'est pas conforme à la lettre et à l'esprit de la Charte constitue une violation et dépasse les limites de ses droits; elle est, par conséquent, illégale.

Pour toutes ces raisons j'ai la ferme conviction que les Puissances Protectrices ne feront aucune attention à un vœu forcé d'une Assemblée illégale, qui ne représente nullement l'opinion officielle du peuple, mais l'opinion personnelle de quelques individus opposée, en outre, au régime du pays.

En tout cas, j'ai l'honneur d'adresser aux Représentants des Puissances Protectrices la présente protestation, afin de préserver les droits du peuple Samien, des droits accordés à la suite d'énormes sacrifices d'une lutte de treize ans.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) TH. P. SOFOULIS.

[24188] No. 16.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 1.)
Sir,

Bagdad, June 9, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your information, a copy of my despatch No. 55 of to-day's date, which I have addressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, on the subject of the recent attack by Arabs on the British steamer "Blosse Lynch."

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Consul-General Ramsay to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 55.)
Sir,

Bagdad, June 9, 1908.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 8th June, I have the honour to inform you that since my return to Bagdad I have been trying to get what information is possible about the recent attack on the British steamer "Blosse Lynch" and the subsequent conduct of the Turks and Arabs. In my telegram of the 8th June I gave a short account of former attacks, and suggested that Nazim Pasha should at once take the place of Hussein Bey, the Vali of Bussorah, that the Turks should be seriously pressed to punish Ghadban, and that the Consul at Bussorah should see the Vali with a view to finding out what arguments he used to defend his conduct. In this letter I will try to explain more fully the history of the case and the grounds for my opinions.

2. The first attack ever made on a British steamer on the Tigris was in 1880, and this was made by the Abu Muhammad Arabs under Seyhul. I inclose a sketch map explaining the geography of the places named in this letter,* and the general limits of

* Not reproduced.

the tribes concerned. The most important, but by no means all, members of the Albu Muhammad tribes are shown in the following Table:—

It seems that the tribal lands were first leased to Shiah, but when he fell into arrears the lands were made over to Yessur, Seyhud, and Wadi. In the spring of 1880 Seyhud's share of the revenue fell into arrears, but he nevertheless wanted to get further leases of his own land, as also of Wadi's land. The Mutessarif took bribes from both Seyhud and Wadi and gave the same land to both of them, telling them to settle their differences between themselves. Apparently Seyhud was the one who suffered most, and finding that he could not obtain either the land for which he had bribed nor the return of the bribe, he determined to call attention to his grievance, and with this object attacked the British steamer "Khalifah," killing a quartermaster and a passenger, and wounding both the captain and the chief engineer. Fortunately the Arabs did not succeed in boarding the steamer. A Turkish steamer had gone up the river shortly before the "Khalifah," and another Turkish steamer followed close behind her. Neither of these Turkish steamers was fired at, and the Resident reported that Fuli Abdul Rahman Pasha was only expressing what every one thought when he informed the Resident that the attack was not owing to any mistake nor to any animosity on the part of the Arabs towards the English, but that a British steamer was selected because the Arabs knew that an attack on a Turkish steamer would do them no good as it would attract neither notice nor sympathy.

As a result of this attack the Vali expressed regret, troops were sent against Seyhud, steamers held the entrance and exit of his stronghold in the marshes, and friendly Arabs were employed against him. The result was that though Seyhud escaped capture, owing to mismanagement or dishonesty, he had to undergo great hardship and some loss, and he clearly realized that he had made a serious blunder when he attacked our steamer with a view to calling attention to his affairs.

The Albu Muhammad Arabs have never again interfered with our steamers, and for twenty-six years no one dared to do so. That this result was caused by the active measures taken against Seyhud there can be little doubt. It would be foolish to suppose that the Turkish officials gave no further cause for discontent among the Arabs and further attacks were, in fact, made on Turkish steamers.

In 1890 Seyhud was dissatisfied with the arrangements made after the death of his brother, Wadi; to show his displeasure he fired on the Turkish steamer "Resafi" and wounded a passenger. The Political Assistant at Bussorah reported that the Turkish authorities appeared to attach little importance to the matter. It does not appear from my records that any steps were taken against the Arabs for this attack.

In 1892 Seyhud again had grievances about his lands, and he plundered a number of sailing-vessels, removed the telegraph-posts, and attacked the Turkish steamer "Mosul." Troops and guns were moved against him, and he was at one time reduced to great straits.

After this the river traffic seems to have been fairly secure up to 1906. On the 12th May, 1906, a number of Arabs in native boats tried to board the British steamer "Medjidieh." They used no violence, and their object was probably to rob some cargo from the barge. It is generally believed that they had succeeded in a similar attempt on the Turkish steamer "Burhaniyah" a few days earlier. As the attempt to board the "Medjidieh" was made some 15 miles below Ezra's tomb, it seems probable that it was made by the Bani Malich Arabs under Seyhud.

On the 26th May it was reported in Bagdad that the Turkish steamers "Burhaniyah" and "Mosul" had both been fired at. When I saw Vali Majid Bey and mentioned these attacks to him he pretended ignorance of them, but later on during the interview he received a report from the Turkish Steamer Administration, and he then

informed me that there had been attacks on the steamers. In writing he denied that there had been any attacks. It is well known in Bagdad that the captain of the Turkish steamer was sent for to the Serai and told that his steamer had not been fired at, and that he was not to say that it had.

On the 30th May the British steamer "Khalifah" was attacked at Nuber Ariz, a short distance above Amarah. This attack was made by the tribe of the Bani Lam, under Sheikh Ghadban, who had shortly before seized a number of sailing vessels, fired on the Turkish steamers, and raided the grazing grounds near Amarah. Ghadban's immediate object was to make his power felt, and so get possession of the Senieh property known as Kuneit. Mr. Consul Crow's despatch, dated the 6th March, 1906, gives a full account of the history of Kuneit. Briefly, it is this. The hereditary cultivators of Kuneit are the Albu Darraj Arabs, and their Sheikh is Hatab. He is married to the daughter of Seyhud, but the tribe is accustomed to accept either the Albu Muhammad or the Bani Lam as overlords. Kuneit had been leased to Hatab for two years, but as there were continual fights between the Albu Darraj and the Bani Lam the lease was cancelled and unexpired portion given to Sheikh Ghadban. Ghadban then seized Hatab and his relations and held them as prisoners. At the time of Mr. Crow's report the lease had expired, the head of the Senieh wanted to give the new lease of Kuneit to the Albu Muhammad, and the Mutessarif wanted to give it to Ghadban. The Vali, who was sent to inquire into the matter, reported that if it was desired to accept the higher offer of the Albu Muhammad it would be necessary to oust Ghadban from the adjoining lands. Ghadban apparently thought it to his interest to show how much trouble he could give if he was not pacified.

After the attack on the British steamer, I failed in my attempts to make Vali Medjid Bey take a serious view of the matter. He treated it as a petty affair of no importance, and said that he hoped an arrangement would be made to settle the difference between the two tribes.

In July it was reported in Bagdad that Vali Medjid Bey, who was at Amarah, was going to give the lease of Kuneit to a nominee of Ghadban's. It was probably for this reason that the Turkish steamer "Burhaniyah" was fired at by Seyhud's Arabs in the same month. The Vali had to admit that shots had been fired, but he denied that any attack had been intended. Shortly after this Ghadban built a fort on the banks of the Tigris.

On the 7th July, at about 15 miles below Ezra's tomb, the British steamer "Medjidieh" was warned by a large body of armed Arabs that they would be attacked on their return journey, unless before that time a satisfactory answer was received to representations that had been made to Constantinople. These threats were, I understand, made by Seyhud's Arabs. It is curious to notice that, though Seyhud still seemed to believe in getting the English to bring his grievances to notice, he remembered the lesson that he had twenty-six years before, and did not carry out his threat.

So far as I have been able to learn, no one has been punished for his lawless conduct during 1906; no apology or expression of regret was ever offered for the attack on our steamer, and generally we and our interests were ignored. I ventured to point out at the time that this could only have one result.

In May 1907 Hatem, son of Seyhud, seems to have had a just grievance against the Seniyeh (see Mr. Crow's despatch of the 8th May), and he took his revenge by stopping the passage of sailing-vessels to the serious loss of British merchants. I have not heard that he was ever punished for this.

In April 1908 the British steamer "Blosse Lynch" was fired at on two occasions at a short distance below Amarah. One passenger was killed, while two passengers and a fireman were wounded. This attack was made by Ghadban's men, and up to the time of writing I am not aware of any steps having been taken to punish him. On the contrary, it is said that the Vali of Bussorah has been bribed, and has even given, or is going to give, to Ghadban all he demands.

3. I have troubled you, both in my telegram of the 8th June and in this letter, with this review of past events, because I think that they show that the tribe, the Abu Muhammad, which attacked our steamer in 1880 and was punished for it, has by one lesson learned that it is not to their advantage to attack us. The Bani Lam, on the contrary, finding that their attack in 1906 had the desired effect, and entailed no disagreeable consequences, have acted upon their own experience, and have in 1908 followed the line of action which they have found profitable in 1906. In the case of the Maaghil affair all local opinion agrees that the motive was of a political nature, namely, to draw the attention of Constantinople to the locality, and get some official,

or party of officials, into trouble. In fact, we are being used as a kind of alarm bell, which can at any time be struck without danger to the striker, and with the certainty that Constantinople will direct the local officials to quiet the excitement that has been caused by the striking of the bell.

The Arabs between Bagdad and Bussorah have not, and have never pretended to have, any grievance against us. Consequently, they only attack us as a matter of policy. If we now insist on their being punished, they will realize that the policy is one that does not pay, and they will leave us alone in future.

4. Anything approaching exact information as to the strength of the various Arab tribes is not obtainable, but I inclose a statement that was obtained in July 1906 showing the Government and Saniyeh lands on the Lower Tigris held by the Albu Muhammad and Bani Lam tribes and a few other persons. The information given in the statement may be taken as approximately correct, but it is of course only compiled from private sources. According to this statement, the Albu Muhammad Arabs were then holding lands valued at £T. 110,000 a-year, and the Bani Lam Arabs were holding lands valued at £T. 13,300 a-year. The statement affords no reason to suppose that the Bani Lam are more powerful than the Albu Muhammad, who in 1880 and 1892 were soon reduced to submission.

5. When I was at Constantinople I saw a telegram stating that, according to the Vali of Bussorah, Nazim Pasha wished to weaken the influence of the local Sheikhs and introduce outsiders from Nejd (I quote the telegram from memory). This was not correct. I have seen Nazim Pasha, and I understand that his object is to curb the rising power of Seyhud and Ghadban, not for the benefit of strangers from Nejd, but for the benefit of the smaller Sheikhs whose tribes, or sections of tribes, cultivate the land. The difference is a very important one, for the effect of introducing strangers from Nejd would be to combine all the local Arabs against the Turks, while Nazim Pasha's policy, if carried out in moderation, makes a large number of friends for the Turks.

6. The present troubles came to a head in connection with the tract of land known as Majar-al-Saghir. The information which reaches me is that this tract used to be held on lease by the El Ezarij Arabs until three years ago, when it was given to Ghadban. Nazim Pasha wished to give it to Ibn Natisa, who, though he is generally known as Natisa Nedjdi, on account of his origin, is a man who was born and brought up in Amarah, and who has been adopted into the El Ezarij tribe.

I have had a long interview with Nazim Pasha, who apparently has no executive authority in the matter of these lands near Amarah—at any rate, none that he could exercise in the face of opposition without reference to Constantinople. He was at Amarah when the "Blosse Lynch" was fired at. He had sent some soldiers under Ismail Bey in the direction of Majar Saghir. I have not been able to ascertain clearly either the object or the objective of Ismail Bey, but Nazim Pasha says that he had no business to be on the river; that it was not known that he had gone by the river; that if he had not gone that way the "Blosse Lynch" would not have been fired at; and that that is the reason that the "Blosse Lynch" was allowed to pass Amarah without being warned of the danger.

After the attack on the "Blosse Lynch," Nazim Pasha submitted a report to Constantinople asking for orders as to the policy to be followed, and recommending the early relief of Ismail Bey, the Commandant of the troops at Amarah. Nazim Pasha thought that it would be better to come to Bagdad and await orders, partly because the telegraphic communication between Bagdad and Constantinople is better than between Amarah and Constantinople.

Before leaving Amarah, Nazim Pasha saw Ghadban's Secretary, and made with him the following conditions, but fixed no time limit for their fulfilment:—

(1.) That if any of Ghadban's men again fired on the river traffic he should hand them up to the Turkish Government;

(2.) That Ghadban should return all the property that his men had taken from sailing vessels;

(3.) That Ghadban should pay up his arrears of revenue; and

(4.) That at the termination of existing leases Ghadban should loyally accept the orders of the local authorities, and not attempt to obtain his wishes by lawless conduct.

Nazim Pasha went on to say that after he left Amarah the Vali of Bussorah came there and practically gave in to all of Ghadban's demands. On hearing this Nazim Pasha telegraphed to Constantinople that it was possible to follow either his policy or

that of the Vali of Bussorah, but not both at the same time, consequently one of them should be relieved of all responsibility. Nazim Pasha also said that on hearing of the conduct of the Vali of Bussorah he had telegraphed to the Daftardar at Bussorah not to agree to any new leases pending the receipt of orders from Constantinople. Nazim Pasha said that he did not think that it would be very seriously difficult to reduce Ghadban to submission; that the exact number of troops required was a matter for decision by military experts; but that, in his opinion, the thing that was really essential was a good commander of the troops and unity of purpose among the Turkish officials. The present Commandant is a man named Muhammad Pasha, an Albanian, with whom Nazim Pasha expressed himself quite content. Muhammad Pasha, I understand, is almost universally respected.

At the end of the conversation I suggested to Nazim Pasha that he had omitted one essential condition, and another that seemed to me desirable. The essential condition was that Ghadban should hand up the men who fired on the "Blosse Lynch." Nazim Pasha said that he had made this condition, and that Ghadban had accepted it in writing. I am afraid that neither of the statements was true. The desirable condition suggested by me was that Ghadban should knock down his fort; Nazim Pasha knew nothing of this fort.

The general impression left upon my mind after my interview with Nazim Pasha was that he wished to see Ghadban brought to his senses, but that he thought more about collecting arrears of revenue and getting assurances for the future than about punishing Ghadban for what he has already done.

Before taking leave of Nazim Pasha I said that I knew there were many evil-disposed persons who spread false rumours that the English intrigued with the Arabs, and that, as far as I could judge, such stories were useful only to those officials whose own misconduct had caused the Arabs to become turbulent. I said that, for myself, my only wish was to see Ghadban punished quickly, so that we might have no further cause to interest ourselves in local Arab politics. I also mentioned that I had heard it said that we were interested in the arms trade. I told Nazim Pasha of the efforts we are making to stop it, and of Major Grey's deputation to Brussels in this connection.

7. I have obtained some other information and opinions from private sources, which I have thought it better to embody in a separate Confidential note which I am sending to you by this mail. I am reserving for this Memorandum my remarks and suggestions as to the various courses of action which seem open to us.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Statement by Captain Cowley, of Lynch's Steamer "Khalifah," respecting the Arab Tribes.

FROM Gurna to Saraifa both banks are occupied by the Bani Malij Arabs. There are several small Sheikhs, whose names Captain Cowley did not know. These Arabs belong to the Madan (Albu Muhammad) tribe, but they are separate from Seyhud.

From Saraifa to Amarah the whole of the left bank is occupied by the Albu Muhammad tribe. On the right bank Captain Cowley did not know the name of the tribe between Saraifa and Ezra's tomb. From Ezra's tomb to Majar Saghaira the right bank as well as the left is occupied by the Albu Muhammad. From Majar Saghaira to Amarah the right bank is occupied by the El Ezarij Arabs. These men formerly looked up to Seyhud, but now they form part of the forces commanded by Ghadban.

Right Bank.

Amarah to Kut: From Amarah to the Liptera Canal, the Bani Lam and Liptera is generally the head-quarters of Ghadban himself. Here he keeps a sort of standing army of about 500 armed men. From Liptera to Kumeit the land belongs to the Albu Darraj Arabs. Ghadban is said to have had the Sheikhs in custody for some time, but some of them recently escaped.

From Kumeit to Ali Shergi there are the El Ezarij Arabs under Ghadban. Some time ago they were intriguing with Seyhud, so Ghadban has sent his brother Bilasan to live with them.

From Ali Shergi to Ali Gharbi there are Bani Lam Arabs under Sheikh Fahad, brother of Ghadban.

From Ali Gharbi to Sheikh Saad there are Arabs of the Beit Jendil tribe.

From Sheikh Saad to Umm-el-Hanna are Bani Lam Arabs owning allegiance to Sheikh Ghadban, but divided into sections under a number of petty Sheikhs.

Left Bank.

From Amarah to Umm-el-Hanna the whole of the left bank is occupied by Bani Lam Arabs, under a number of Sheikhs owning allegiance to Sheikh Ghadban.

Umm-el-Hanna appears to be the point dividing northern and southern interests.

Inclosure 3 in No. 16.

STATEMENT showing the Amount of Rent Paid by the Albu Muhammad and Beni Lam for the Lands Leased by them from the Turkish Government and Dayerat-es-Saniya in 1906, A.D.

Name of Lessee.	Name of Property.	Name of Position.	Rent of Government Lands.	Rent of Saniya Lands.	Remarks.
			Turkish liras.	Turkish liras.	
		ALBU MUHAMMAD.			
		Right Bank of the Tigris.			
Fehed-bin-Seyhood	Kasra	Between Ezair and Kal'at Saleh	1,000	..	
" "	Hafira	Opposite Kal'at Saleh	5,500	..	
Sheikh Seyhood	Majar-el-Kabir Canal	At Abu Sidra, between opposite Kal'at Saleh and Amara ..	24,000	..	
Sohgh-bin-Gibail	Jowwar	Above Majar-el-Kabir	1,500	..	
[illegible]	Majar-es-Saghir Canal, south bank	Above Jowwar	8,000	..	
Abu Darraj	Sufha and Sufaiha	Adjoining Kumait, but below it	5,000	..	
		Left Bank of the Tigris.			
Othman and Zeboon, sons of Yissir	Machriya and Shat	From opposite Ezair to Abu Sidra	..	10,000	
Araibi-bin-Wadi	Chahala	From behind Amara to Soweib and Howaiza	..	25,000	
" "	Dhalaima	South part of the Island of Amara	..	2,000	
Mahomed Sa'ad and Mahmood Ajil, Shiekhs of Soudan Arabs	Bahatha	Adjoins Chahala on the north	..	2,500	
Ibn Faris, of Soudan	Jirait	Adjoins Bahatha	..	2,500	
Buddai-bin-Michaisir, of Sowa'id Arabs	Misharrah Canal, south bank ..	Adjoins Jirait	..	10,000	
			18,000	62,000	
		Total	110,000		
		BANI LAM.			
		Left Bank of the Tigris.			
Sheikh Ghadban	Nahr Sa'ad	Above Misharrah Canal	1,500	..	
" "	Jezra	Above Nahr Sa'ad	1,700	..	

Name of Position.	Name of Property.			Rent of Government Lands.	Rent of Sundry Lands.	Remarks.
				Turkish lires.	Turkish lires.	
Sheikh Ghadhban	Khudeiya	..	..	700	..	Inland tract between Jezira and Tib stream
..	Dowaibji	..	..	400	..	Large inland tract between Dowaibji stream and Persian frontier
Shaikh Abdullah and Mudhlaj	Thileib and Thileibat and Shaikh	..	..	3,000	..	From desert to about boundary and to Tib stream inland
			..	..	6,000	
				7,000	6,000	
		Total	..	13,000		
						Right Bank of the Tigris.
Sheikh Ghadhban	Kumait	..	..	2,500	..	Between Amara and Kumaili
			..	..	6,000	Majarra-Saghir Canal, north
			..	..	..	Majarra-Saghir Canal
			..	..	..	Bisaira
			..	..	..	Abu Tikana
			..	..	..	Abu Rumana
Fahad ibn-Ghadhban and Mezaiel-bin-Nirma	Ali Gharbi		..	1,500	..	
				7,000	11,000	
		Total	..	18,000		

Name of Lessee.	Name of Property.			Rent of Government Lands.	Rent of Sundry Lands.	Remarks.
				Turkish lires.	Turkish lires.	
Sheikh Ghadhban	Khudeiya	..	..	700	..	Inland tract between Jezira and Tib stream
..	Dowaibji	..	..	400	..	Large inland tract between Dowaibji stream and Persian frontier
Shaikh Abdullah and Mudhlaj	Thileib and Thileibat and Shaikh	..	..	3,000	..	From desert to about boundary and to Tib stream inland
			..	..	6,000	
				7,000	6,000	
		Total	..	13,000		
						Right Bank of the Tigris.
Nasrin-bin-Mejlli Amara	Abdulla,	of	Akkip and Rumeili	..	2,500	Between Amara and Kumaili
Rahadi	..	..	Majarra-Saghir Canal	north	..	Above Jahwar
			Bisaira		..	Opposite Jahwar
Lateyef-el-Amara	..	..	Abu Tikana	..	..	..
..	..	..	Abu Rumana	..	..	..
Fahad ibn-Ghadhban and Mezaiel-bin-Nirma	..	..	Ali Gharbi	..	..	..

[24189] No. 17.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Sir, *Baghdad, June* 13, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your information a copy of the Confidential Memorandum mentioned in paragraph 7 of my despatch of the 9th June to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad.*

Inclosure in No. 17.

Memorandum regarding Arab Disturbances on the Tigris.

(Confidential.)

IN reply to my telegram of the 8th June Mr. Barclay pointed out that Lynch had claimed damages for the attack on the "Blosse Lynch," that my proposals would probably entail interference with navigation, and he inquired whether Lynch's agent was in agreement with me.

I replied on the 11th June that Lynch's agent agreed with me, as did Mr. Cree, the only other British merchant here, and that I did not think there would be serious interference with navigation if the Turks showed a real determination to punish Ghadban, acted quickly, and removed the Turkish officials who are supporters of Ghadban.

There are three purely British firms in Baghdad, one of which is temporarily represented by a Baghdad Jew; the other two are the firms of Lynch and of Blockey, Cree, and Co. Mr. Parry is the Manager of Lynch; he is a shrewd man with a clear head, and many years' experience of Baghdad, Bussorah, and Ahwaz. Before he left Baghdad for Bussorah he showed me his confidential report to Mr. Lynch, in which he urged the necessity of pressing for the punishment of Ghadban; he mentioned the possibility of Lynch making a claim for damages and gave some figures, but it was quite clear that he did not support the idea of making a claim. As a matter of fact Lynch has no just claim. The recent disturbances on the river had closed it to sailing-vessels for some months previous to the attack on the "Blosse Lynch," and during this time downward steamer freights have been ruinously high, owing to the absence of sailing-vessels. Consequently the unsettled state of the country has put money into Lynch's pocket. If Lynch's claim is that one of his steamers lost a trip because she was stopped at Kut, the obvious answer is that the Turks supplied an escort for the vessel when she started from Baghdad, and that Mr. Lynch telegraphed to have her stopped, in ignorance of the fact that an escort had been provided. If he likes to act in the dark, that is surely no reason why the Turks should pay compensation. If Mr. Lynch's claim is on behalf of the killed and wounded, it does not seem much better founded. The woman who was killed is a Persian, and among the wounded there is only one Bahreini who has any claim to British protection. In any case a claim of this sort should be made, if it is made at all, by the British Government, and not by Mr. Lynch.

In my telegram of the 11th June to Mr. Barclay I said that I had informed Lynch's agent that I should oppose any claim for damages, and the agent said that he would telegraph to Mr. Lynch to withdraw the claim and to ask for the punishment of Ghadban. It is, I think, most important that we should allow no side issues regarding private claims to obscure the real question which we have to face. That question is, can we again afford to salve our wounded interests and dignity with Turkish assurances for the future? I am a novice in Turkish politics, but I have some experience of Orientals in general and of semi-civilized Mahommedan tribes in particular, and I am quite sure that the answer to the question is in the negative.

Lynch's present agent is Mr. Tod, who has been in Baghdad for four or five years. He entirely agrees with my views.

The firm of Blockey, Cree, and Co. is represented by Mr. Cree, who has been in England for about thirteen years, and who is a sound business man. He also agrees with me.

I am aware that it may perhaps cause temporary trouble and inconvenience if pressure is brought to bear on Ghadban, but the feeling in the British community here is very strong that we had better put up with any temporary inconvenience rather than allow it to be supposed that British interests can be attacked in the most open and direct way, not only with impunity, but with positive advantage to the assailant.

2. The history of past troubles on the Tigris goes to show that they are generally caused by the rapacity and mutual jealousies of the Turkish officials, and each attack is a sort of savage appeal for justice, which the Arabs think they cannot get by lawful means. It is an unfortunate state of affairs, and I have every sympathy for the Arabs; but because they are misgoverned it is no reason why British interests should be allowed to suffer by direct attack. To insure justice for the Arabs is, I fear, impossible under the existing Turkish system, and if this is so the only remedy open to us is to force the Arabs to understand that their protests must not take the form of attacks on us. The Arabs seem to have a kind of general confidence in British justice, and they think that if we are forced to interfere we will support the person who has justice on his side. Some people also tell me that the Arabs have an idea that if there is enough trouble we will step in and put things right by direct intervention.

3. I have had a long private and confidential conversation with the Commander-in-chief. His view is that nothing can be done as long as Hassan Bey is Vali of Bussorah, because he will always support Ghadban, who has bought him; that Ghadban can easily be brought to his senses by a very small number of troops, if he gets no support from Turkish officials, and if the Commandant of the troops is a good man; that Muhammad Pasha is an excellent man for the work if he gets the necessary orders from Constantinople; that the troops can be trusted if the Commandant is the right man and really means to do what he pretends to be doing; that Yusuf Pasha, the Head of the Sanie at Amarah, is a good and straightforward man, who disapproves of the conduct of the Vali of Bussorah; and that Ghadban was beginning to be afraid before the Vali returned to Amarah to support him.

Sidki Pasha enlarged upon the need for loyalty to each other among the Turkish officials and the difficulty of obtaining it. I asked him if he thought it would tend to keep them together if I went down in the "Comet" and kept in touch with them. He of course said that this would not be approved at Constantinople, and I only made the suggestion in the hope that he would mention it at Constantinople as a horrible possibility. His Excellency is in favour of punishing Ghadban.

4. I have also had a long private talk with Pertev Pasha. He is an intelligent man, who has studied the Arab question from the military point of view. His opinion is practically identical with that of the Commander-in-chief. He said that Muhammed Pasha could be trusted to bring Ghadban to submission with a very small force, if Constantinople make it clear to all concerned that Ghadban's submission is the real object desired.

5. The inner history of the latest attack on the "Blosse Lynch," as I have been able to piece it together from various local sources of information, is as follows:

Certain leases of lands on the lower Tigris were going to expire this spring. In February 1908 Ghadban's Secretary, Mulla Mirayes, went to Bussorah with £T. 2,500, which he deposited with one Sayed Ahmed Samedy, under the guarantee of Abdul Wahab Kattas. The money was to be paid to the Vali on his granting satisfactory leases for the next three years. Nazim Pasha heard something of this, and he telegraphed to Bussorah to give no leases pending his arrival at Bussorah. (I know that Nazim Pasha left hurriedly for Bussorah on account of some information received, because this is how he explained his being unable to dine with me.) From Bussorah Nazim Pasha went to Amarah, and called on Seyhud and Ghadban, to pay up their arrears of revenue on their existing leases before they began to discuss new leases. This did not suit the two Sheikhs or the Vali of Bussorah, so the latter advised the two Sheikhs to settle their mutual differences, and so become too strong for Nazim Pasha. The Vali did this in the hope that he would eventually be called in to settle matters. When Nizam Pasha was at Amarah, the "Blosse Lynch" was attacked, and the Vali told the Consul at Bussorah that Nazim Pasha was upsetting the country by trying to supersede the local Sheikhs by Nejdis. Nizam Pasha then returned to Bagdad, and if he did so under orders from Constantinople the Vali's plans seemed to have succeeded famously.

After Nazim Pasha's departure, Ghadban's Secretary and Seyhud's clerk, Khassaf, both went to Bussorah in the Turkish steamer "Burhaniya," the latter taking with him £T. 2,000; at Bussorah they stayed with Sayed Ahmed. After this the Vali of Bussorah came to Amarah, and it is said that in all he received £T. 5,000 from Ghadban, and was prepared to give him all that he wanted. When Nazim Pasha heard this he telegraphed to the Defterdar of the Bussorah Vilayet to agree to no leases without orders from Constantinople. One result of these proceedings on the part of the Vali was that the townspeople of Amarah besieged his house and complained that he had sold them to the Arabs, over whom there would be no semblance of control in future. The townspeople at the same time telegraphed on the subject to the Porte and to Nazim Pasha. The Vali, seeing that he had got into an awkward position, sent a man named Sherkh-el-Taif to meet Ghadban at a place called Dallis, near Amarah, and it was arranged that Ghadban should return all property stolen from the people of Amarah, that Ghadban should see that law and order were preserved in the precincts of Amarah, and that just debts were paid.

6. On the 12th June I heard, and it is confirmed by a private letter from Mr. Gerry, that Hatem, son of Seyhud, about the 2nd June, 1908, attacked some sailing-vessels, that the Vali of Bussorah got him into Amarah on some false promise and threw him into gaol.

7. To kill or arrest Ghadban is very probably beyond the power of the Turkish Government, but to make him suffer severely in reputation and property is not difficult. With the steamers at their disposal the Turks are in no difficulty for transport, and, if Ghadban is forced to fly, he will at once lose prestige and the Turks can assist his enemies to harass him.

He must have many enemies, and I am informed by a man who has a lifelong experience of the river that there is great discontent in Ghadban's own camp, especially among the Bait Jendil and the men under Fahad.

The Turks can make use of the hereditary enmity between the Albu Muhammad and the Bani Lam; even if the two Sheikhs of these tribes patched up their quarrel the reconciliation is not likely to last long, especially if the Vali of Bussorah gives everything to Ghadban and casts Hatem into gaol.

8. It seems to me that three courses are open to us:—

(1.) To be satisfied with the paper assurances of the Porte, which we know to be valueless;

(2.) To really press the Porte to take serious notice of Ghadban's attack on us; and

(3.) To submit to what has already happened and then approach the Arabs direct, and tell them that they only combine us with the Turks against themselves if they attack us, and undertake, if they attack us again, to take a very direct interest in having them punished.

9. The first course seems to me impossible of acceptance, unless we are prepared to submit to an unlimited number of similar assaults. In February 1907 British promises at Muaghil were attacked and an Englishman shot in his house, and up to the present moment no one has been finally sentenced to any punishment, the case is still in the Courts, while most of the prisoners have escaped from gaol. In May 1906 our steamer was fired at, and not even an attempt was made to punish any one. In April 1908 the same thing has occurred.

On this occasion, as the captain kept his head, and his course, we escaped with one killed and three wounded. It is not difficult to imagine the public outcry there would have been if the ship had been gutted and a large number of British subjects killed. Careless steering for less than a minute would be enough to run the steamer ashore, and if she had run ashore, who can put a limit to the violence and savagery of the Arabs? Lynch's steamers have been known to carry as many as 800 British subjects.

The Arabs are getting better armed every day, and if they got emboldened by success beyond a certain point they may get so strong as to be really dangerous to the Turks.

It must not be supposed that the Turks may be beaten by the Bani Lam as they were beaten not long ago by the Muntafic. In that case they wanted to get revenge; in the present case they need only punish; and if Ghadban has to flee something will have been gained.

Fortunately, to attain our object, we are under no obligation to eradicate the

natural dislike of the Arab to pay revenue, nor has he any quarrel with us. All we need do is to convince him that it is unprofitable for him to gratuitously attack us on the foolish assumption that we shall help him because he does so.

There are other reasons against a policy of absolute resignation. There are foolish people who say that we foment these Arab revolts with a view to stepping in later on, and I have heard it said that we have allowed the British steamers to be attacked merely to hide the fact that we are assisting the Arabs. However fantastic the tale, it may be argued that there is no other explanation of our inaction under repeated aggression. I must admit that I can offer no satisfactory explanation. If these ideas spread they will do us more damage at Constantinople than will pressure put on the Porte to assert its authority.

Another reason in favour of energetic action is that the ways of the Porte are tortuous. It is possible that these attacks on our steamers have the approval of those who would like to see our steamers off the river.

Another reason for some decisive action at the present time is that the unrest in Persia and along the northern portion of the Turco-Persian frontier has not yet spread to the south, and it seems desirable to settle with the river Arabs before there is any trouble on the adjacent frontier. If once the idea gets abroad that we favour disturbances they are likely to increase, to the serious detriment of our commerce.

Finally, we must remember that there is continual intercourse between India and Mesopotamia, and it is most distinctly against our interest that returning Indians should spread stories that we are either unable or unwilling to protect our subjects and property as well as we used to do.

10. The second alternative is the only one which seems to me practicable. If the Porte will meet our wishes I could very easily let it be known that they were acting with our approval, and I might go to Amarah, pay and receive visits from the Turkish officials, and so give them a certain amount of moral support. At the same time the Consul at Muhammarah, the Political Officer at Koweit, and the Consul at Kermanshah might approach the Sheikhs of Muhammerah and Koweit and the Vali of Pushti Kuh with a view to asking them to write friendly letters of remonstrance to Ghadban for having attacked British interests. If the Sheikhs do not care to write letters, they can no doubt find means of making their views known, should they care to do so.

11. I am aware that His Majesty's Embassy may find it difficult to stir the Porte to serious action. I believe that the motive which is most likely to move them in the direction we desire is a wish to give me no excuse for entering into any relations, official or social, with the Arab Sheikhs. I have tried, without committing myself in any way, to arouse a fear of this possibility. In my private interviews with the Commander-in-chief and Fetter Pasha I suggested the possibility of my going to Amarah and the impossibility of our acquiescing in the present state of affairs. I have written to Messrs. Lynch and Co. asking whether they can supply me with coal for the "Comet" at Amarah at short notice during the next three months, and I have asked Messrs. Lynch's agent not to treat the letter as confidential. I have told the pilot of the "Comet" to find out who are Ghadban's enemies.

12. The third alternative offers many difficulties. It might succeed, but it would be hateful to the Turks while, if it failed, it would put us in a doubly awkward position. In fact, it is rather an alternative which may be useful for purposes of discussion with the Porte than one that can be seriously considered as a practical course of action.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad.*

Baghdad, June 13, 1908.

[24190] No. 18.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 3.)

Baghdad, June 25, 1908.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 2 dated the 13th June, 1908, I have the honour to submit for your information a copy of my despatch No. 61 of to-day's date,

which I have addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople on the subject of the recent attack on the British steamer "Blosse Lynch."

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Consul-General Ramsay to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 61.)

Sir,

Baghdad, June 25, 1908.

AS I found it difficult to fully reply by telegram to the questions raised in your telegram of the 17th June, I thought it better to ask you to await a letter.

2. The first question that appears to need an answer is: Have we any guarantee that the Grand Vizier is not temporizing with us rather than with the Arabs? I have no means of forming an opinion on this question.

3. It is not ideal weather for military operations in this country, but troops on active service in Mesopotamia will suffer at any time of the year from either heat or cold. It is not considered too hot to send troops to Nedjef, and I do not see why it should be thought too hot to send them to Amarah.

4. I am asked whether I think the Turks can punish Ghadban at this time of the year without much difficulty. I think that the answer entirely depends upon the real intention of the Turks. I have not suggested that they should make war upon the Bani Lam tribe, and I think it would be both unjust and unwise to do so; unjust, because the tribe as a whole has not misbehaved, and because the ordinary tribesmen cannot help obeying the orders of the Sheikh of his tribe, who has the support of the Turkish Government; unwise, because the whole work would have to be done by Turkish soldiers, and the whole tribe, and possibly their friends, might unite to oppose the Turks. All that I have asked for is the punishment of Ghadban, who caused our steamers to be twice attacked (1906 and 1908) for his own political ends, and also the punishment of the Vali of Bussorah, who has supported Ghadban. The Vali can be punished by a mere order, and until such an order is issued it would appear unduly sanguine to believe in any assurances of the Grand Vizier or the Sublime Porte. The punishment of Ghadban should not be difficult if it is properly managed. My information is that Ghadban is far from popular, and I inclose a list of the Sheikhs of his tribe who are not on friendly terms with him. This list has been prepared by a man who has intimate knowledge of the tribe. I am trying to get the information he has given me checked from two independent sources, but this is not easy. If the Turks were to once make it known and get it believed, that they were determined to punish Ghadban, that they had no quarrel with the tribes, and that they would reward the Sheikhs who might assist them, I do not think that any military operations on a large scale would be required, though some show of force would be necessary to escort Ghadban and to put more into his enemies in the tribe.

5. The question of interruption of navigation is of course an important one. Here again much depends upon the real intention of the Turks. If they want the navigation to be interrupted it certainly will be interrupted, and further attacks may take place on our steamers, but if the Turks act in good faith, I do not believe that the interruption would last long.

6. If there is an interruption all traders will be liable to suffer, and I trust I may be excused if I say that I am unable to understand why Lynch and his shareholders should be shown more consideration than any one else trading in British merchandize. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company have for many year enjoyed the support of the British Government, and the large profits arising from a partial monopoly; if for a week or two they cease to gather those profits, on what grounds should they demand compensation, especially if the interruption is due to reasonable measures taken by the Turks to uphold our interests and to avenge insults to us?

7. In my recent letters I gave a brief review of the attacks to which we have submitted without obtaining the punishment of any of our aggressors. I omitted to mention the occasion on which the Vice-Consulate at Karbala was fired into in 1906. My investigation on the spot showed—

(*a.*) That the local officials had no reasonable excuse for firing;

(*b.*) That they opened fire from a place where it was almost certain that the Consulate would be struck;

(*c.*) That some men fired into the door of the Vice-Consulate at a range of a few (say 10) yards;

(*d.*) That no kind of local apology was made; and

(*e.*) That, as far as I could ascertain, the Persians seeking our protection were practically massacred, with the sole object of minimizing British influence in Mesopotamia.

8. In the present state of affairs I quite appreciate the danger of large military operations causing fear to Persia and the Persian border tribes. I think the danger would not exist if the Turks confined their efforts to punishing Ghadban, and if the Persian Government, the Vali of Pushti Kuh, and the Sheikh of Mohammerah were informed by British Representatives that action is being taken against Ghadban with our approval, and because he attacked our steamers. The question resolves itself into a choice of evils. I am satisfied that the greatest evil is to let it be known, by facts which are public to every one, that we can be attacked not only with impunity, but with advantage.

9. It is reported in the "Times" of the 6th May last that Sir Edward Grey made a statement in the House of Commons regarding the attack on the "Blosse Lynch." I venture to offer some local information regarding the statements made:—

Sir E. Grey's Statement.	*Remarks.*
Nazim Pasha, the Turkish Commissioner, has been directed to go to the spot.	Nazim Pasha was at Amarah on the 2nd April when the "Blosse Lynch" was attacked. He came to Bagdad on the 18th April by the "Blosse Lynch," and not, as he had intended, by the "Burhaniya."
Troops have been sent there:	It was reported in the diary for the week ending the 7th April that 150 soldiers (without arms) had been sent in the "Burhaniya."

Later information gives the details as follows:—

Soldiers for Kut	20
Soldiers for Amarah	60
Soldiers for Bussorah	35
Guards for the "Burhaniya"	10
	125

Of these, all, except the ten guards for the "Burhaniya," are reported to have been without arms or uniform. I have heard of no additional troops being sent to Amarah, but some (see my diary for week ending the 15th June, 1908) are said to have been sent from there to Nejef.

And an inquiry will be held with a view to punishing the culprits.

There has been no attempt at a serious inquiry. The Vali of Bussorah is reported to have taken bribes and to have arranged things to the satisfaction of Ghadban. Surely, at an inquiry,

Sir E. Grey's Statement.	*Remarks.*
	the complainant has a right to be heard by the officer holding the inquiry?
	If the Turks still offer assurances that an inquiry has been held, they cannot deny that it is an *ex parte* one, and, as far as I know, they have not had the courtesy to inform the British Government, through any of its Representatives, who held the inquiry nor what has been the result.

The "Times" is read by many people in Bagdad who know the facts.

10. My letter of the 13th June, sent to you by the British post, and this letter, sent by the Beirout post, should both reach you about the 15th July. Should I obtain any useful information between this and then, I will communicate it to you by telegram.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

Principal Chieftains of the Beni Lam Tribe who are not on friendly terms with Ghadban.

1 and 2. FAHAD-IBN-GHADBAN and Mozan-ibn-Nirma have jointly taken on lease lands opposite Ali Gharbi, extending from Sheikh Sa'ad to Ali Shergbi. Yearly rent, £T. 6,000. Have under their command about 6,000 to 7,000 horsemen.

3. Hussein-el-Ali, who was imprisoned by Ghadban, but breaking his fetters fled to Ali Gharbi, and is now with Fahad and Mozan.

4. Shabeeb-ibn-Mazban, Ghadban's uncle. Lives with Ghadban, and is always kept under watch.

5. Mattag-ibn-Mazban, brother of Shabeeb and another uncle of Ghadban. Lives with Ghadban.

6. Ali-ibn-Moosa, cousin of Ghadban, has taken on lease the land called Gharabiyet in the vicinity of the boundaries of Kut.

7. Abbas-el-Ali, partner of Ali-ibn-Moosa, in the cultivation of the land called Gharabiyet, opposite Sheikh Sa'ad.

8. Moosa-el-Fereij, Ghadban's cousin. Is a farmer. Has taken on lease a plot of land from Ghadban.

9. Jawy-ibn-Lazim, Ghadban's cousin. A farmer under Ghadban.

10. Lazim-ibn-Mazban, Ghadban's cousin. Living with Ghadban.

[24293] No. 19.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July 13, 1908.*

I HAVE heard nothing of atrocities at Khatchen, in the neighbourhood of Van, to which you allude in your telegram No. 118 of the 11th instant, and have therefore telegraphed to Captain Dickson on the subject.

I have drawn the attention of the Porte to rumours of excessive severity shown during the search for arms in the villages of Gavelicum, and I am assured that inquiries are being made and that any persons proved to be guilty of excesses will be punished.

[22223] No. 20.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 275.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 14, 1908.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 351 of the 22nd ultimo, inclosing reports on the deplorable state of affairs in the Bitlis Vilayet.

I have to instruct you to lose no opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Ottoman Government the destitution and misery prevailing in this province, and to urge upon them the pressing need for measures of relief and administrative improvement.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[24461] No. 21.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th instant, relative to the situation at Abu Musa.

A copy has been sent to the Director of Military Operations and Director of Naval Intelligence.

India Office, July 14, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 21.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 7, 1908.

ABU MUSA. See my telegram of the 2nd June and papers forwarded with letter of the 28th May from your Secretary in the Foreign Department.

In consequence of an inquiry by the German Embassy, Foreign Office ask whether the local representative of Messrs. Wönckhaus has actually been informed by Major Cox that he may export all oxide mined (see my telegram of the 6th April), and whether a similar intimation has also been made to the German Consul at Bushire. They should be informed accordingly at once, if this has not been done. Your telegram of the 15th May regarding his communications with Hassan is the latest information I have received respecting Major Cox' action.

[24686] No. 22.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 381. Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 11, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 243 of the 19th ultimo respecting the recent disturbances in Samos, and, in order to reply to the final paragraph, I am making inquiries of the British Vice-Consul at Vathy. In the meantime I venture to refer you to the footnote on p. 116 of Volume I of Young's "Corps de Droit Ottoman," according to which a garrison of 150 men has been stationed in the island since the troubles in Prince Vogorides' time.

As regards the first paragraph of your despatch, I should mention that it has already been pointed out to the Sublime Porte more than once by the three Embassies that it would have been better if, before sending the two companies of reinforcements from Smyrna, the Porte had informed the three Embassies.

The information contained in my despatch No. 258 of the 25th ultimo and in the inclosure to this despatch, which has been confidentially communicated to me by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, reveals a situation, at the time the two companies of reinforcements were called for, little short of open revolt. In these circumstances, and in view of the representations already made, I venture to defer making the more formal representations indicated in your despatch under reply, pending further instructions.

I am endeavouring to obtain information on the present situation in the island with a view to replying to your despatch No. 258 of the 30th ultimo. Meanwhile, I may mention that the 3rd battalion has been withdrawn from the island, and that the Grand Vizier informs me that there are now less than 500 troops stationed there. I have told him that we shall expect the garrison to be reduced to its former strength, and he assured me in reply that there was no intention of a permanent increase, but that the Assembly had asked that the present force might be left for a time in case the Sofoulists might make a further attempt to disturb the peace.

I should add that Mr. Mare, writing a few days before my interview with the Grand Vizier, reported that there were still 700 troops left in Samos, and that 300 was enough

to keep order. I shall not lose sight of the matter, and it may be necessary later that the three Embassies should formally remind the Porte of its promise to maintain a garrison of no more than two companies in the island.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Report of the Italian Consular Agent in Samos to the Italian Consulate-General at Smyrna, dated June 18, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following Report on the events which took place in this capital from the 25th to the 31st May, as well as a review of the causes which gave rise to these events. From 1905 onwards I have kept you informed of the division of the population into two political parties; the leader of the minority at that time was M. T. Sofoulis, who, by licit and illicit means, by trampling on the persons of his opponents, succeeded in gaining the power. While he was far removed from power, this man declared, in articles published in the Greek press, that the authority of the Prince ought to be strengthened so that he should be able to govern the country independently of party. Afterwards, when he came into power, he made it his chief aim to deprive the Prince's Government of all power by making over all authority to the Senate, of which he was President, thus violating the organic Statute (privileges of the island).

Taking advantage of the patience which the Sultan has always shown in dealing with the Island of Samos, M. Sofoulis increased the gendarmerie from 150 to 350 men chosen from among well-known smugglers and criminals, so that they should be entirely in his hands. Justice existed only in name; appointments were given to immoral men; the Departments were administered by incapable and dishonest officials, so that the Princes were gradually deprived of all authority, and whenever they tried to reassert their liberty of action they were driven out by the vote of the Assembly. By these means he managed to acquire a dictatorial power, his chief supporters being the Senator Hadzidaki, the Deputies Chrissaki and Sideri, and the President of the Court of Appeal.

During the last two years every law was overridden; the Treasury was emptied, and the population overwhelmed in debt; corruption was introduced into all branches of the Administration, and the island became the refuge of criminals and smugglers in league with the authorities of the island, as is proved by documents seized during the last few days in the houses of Sofoulis and Hadjidaki. From 1905 on four Princes were removed, namely, Mavroghenis, Vithinos, Carntheodoris and Georgiadis. In January last the present Prince, A. Copassis, was appointed; he is a man of intelligence and iron will, who, finding that the country was in a lamentable condition, decided to ameliorate its condition. While he appeared to bow to the wishes of Sofoulis and his adherents he was in reality studying the needs of the people, and at the same time collecting proofs of the abuses committed by the ruling clique. At the same time he acquired popularity by staying in the outlying villages, advising the peasants not to submit to the corrupt wishes of the party in power, and to refuse them their support at the next elections.

At this time the Prince learned that the Senators were introducing arms and ammunition from Greece. He was afraid that both he and the 150 troops of the Imperial garrison would be attacked unawares, and therefore felt compelled to inform the Imperial Government, submitting a detailed report on recent events. Seeing that they were beginning to lose ground owing to the growing disgust of the population at their misdeeds, the Senators thought of escaping from their consequences by bringing about an insurrectionary movement. Had they succeeded in their intention, thanks to the support of the population, they would have expelled the Prince and demanded the intervention of the European Powers. In the contrary event they were prepared to take refuge in Greece, where they would have posed as martyrs of liberty and national patriotism and accused their opponents of treachery.

On the pretext that the Prince had failed to summon the General Assembly, they sent him on the 2nd May a Memorandum in the form of a note in which they insisted on his calling it together in the capital within a week, and warned him that, in the

event of his refusing to do so; they would meet without his orders. At the same time they invited the Deputies of their party to assemble at Vathy with all their partisans, and to the displeasure of the Imperial Government they accused the Prince of inciting the people against the Senators. On hearing what had occurred, the Ottoman Government sent orders that troops should be sent to the island from Smyrna in the hope of thus avoiding an incident.

On the 25th May troops to the number of 200 accordingly arrived, accompanied by a small gun-boat, the "Dikili." This vessel went alongside the mole near the custom-house, and the troops began to disembark, and the Commander of the garrison went down to receive them according to custom. On hearing of the arrival of the "Dikili," the Senators gave orders that the people should take up their arms and assemble in the square, that the shops should be shut, and that the gendarmes should take up defensible positions. The Senators Sofoulis and Hadjudaki, and the Deputies Chrissaki and Sideri, accompanied by the head of the gendarmes and "gardes-champêtres," the Chief of the Police, and other officials and citizens, about sixty in all, went from the square to the Palace, forcibly made their way in, and insulted and maltreated the Prince. They compelled him to accompany them, threatening to kill him, and dragged him to the square, where they coerced him into giving orders to the Commander to re-embark the troops, who had just arrived, and send them back in the same ship. The Prince replied that he had no trustworthy person to send at that moment, so they sent the Chief of Police with armed men to induce the soldiers to re-embark, with instructions, in the event of non-compliance, to use force. The rest of them surrounded the Prince, treated him shamefully, and threatened with loud cries to put him to death. The latter most courageously replied: "You can kill me, but reflect that my death will involve the destruction of the country, because, in my person, you will be killing the Sultan's Representative." He then turned to Sofoulis, and said to him: "If you still have any cool judgment left, think of the consequences of killing me and of the responsibility you will have assumed towards the Sultan and your country." I unfortunately assisted at this scene as I passed through the square on my way to my office, and, seeing the crowd, I approached to find out what was occurring and to telegraph to you.

The Chief of Police went up to the Turkish officer and gave him the orders mentioned. The latter asked from whom they emanated, and was told it was from the Prince. "Very well," he replied, "in a short time I will go to receive my orders in person." The Chief of Police pretended to go back, but, instead of doing so, rejoined his men in the narrow street near the French Consulate, gave orders that the tocsin should be sounded from the church on the hill, and that fire should be opened on the soldiers, firing the first shot himself. Two soldiers of the garrison fell at the first discharge. The crowd of onlookers were seized with panic, and three of them were killed. Seeing that his men were exposed, the Commander ordered them to take up positions and to fire in the air, and, as soon as the mole had been cleared of the idle crowd, to advance in open order, firing in all directions to disperse their assailants. A number of the troops who had just arrived followed the garrison soldiers as they made their way towards the Palace, while the remainder were ordered to ascend the hill and drive the rebels from the church, from the precincts of which they were firing on the soldiers. They had hardly got to the top of the hill when the officer in command fell wounded, and some of his men were mortally wounded. The officer, who was wounded in the arm, fled, and his example was followed by the soldiers, who did not know the streets, and found themselves lost and scattered without a Commander. Forty-two of them were made prisoners, and were led away at night over the mountains by the rebels, and massacred before coming to the village of Ano Vathy, with the exception of thirteen, who escaped under cover of the darkness.

Meanwhile Sofoulis and his followers, surrounding the Prince, seeing the troops arrive, dragged him by narrow roads to the Senate House, where they threatened to ill-treat and beat him. When they heard the noise of the soldiers hurrying up they realized their danger and fled, leaving the Prince, whom the Chief of the Guards had shut up in a room to save him from death. On the departure of Sofoulis and his men, the Prince succeeded in escaping from his perilous situation and withdrawing to the Palace.

The rebels, who had assembled at the village of Ano Vathy and regretted that in the panic of the moment they had let the Prince go, ordered their partisans to attack the Palace as well as the barracks and kill the Prince and Turkish soldiers. At 11 o'clock on Monday night they came down in large numbers, accompanied by about eighty criminals who had been released, and after occupying the Senate house began

the attack on the Palace and barracks. Firing continued for about two hours without producing any result. They withdrew from the Senate and had the unfortunate idea of removing all the documents in the different rooms. The next day the inhabitants of the capital and of Ano Vathy were seized with terror and began to escape to the villages and open country in the interior. About 1,000 remained and took refuge in the Consulates, Missions, and Sisterhoods. About fifty persons were killed on the first day.

On Tuesday, the 26th, the firing lasted all day, the rebels in possession of the heights, the town and the village firing on the barracks and Palace, while the troops shut up in those two strong buildings replied only to keep the rebels off. On this second day there were relatively few casualties. The rebel chiefs announced to all the villages by means of special messengers that the two parties were reconciled and that they were acting together, that a large part of the troops were killed, that the Prince had been taken prisoner, that European ships were expected to prevent the disembarkation of Turkish troops at Samos. Finally they incited the whole population of the island to join in the defence. These orders received but little attention. About ten inhabitants of Tigani and some gendarmes of the other communes, who have joined thirty smugglers just back from Syra and Aivani, brought up the number to about 300 rebels.

On Wednesday, the 27th, the "stationnaire" arrived in the morning from Scala Nuova. It had been sent to bring the Government mail, but owing to the heavy fire from the hills it could not approach sufficiently close to the Palace to deliver it and was compelled to withdraw. However, on the arrival of the cruiser "Marmary" from Arlona it was able to carry out its mission. Towards evening the bodies, which had been lying in the street since the beginning of the disorders, were buried. At noon on Wednesday a meeting of Consuls was held at the French Vice-Consulate in order to decide what collective measures should be taken in order to put a stop to the rebellion. This meeting led to no result. The Greek Consul proposed that we should go in a body to the Prince and demand an amnesty for the rebels, provided that the firing was stopped, but this suggestion was not adopted in the absence of instructions. Firing continued all that evening and throughout the night on both sides.

On Thursday, the 28th, the gun-boat "Izzedin" arrived, having on board Sadik Pasha, Aide-de-camp to His Majesty, and shortly afterwards the cruiser "Basra" and the "Aintab" anchored; on the former ship was the Commodore of the Archipelago, who had come from Rhodes. There was but little firing this day, but in the night there was a sharp attack on the Palace and barracks, and the ships were compelled to reply to the rifle fire with cannon. The rebel leaders, seeing that they were not followed by the people and that Turkish reinforcements had arrived promptly instead of the European ships that they had looked for, decided to seek safety in flight.

Thus on Friday morning Sofoulis and some of his adherents went to Tigani, saying to their companions that they were going to Pyrgos to send them help and at the same time to summon the Assembly in order to proclaim the annexation of the island to Greece. Before arriving at Tigani, however, he embarked at Misiemmbo on a small sailing-vessel and left for the Greek Island of Amorgos. Before starting he ordered his men to submit to every sacrifice and to destroy the Palace and kill the Prince. The Deputies Chrissaki and Sideri went on the same day to Coeuri to exhort the other Deputies of their party to go and meet their President at Pyrgos. On the same day the cruisers "Hamidieh" and "Muhsoussé," with another ship of the type of the "Marmary," came to anchor at Vathy. Vice-Admiral Hulil Pasha was on board the first. At noon two "Muhsoussé" transports arrived with three battalions of soldiers and the Governor-General of Salonica, Reouf Pasha, and the Mouavin, Constantinides Pasha. On Friday night the rebels approached the Palace and threw two dynamite bombs in the course of the attack. Fortunately they were detected by means of the searchlights of the squadron, and were routed by rifle and artillery fire. The rebels then went to Ano Vathy for orders, but there they learned that their leaders were already far away. Part of them then threw down their arms and embarked for Greece on small sailing-boats, and others took to the mountains.

On Saturday after the bombardment from the side opposite Vathy some troops disembarked at Malagari and took possession of the heights above the town, and thus this senseless movement collapsed, after seriously compromising the situation of the island and causing material losses amounting to over £T. 80,000.

The Italians who suffered material losses are: Carlo Piccinini and Aristidi Stamitiadis, and the Portuguese Antonio Freve did also. New Judges have been appointed lately who have begun to hold an inquiry into the occurrence. About 200 people have been arrested. Unfortunately among these not one of the responsible leaders has been found. Yesterday, the 17th June, the General Assembly met after the

supplementary elections for eleven vacant seats, which took place last Sunday. The Prince's speech gives a faithful picture of the state of the island during the last few years.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARIST. STAMATIADIS.

[24863] No. 23.

Mr. Goodhart to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 105.)
Sir, *Athens, July 9, 1908.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that, in the course of conversation at M. Baltazzi's first weekly reception to-day, his Excellency told me that M. Zolomnis, the Greek Consul in Samos, had been granted long leave, which he (M. Baltazzi) hoped might never terminate. The reason for this step was that he had proved himself to be an *imbécile* by his conduct in leaving his Government without any news for the space of several months. That he had had anything to do with the movement in the island M. Baltazzi did not for one moment believe, in fact, he was too *imbécile* to have taken any part in it. Indeed, even since the troubles his reports had been most meagre, and he had shown a great lack of energy and an apparent inability to grasp the serious nature of the situation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HERON GOODHART.

[24899] No. 24

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 18.)

India Office, July 16, 1908.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 2nd instant on the subject of the "Johara" dhow incident, I am directed to state that Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to emphasize to the Ottoman Government, after the compensation awarded has been paid in the manner proposed, the fact that those of the Aden merchants interested in the dhow who are subjects of the Sultan of Shehr and Mokulla, are British-protected persons.

It was stated in the letters from the Resident at Aden of the 4th and 27th February, 1907, forwarded with the letter from this Office of the 13th June, 1907, that of the four Aden merchants interested in the dhow, three, including the owner of the dhow, were subjects of Shehr and Mokulla, and the fourth a British-born subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[24904] No. 25.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 18.)

India Office, July 16, 1908.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter dated the 4th instant, I am directed by Viscount Morley to inclose copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India, from which it will be seen that the German Consul at Bushire was informed on the 8th June last that all the oxide mined might be exported from Abu Musa, and asked to request Messrs. Wönckhaus to give due notice as to the resumption of shipping operations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

Telegram from Viscount Morley to Government of India, dated July 7, 1908.

[See Inclosure in No. 21.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 13, 1908.*

YOUR telegram dated the 7th instant: Abu Musa.

We are sending a despatch by next mail. German Consul was informed on the 8th ultimo by Resident, Persian Gulf, that exportation of all oxide mined might proceed. Consul was also asked to request Messrs. Wönckhaus that they would give due notice, with a view to the necessary arrangements being made, when firm desired to recommence shipping operations.

[24990] No. 26.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July 18, 1908.*

MY telegram No. 168 of the 13th instant and your telegram No. 118 of the 11th instant.

In reply to my inquiry, Captain Dickson telegraphs that the Vali of Van has received complaints from the villagers of "Khachan" that abuses had occurred during the search for arms.

I have received from Captain Dickson a full report on the search for arms, which I am forwarding by to-day's post. He reports that a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and dynamite were found in Van. Though excessive severity has been used in some of the villages, it must not be forgotten that the existence of a dangerous revolutionary movement organized by the Tashnak Committee has been proved to exist by the events of the last few months. The situation was in fact one which if differently handled might have culminated in a wholesale massacre, and the Turkish authorities behaved on the whole, I think, with moderation.

As the result of my representations, the Sublime Porte has ordered that a Special Commission shall inquire into the conduct of the Redifs, who seem to have been especially to blame. Captain Dickson reports that the regular troops behaved well, but he has brought the conduct of a number of gendarmes to the notice of the Vali, who has admitted their guilt and ordered them to be punished.

[25059] No. 27.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 387.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 14, 1908.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 213 of the 2nd ultimo and to previous correspondence with regard to the incident of His Majesty's ship "Lapwing," I have the honour to report that I have received a despatch from the Acting British Vice-Consul at Bussorah, stating that the vessel touched at Katif about the middle of June, when a profuse apology was tendered by the Kaimakam, who paid every mark of attention to Lieutenant-Commander Goldsmith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[25255] No. 28.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 20.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, July 16, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the recent attacks on our steamers and our claim against the Turkish Government in connection with the same, I have the honour to report that we have recently received several letters from our local agents dealing with this subject.

It appears that about the 20th May the Vali of Bussorah arrived in Amarah, and, despite the protests of the merchants and other inhabitants of that town, concluded a settlement with Sheikh Ghadban under which the latter received new leases of all the land for which he asked. Our agents inform us that native merchants in Bagdad have received warnings from their friends in Amarah to discontinue shipping by native craft. It is surmised that the smaller tribal Chiefs, discontented with the present arrangements and encouraged by the success of Sheikh Ghadban, will proceed to harass the Turkish Government in order to better their position.

It is alleged that the Vali of Bussorah has received a considerable sum of money from Sheikh Ghadban, the figure given being 4,000*l*. If this be so, a continuance of the unrest now prevailing appears to promise further personal profit to the Vali.

The connection of Sheikh Ghadban with the recent disturbances on the Tigris is well known to His Majesty's Government. We learn that His Majesty's Resident in Bagdad has discussed with our agent there the question of urging the Turkish Government to send a punitive expedition on a considerable scale against Sheikh Ghadban; and he has asked whether, if the Central Government decide to adopt this course, our Company would be prepared to waive any claim for interruption of the steamer service, should such interruption be necessary, during the enforcement of such punitive measures.

It is estimated that, if a sufficiently strong force should be sent, the running of the steamers would not be affected for more than a fortnight, if at all.

My Board have considered the situation, and would beg leave to express their views for the information of His Majesty's Government as follows:—

They agree with the local agents that it is probable that the minor Arab tribes, encouraged by the success of Sheikh Ghadban, will adopt similar methods in order to better their position.

They consider the present position of affairs on the river most unsatisfactory and are desirous that prompt and effectual measures should be taken to restore order in a permanent manner. In their opinion the measures to be taken should provide—

1. For the dispatch of a really adequate force of troops.
2. That the period of the interruption of the steamer service should be confined within reasonable limits, if any interruption should be necessary.
3. That our steamers should not be required to cease plying unless it is found necessary to suspend the Turkish service also.

My Board do not consider it desirable that they should make any declaration as to their intentions regarding claims in the event of future damage being sustained. Their action in this respect is always governed by the circumstances of the case, and depends greatly on the view which may be taken of the particular circumstances by His Majesty's Government.

In this connection my Board desires to emphasize the fact that it is the British steamers and not the Turkish steamers that are fired upon by these Arabs, and that the Turkish steamers have adopted the plan of flying a conspicuous red pennant on their foremast, which they never carried before, in order to establish their identity. The immunity thus given to the Turkish steamers is the more remarkable inasmuch as the Arabs are on friendly terms with us and have a quarrel with the Turks only. This policy on the part of the Arabs so far suits the Turkish Government, in that we, the competitors of their Hamidieh Administration, are the principal sufferers from it.

My Board are strongly of opinion that, unless and until the Turkish Government are required to pay adequate damages for attacks on our steamers in such circumstances, such attacks will be repeated.

With regard to the claim for damages already put forward by this Company, and Board would urge the necessity of getting the claim settled without delay. The Central

Government will probably recover the sum from the local authorities; and, unless the claim be pressed, these authorities will not only go scot-free, but they will have profited in a pecuniary sense from their conduct. When the "Blosse Lynch" left Amarah on the trip to Bussorah, when she was fired upon, the meeting between the Arabs and the Turkish officials to discuss the land question had broken up in disorder, and the Turkish officials knew that the Arabs intended firing on our steamer, yet they permitted her to leave Amarah and provided no adequate protection. It is imperative that adequate compensation should be obtained for criminal negligence of this description.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. E. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[24904] No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the German Ambassador and, with reference to the communication made by his Excellency on the 1st instant, has the honour to state that, according to a telegram received from the Government of India, the German Consul at Bushire was informed by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf on the 8th June last that all the red oxide mined might be exported from Abu Musa. Major Cox at the same time requested Herr Listemann to request Messrs. Wönckhaus to give due notice as to the resumption of shipping operations, in order to admit of the necessary arrangements being made.

Foreign Office, July 23, 1908.

[25647] No. 30.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 394. Confidential.)

Sir,

Therapia, July 16, 1908.

ON receipt of your telegram No. 96 of the 16th ultimo, I inquired by telegraph whether the punishment of Gadban in connection with the recent attack on the "Blosse Lynch" near Amara could be effected without much difficulty and in the present season, and I received from Major Ramsay, in reply, a telegram asking me to await certain despatches which were on their way to Constantinople. The despatches referred to are three: two of them he tells me he has already sent you; of the third, which is Confidential, I inclose a copy.*

Major Ramsay urges strongly that Gadban, the Chief of the Beni Lam, should be punished, and the Vali of Bussorah, Hassan Bey, who has supported him, dismissed. He gives his reasons for thinking that an adequate measure of punishment could be inflicted on Gadban without much difficulty if the Porte were really in earnest, and (confidential) in this view Subki Pasha, the Commander-in-chief at Bagdad, seems to concur.

As regards the demand of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company for compensation, Major Ramsay is opposed to our putting in a claim on their behalf. On this point I have, in obedience to your instructions, called upon the Consulate at Bussorah for a report; but I venture to suggest that as the Consulate is in the charge of Mr. Geary, who was not at Bussorah at the time of the firing on the "Blosse Lynch," Mr. Crow, who is now in England, should be consulted by your Department.

From the letters from the Company to your Department, with copies of which you have been good enough to furnish me, and especially their letter inclosed in your despatch No. 332 of the 23rd May last, it would seem that the Company would be opposed to coercive measures. They look to the "mulcting of the local authorities in heavy money damages" to prevent the recurrence of attacks on their steamers, though it would seem from Major Ramsay's despatches that their representatives in Bagdad held the opposite view, viz., that Gadban's punishment is the essential point, and that they have not advocated a claim for damages.

I am in entire agreement with Major Ramsay as to the inadvisability of putting

* No. 17.

in a claim on behalf of the Company. The considerations urged in my despatch No. 214 of the 28th April are now reinforced by the knowledge that the Company have made more than they have lost owing to the disturbances.

As regards the punishment of Gadban, it would seem from the Company's letter of the 12th June and from Major Ramsay's reports that the punitive measures against his tribe have been of a derisory nature, and that he himself has gained his point. It would no doubt be an excellent thing for our prestige that this unruly Chief should be made really to suffer for his attack on a British ship, but although I am of course not in so good a position as Major Ramsay to judge of the difficulties which this would involve, it seems to me quite probable that serious fighting might be necessary, and that there might be further prolonged interruption of the river traffic. In these circumstances, and as I am by no means convinced that the attacks in 1906 and last spring were specially directed against British ships, for on both occasions native craft were also attacked, I am not prepared to undertake the responsibility of pressing the Porte, without instructions, in the sense desired by Major Ramsay.

Major Ramsay's despatches throw a new light on the measures proposed by the Special Commissioner, Nazim Pasha, which are understood to have been the cause of the disorders last April, and also on the conduct of the Vali of Bussorah, who was in favour of their revocation. It is clear that if it is decided to press for the punishment of Gadban it would be essential that Hassan Bey should be removed. Some weeks ago, as the result of Nazim Pasha's complaints from Bagdad in connection with the disturbances, it was decided to dismiss Hassan Bey, but this decision was subsequently rescinded, though he was given to understand that his retention in office was conditional on his effectually preventing a recurrence of tribal attacks on the navigation of the Tigris within his district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

25429

No. 31.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July 22.*)

(No. 395.)

Therapia, July 17, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith inclosed a long Report from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van, giving a detailed narrative of the methods employed and the success achieved by the local authorities in breaking up the Tashnuak Armenian revolutionary organization in that town and the surrounding districts. Captain Dickson describes that success as extraordinary, comprising as it does the seizure of 1,300 rifles, 450,000 cartridges, 800 lb. of dynamite, some bombs and infernal machines, besides the archives, printing presses, flag, and seal of the revolutionary Committee. They also effected the capture of the local Tashnuak "fedais," or ringleaders, with the exception of a few who escaped to the district of Havatsor.

It is satisfactory to note that, as stated by Captain Dickson, "the Government has been very magnanimous." During the last three months I have repeatedly urged on the Palace and the Porte the necessity of not confounding the innocent with the guilty in the matters of search and arrests, and of proceeding with severity only against the real ringleaders.

The Vali appears to have evinced willingness to listen to the advice of Captain Dickson and his colleagues, and this, despite the feelings of exasperation of the Moslem population against the Armenians.

The Mufti of Van some time ago telegraphed to the Palace and the Porte complaining of the leniency shown by the Vali and local authorities towards the Armenians, whose "disloyalty and traitorous machinations have been brought to light." The Porte replied *en clair*, telling him to attend to the duties of his office and not to mix in the affairs of Government. The resentment of the Van Moslems against their Armenian fellow-citizens is probably partly accountable for the reluctance of the Vali to proceed with severity against the instigators of, and perpetrators of, the massacre of some fifty Armenians on the 23rd March, as also for the barbarous behaviour of the Van reserves and zaptiehs in searching for arms and the escaped "fedai" in villages near Van. I have brought their disgraceful conduct to the serious notice of the Porte, while, in answer to the representations of Captain Dickson, the Vali instituted an inquiry, and on the 25th June admitted to him that the guilt of the zaptiehs had been established. I am urging their punishment, as also that of the Moslems responsible for the partial

massacre of Armenians on the 23rd March. I have recently given a list of the latter to the Grand Vizier, who, on the 11th July, telegraphed to the Vali of Van urging him to take action against them. I have been informed by the Ministry of Police that it has been decided to remove Osman Effendi, the President of the Van Court of Appeal, who, according to Captain Dickson, incited the local Mahommedans against the Armenians, while the announcement by public crier in Van on the 19th June that neither Moslems or Christians are henceforth to carry arms appears an indication that the authorities may be induced to act impartially as between the adherents of the two creeds.

The ramifications of the Tashnuak organization in Van now laid bare, reveals the existence of a wide-spread conspiracy in that province, and judging by the past, the consequent resentment of the Moslems and especially their suspicions as to the probable destined use of the large quantities of dynamite discovered might easily have had disastrous results for the Armenians. That no such untoward incident occurred is evidently due to the fact that the local authorities, acting under instructions from head-quarters handled the situation with considerable prudence, in drafting into the town troops from the Erzeroum district, and in not allowing the Bashi-Bozouks to take part in the search.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the premises of the English missionaries should have been used for concealing arms, &c., and that their servants should have been connected with the revolutionary movement, but apparently, as admitted by the Vali, they were not to blame, as the same had happened in the case of Moslems.

It occurs to me that Khatchen referred to in your telegram No. 118 of the 11th July, as the scene of alleged cruelties against Armenian villagers, may be amongst the villages in the neighbourhood of Van, where, as reported by Captain Dickson, the Van Redifs conducted the search for arms with exceptional rigour.

It is to be feared that the Van incident, and the extensive connection of the Armenians in the province with the revolutionary organizatoin just unearthed by the Ottoman authorities, will tend to diminish the force of any representations it may be necessary to make to the Porte on behalf of their brethren, who are the victims of oppression in the Bitlis Vilayet, or other districts of Kurdistan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 18.)

Sir,

Van, June 20, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to continue the account of the measures taken to search for the Armenian revolutionaries and arms in Van, which are now nearing completion, having been carried out most successfully.

The firing on the 25th May, mentioned in my No. 15, turned out to have been a put-up affair. While a certain quarter was being searched some bad characters among the soldiers surrounding it started firing at the house of a rich Armenian in the quarter, pretending that there were "fedai" in the house, this giving them the excuse to enter the houses and start robbing and pillaging. Their officers behaved well and stopped them, in one case an officer had to draw his sword and strike a man, who had to be taken to the hospital, this giving rise to the rumour that the "fedai" had wounded him.

About this time there had been many complaints about the conduct of the soldiers and gendarmes taking part in the search, who were getting pretty well out of hand. I and my colleagues asked the Vali and Ferik to give severe orders with regard to their behaviour, and to make an example of any offenders. I understand that this was done, as since this event of the 25th May a marked change has been noticeable in their conduct.

As I mentioned in my No. 15, crowds of Armenians, including all the women and children, evacuated their quarters and bivouacked round my Consulate, to escape the ill-treatment of the soldiers and the chance of the "fedai" coming to their houses and so implicating them. The Vali ordered these to return to their houses under pain of arrest. We told him that he must see that they were not maltreated by the soldiers. There have not been many complaints since.

It appears that the band of six "fedai," who caused the fracas on the 23rd May

after escaping from the house, collected their forces, and, in spite of the cordon of troops surrounding the quarter, escaped from the town that night. There were some sixteen in all that left, and they made for Havatsor. For a long time afterwards the authorities refused to believe that they got away and continued the search for them with great precaution. The Vali had now got a quantity of paid spies and informers. Only houses that had been denounced were searched, and these usually with success. The system employed has been for the search commission under Ahmed Bey and some six or eight officers and civil employés, to collect evidence from prisoners with the help of a stick, this often leading to the disclosure of hiding places for arms and fresh persons being denounced as having useful information. These, in their turn, would be arrested and put through the same process. Many Armenians have given information and surrendered arms voluntarily, especially lately. The Government has been very magnanimous, and in comparatively few instances have persons been kept in prison. The usual procedure has been that some man arrested will say that five rifles had been confided, say, to a certain Armenak. The Commission go to Armenak's house, and tell him to surrender the rifles. He usually professes ignorance, and then after a gendarme has beaten him, he shows where the rifles are hidden. The Commission goes off with the rifles and do not arrest Armenak unless he is on their list of principal "fedai" or does not give up the rifles. If he happens to be on the list, then he is arrested and beaten until he tells all he knows. Thus, like a snowball, their information increases, and their success has been extraordinary. The places chosen by the "fedai" to hide the arms, &c., have been very cleverly selected. In many cases holes 6 to 10 feet deep have been dug under walls, pillars, fire-places, &c., the arms deposited, and the hole filled up and the wall, &c., replaced to defy detection. Horizontal tunnels in the sides of deep wells, trees hollowed out under the bark, the water of irrigation canals diverted to allow a hole to be dug in the bed of the canal, and the water then turned on again. Altogether, without betrayal, none of the arms would have been found. Several men have given up a single rifle, but the majority have been found in batches of five or ten, wrapped up in canvas cases, each rifle sealed with the Tashnak seal.

The prison has long been full to overflowing, and it may be for this reason that only the principal delinquents have been imprisoned. Of these many who have given useful information have been released to make room for others. I understand that the prisoners have been having a bad time. I am told they are not allowed bedding, as there is not room for beds, and that there are difficulties about food. The Vali acknowledged to me that the accommodation is very bad, and he has asked permission from Constantinople to enlarge the prisons. If half of the stories one hears are true, a good deal of torturing goes on in the prisons.

About the 28th May a wave of despondency seems to have set in among the "fedai" and their sympathizers, and many surrenders and denunciations were made, while many villagers, who seem to have been waiting to see which way the cat jumped, let it be known that they were prepared to surrender such arms as they had.

Therefore, about this time the collection of arms in the villages was commenced. The Mudirs and Kaïmakams collected in their own districts as a rule, but a force of gendarmes under the notorious Major Haji Izzet, left for Havatsor for this purpose. Colonel Tahir Bey was sent to the Timar district, Jevdet Bey, Kaïmakam of Serai, went to the Alagha Plain, and later on Jelal Pasha with a force of troops went to Gargar, where the "fedai" were reported to be in force. The Van Redifs collected the arms from the villages round Van, and it is reported that they behaved in an abominable manner, beating, pillaging, robbing, and raping.

On the whole, with the exception of the case of the Van Redifs, it appears that where the troops have been employed, the search in the villages has been carried out fairly well. In the case of the civil employés, and especially of Haji Izzet at Havatsor, Kamil Effendi at Archagy, and Said Effendi at Timar, the most scandalous abuses have been made. On account of the numerous complaints I went out to Havatsor on the 12th June, returning on the 14th.

In the mountains south of Havatsor and round Norduz and Shattakh, there are three or four bands of Kurd brigands, Jengir Aga, Mir Mihai, and Kurt Bey are the worst. These men with bands of from ten to twenty Kurds, mostly outlaws, have been terrorizing the district for the last eighteen months; once or twice the authorities have made half-hearted attempts to arrest one or other of them, but with no result, generally owing to the complicity of the agents employed. Jengir Aga is an ex-zaptieh and is the cousin of a certain Mehmed Sheriff, chief of the zaptiehs at Havatsor. These two seem to have made a good thing out of the collection of arms in Havatsor.

The usual procedure was that Jengir having obtained information that a certain

village had offered to surrender its arms and that the gendarmes were going there to collect them on a certain day, he and his band would then go to the village the previous night and order the villagers to give up their rifles to him, sometimes saying that he would give them to the Government, the villagers would refuse and then he would maltreat them, and generally finished by going off the next morning with various rifles, loot, and money.

The next day the gendarmes would arrive and demand, say, six rifles (according to the number inscribed on the lists captured), those who had had their rifles taken by Jengir, would again be beaten until they gave up a rifle of some sort, bought at an exorbitant price from neighbouring Kurds, or from Kurds accompanying the gendarmes for this express purpose. Among other abuses the zaptiehs levied fines on the villagers for their own profit, pretending that the number of rifles surrendered was deficient, and maltreated the villagers until the money was paid. In nearly every village sums of money varying from 4*l.* to 20*l.* have been taken by the zaptiehs or Jengir Aga. This money was the money collected by the villagers for the taxes. In some instances, the Kurds accompanying the zaptiehs would give an old rifle and two or three Mejidieh to the zaptiehs and receive in exchange a surrendered Mauser. Thus from a village, which, according to the lists possessed six Mausers, the zaptiehs would return with, say, four Mausers and two flintlocks, and the Government would still debit the village with possessing two Mausers.

Previous to the arrival of the gendarmes to collect arms, the "fedai" Chiefs, the Doctor and Sarkis and their band had been round to most of the villages to collect the arms and hide them so as to prevent the Government getting them. It seems the villagers objected to giving them up, saying that the Kurds and the Government knew that they had rifles, and so what would they do when the troops came to search if they could not give the guns up. In some cases the villagers took their rifles and ran away and hid until the "fedai" left the village; in others the "fedai" collected the rifles, and being pressed for time, got some trusty villagers to carry them some little way from the village and then buried them. When the "fedai" had left, the other villagers got hold of the trusty villagers when they returned, and forced them to show where the rifles had been buried, and so they got them back so as to surrender them to the Government. As they said, what is the use of our keeping our rifles if the Vanlotes have given up theirs.

The abuses and maltreatment by the zaptiehs were carried to such an extent that one or two villages near Van brought their arms in to Van and surrendered them to Jelal Pasha. This did not help them much, as the zaptiehs visited them all the same, and took it out of them for having already given up their rifles.

On the strength of the information I had obtained in Havatsor, I spoke to the Vali and detailed most of the abuses I had been able to check, giving the names of the principal culprits. He promised me to inquire into the matter. I mentioned to him that, while the villagers had possessed arms, even although hidden, the Kurds had known it, and this knowledge had acted in a great measure to protect the Armenians from Kurd attacks and pillage. Now that he had disarmed all the Armenians, and the Kurds were still armed and even better armed, it was his duty to take more elaborate steps to protect the Armenians. I pointed out that although the possession of ten or twenty Mausers in a village was a menace to the Government and could not be allowed, two or three old guns in a village would not hurt the Government and would serve to give each village some defence against petty robberies which the Government could not always prevent. To illustrate this, I mentioned the case of a Nestorian village, Hashwasorik, that I had visited. Here the villagers are Assyrians, and there is no question of "fedai" with them. Two days before I visited it the zaptiehs had been there and taken three old guns used by the shepherds to guard the large flocks of sheep belonging to various Mostems in Van which pasture on the lands of the village. The night after I left Kurds came and robbed the village, and also the neighbouring village of Doni. The Vali promised to think over the affair, and a couple of days later told me that he had sent for some eight of the zaptiehs and their officer, who were the chief delinquents during the searching in Havatsor, and they were now in prison, and an inquiry would be held on the affair. He was also sending a battalion of troops to be distributed about the district to protect the Armenians from the Kurds. A certain Mehmed Effendi was being sent as Kaïmakam to Shattakh, with instructions to act with these troops to capture the brigands mentioned above. He had also given orders to allow two or three old rifles to be returned to various villages for defensive purposes. He had also sent for Nejib Aga, Chief of the Mutkuri Kurds, as he suspected his men of having robbed Hashwasorik and other villages.

There are many complaints of the cruelty and abuses practised by the Mudirs of Arebig and Timar in their districts, but I have not been able to go out and verify them. Altogether it is reported that some ten Armenians have been beaten to death by the zaptiehs during the search in the villages, and as the majority of these were in the endeavour to extort money and not arms, so it is reported, it shows how little the gendarmerie are to be trusted to do anything cleanly.

On the 24th June Jelal Pasha returned from Gargar. They had been unsuccessful, and had found the district evacuated, the villagers having fled. They saw no "fedai," and Samson, one of the "fedai" captured in the drain, whom they had taken with them to show them the hiding-places, was useless. The Ferik informs me that they left some troops there, who will collect the rifles from the villagers when they return.

I inclose an approximate list of the things captured up to date in Van and the villages. Some of the infernal machines were very ingenious, being fancy cigarette boxes, but when one turned the key to open them this released some mechanism which exploded the contents. In the case of any suspicious-looking finds, Aram was brought from the prison and make to explain them and open them if necessary. On one occasion when some officials were roughly handling some "fedai" documents Aram asked them to be more careful, as the Geneva Central Committee would hold him responsible if anything got lost. Many letters, lists, and archives have been taken from time to time, some, probably the most important, are in cypher, one key has been found but some still remain undecypherable. A special police commissaire has come from Mousb to translate the mass of documents. Among other interesting documents are the death warrants of the late Vali, Ali Bey, and for one or two officials still living. These are signed by the "fedai" Chiefs, and one or two Van Armenians. There is also a document with the terms which they would ask from the Turkish Government after their revolution should have succeeded.

The enormous quantities of dynamite captured has created a very bad impression among the Moslems, who say that the rifles may have been for defence only, but that dynamite means terrorism and murchy, and was meant to blow up the Turks when in the mosques, or the troops in the barracks. From time to time the captured dynamite has been destroyed by detonation, and on each occasion the explosion has caused a panic. The money forgers' equipment shows the moral tone of the "fedai," and it is said that those of their rifles which were not stolen were paid for in false money.

At one time the Moslems and Bashi-Bozouks were particularly incensed against the Armenians, and tried every means to get the Armenian Notables arrested. They sent complaints and petitions by telegram to Constantinople, and got snubbed by the Palace in reply. They brought false charges against several of the principal Armenians, but have not succeeded. It is said that their idea is that if the Armenian Notables are arrested, then, if the time should come and the Moslem culprits are arrested for the part they played in the massacre of the 23rd March, they hope that the Moslems and Armenians will petition that the Armenians and Moslem Notables arrested may be liberated together, and only the arrested "fedai" suffer.

In one case the miniature photograph of a Russian woman, found in Aram's watch, was sworn to by the police as being that of the wife of Terzibashian, one of the richest Armenians here, and they wanted to have him arrested. *En passant*, I may say that Terzibashian's death warrant is among the "fedai" papers found. The Vali has shown plenty of common sense in these affairs.

The fact that a large majority of the rifles taken are the Russian army model has also created a bad impression, and this is not decreased by the fact that the dragoman of the Russian Vice-Consulate is credited with being one of the most influential members of the "fedai" Committee, and that three of the largest depôts of archives and arms were found adjoining his house.

It is very unfortunate that three depôts of arms and chemicals have been unearthed in the premises of the English Mission at Van, and that it is said that their premises have been largely used by the "fedai" as a place of refuge and concealment, especially during the most exciting parts of the search.

At the commencement of these events I had impressed on the Englishmen and Americans here that they must take very special precautions to prevent their premises from being made use of by the "fedai," as, under the peculiar circumstances of their position as foreigners in Turkey with ex-territorial rights, this would be a great temptation to the "fedai." It appears that among the servants at the English Mission were three Armenians, of whom one, a youth named Tchochaga, was pretty deeply mixed up with the "fedai." Another, an old man, had a rifle, but, I believe, was otherwise harmless. The third was an old woman.

The missionaries had no suspicions of their revolutionary tendencies. Some time in the beginning of May Mr. Wigram and Mr. Brown left Van for Kochannes, leaving Mr. Bowdon alone in Van. While in Kochannes Mr. Brown heard somehow that Tchochaga was a "fedai," and went about armed; he wrote to Mr. Bowdon at Van about this, suggesting that he should be dismissed, but at the time Mr. Bowden did nothing.

On the 23rd May, when the fracas between the "fedai" and troops took place at the foot of the English Mission garden, the troops suspected that the "fedai" had taken refuge in the mission-house, and the house was searched, as reported in my No. 15 of the 24th May. Mr. Bowdon vouched for there being no one in the house that he was not acquainted with, and they made quite a cursory search round the rooms, and without result. From what Ahmed Bey told me at the time it seemed that they had some suspicions of the Mission premises, and I again cautioned Mr. Bowdon to be extremely careful and to make frequent surprise searches round the premises. He then told me that Mr. Brown had written him from Kochannes saying that he heard Tchochaga carried a pistol, and that he thought he was a "fedai." I said it would be better to get rid of him. Mr. Bowdon asked if he should get rid of him at once, adding that it would be a great personal inconvenience. I said it would be better then to wait a day or two, as dismissing him under the present circumstances might attract attention to the man, which he did not want to do. Some days later, while searching about his house, Mr. Bowdon found two rifles and bandoliers. His servants at first denied all knowledge of them, but later confessed to owning one each Mr. Bowdon came to ask my advice, but unfortunately did not find me in, and so, without waiting, he dismissed them that night, allowing them to take the rifles away with them. He never told me anything of this, although I saw him the next morning, as he thought I should disapprove of his action.

About a week later, on the 15th June, I was informed that the doctor and Sarkis had spent the night of the 22nd May in the English mission. I was on my way up to see Mr. Bowdon, when I met him on the way to see me, to inform me that he had just found some troops and zaptiehs in his garden, that they had got in over the wall at the foot of the garden without asking any one, and that they had dug up some cases of ammunition and chemicals. He then told me the story of his finding the rifles and dismissal of his servants.

On making inquiries I found that Tchochaga had been arrested and beaten, and that he had then informed Ahmed Bey and the Commission that he could show them where something was hidden. Ahmed Bey informed me that he was not told, and that he had no idea that it was in Mr. Bowdon's garden, and he had sent a police commissaire and an officer with some troops, and these had been led by Tchochaga through various gardens to the spot, and these say that they had no idea it was the garden of a foreigner. There is a possibility that this is all true, although I feel certain that the police commissaire knew that it was the mission garden, but being an ignorant blackguard he may not have mentioned it. The next morning the Vali, on being informed of the episode, sent his aide-de-camp to apologize for the error. I should have dearly liked to have taken this opportunity to get several bad characters among the police and gendarmerie punished, but as every one professed complete ignorance and contrition, I thought it advisable to accept their apologies and let the matter pass, more especially as they had found arms on the premises and considering the suspicions they had about the house.

Tchochaga seems to have had some more beatings, as on two later occasions the house has been searched (I being present); in one case some sacks of powder and saltpetre were dug up in the garden, and on the second four rifles and bandoliers of cartridges were dug up under the w.c. On this occasion the chief of the Search Commission, Ahmed Bey, informed me that there was an underground chamber dug out under the floor of the servants' room which had been frequently used by the "fedai," and that when they had searched the house on the 23rd May there had actually been eight "fedai" concealed there. We went to the servants' room, and, pulling aside a case, found some loose planks in the floor which disclosed a dug-out chamber with room for about ten people which showed evident signs of having been recently used as a place of refuge.

Although the circumstance is regrettable, I do not think that the authorities think the English missionaries at all responsible, as they realize that, with deceitful servants, a similar misfortune might happen to any one, and, as the Vali said, the same thing has happened to several Moslems.

About the 4th June the air began to clear a little, the authorities having come to

the conclusion that the "fedai" had really left the town, and that there was nothing to be feared from them or from bombs. The elaborate military precautions and stringent regulations adopted against the circulation of Armenians in the streets during the initial stages of the search were greatly relaxed, until it became a matter of the Search Commission and some troops going to a house or two every day and fishing out arms, &c., with monotonous regularity. The people began to move about the streets and go to the bazaar, which has since gradually opened and is now in full swing. The premises of the American Mission have been searched on three occasions, the first two without result, the last time, on the 28th June, some important archives and lists were found buried in the church.

On the 17th June my French and Russian colleagues and I called on the Vali and asked him what he proposed doing as regards the punishment of the Moslem culprits of the massacre of the 23rd March. He told us that a Commission had been charged to make an inquiry into what had happened on the 23rd March, and to find out who were the culprits and obtain evidence against them.

The Commission had started work about the 20th April, but had suspended work when the search for "fedai" had commenced. He hoped the searching would shortly be finished and this Commission would then continue its inquiry, and those persons that it found guilty would be sent for trial. On further questioning we found that, although this Commission had been sitting for some four weeks, they had so far obtained no evidence. We pointed out to the Vali that the Porte had told our Embassies that the Moslems would be punished when the troops arrived. The troops had now been here six weeks and so far only Armenians had been punished. We had not mentioned the matter to him before, not wishing to embarrass him in his action against the "fedai," but that now the searching was nearing its end and there were rumours that the troops were to be sent to the Persian frontier, we had thought it advisable to remind him so that the Moslems might be punished before the troops left. We further said that we had little confidence that the method he proposed employing would lead to any of the Moslem instigators and assassins being punished, as the members of the Commission were the relations, friends, and associates of the instigators, and the members of the Courts of Justice were the principal instigators.

The Commission had given an idea of its method of collecting evidence on the 6th May when two corpses of massacred Armenians were found. The Commission and the police had taken care on this occasion that no Armenians should have a chance of identifying the bodies, it had then professed that, although unidentified, they were probably Moslems killed by Armenians, and the corpses were buried in neither a Moslem or Christian cemetery. This episode and others gave us the idea that the Commission was trying rather to hide than find out the truth. We reminded him of a promise he had made us shortly after the massacre, that when the troops arrived, both Armenian and Moslem offenders would be punished in a summary manner without having recourse to the long and uncertain process of the Tribunals. We had a long discussion, and he promised us that undoubtedly the Moslems would be punished, but that he must have some evidence against them to go on, and if we would only have confidence in him and give him a little time, he would be equally surprised with what he would do to punish the Moslems, as we all had been with the success of the "fedai" hunting.

On the 18th June a "fedai" soldier, called Tchochaga, surrendered to the Government. He had been with the doctor and Sarkis and their band when they left Van on the 23rd May. He said that they had gone to Gargar, and that there were in all there about fifty of them, but that the Vaniotes and the Russians had quarrelled, and that he with other Vaniotes had returned to Van; he thought the others would all surrender shortly, as the revolutionary cause was done for, and they were all tired of it. He also said he thought the doctor and Sarkis, with the other Russian "fedai," were in Persia by now, but I am not inclined to credit this statement.

On the 19th June the public crier announced that in future no one Moslem or Christian was to carry arms.

On the 25th June, in talking unofficially with the Vali, he told me that the inquiry on the Havatsor search party had just been concluded, and that they had found that the zaptiehs had been guilty of everything, and even more than I had mentioned, as some of the searches they had made had been without authority. The troops he had spoken about were already posted in that district, and Jengir Aga had fled to his relative, the arch robber Simco, at Kotur. The searching was practically over, and the Commission to find the Moslem culprits had recommenced work, and he was hopeful of success.

He further told me some interesting information that Aram had told him. Aram had said that the present Dashnak "fedai" movement was done for, but that if the authorities had continued their search after the fracas at Sahag Bey's house on the 8th February, the "fedai" would have resisted them, and there would have been a general rising of all the Armenians. At that time they had decided to mobilize all their resources and resist the Government, and he thought they would have been successful. However, the Government had not continued, but had assumed the defensive until strong reinforcements had arrived, and this had caused them to change their plans, and now they had been betrayed; he also had a few unflattering epithets for the Armenians of Van.

On the 25th June the troops, which had been posted in a complete ring round the Armenian quarter since the 15th May, were changed, and permanent posts have been placed here and there in various places inside the Armenian quarters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,
Captain, R.F.A.

[24899]

No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 296.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, July 24, 1908.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 346 of the 22nd ultimo respecting the "Johara" piracy case, I inclose, for your information, copies of correspondence which has passed between this Department and the India Office on the subject.*

In the inclosure in my despatch No. 233 of the 18th June, 1907, it was stated that of the four Aden merchants interested in the dhow, three, including the owner of the vessel, were subjects of Shehr and Mokulla, and the fourth a British-born subject.

I request, therefore, that you will take an opportunity, after the compensation awarded in this case has been actually paid in the manner proposed, to emphasize to the Ottoman Government the fact that those of the Aden merchants interested in the dhow who are subjects of the Sultan of Shehr and Mokulla are British-protected persons.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[25903]

No. 33.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 307.)
Sir,

Therapia, July 19, 1908.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 265 of the 6th instant with regard to the persecution of Christians in the Vilayet of Diarbekir by Minas Effendi Haudoponat, I have the honour to report that in consequence of the constant complaints against the Mutvin I made representations at the Porte and the Palace, with the result that by virtue of an Imperial Iradé he was removed from his post some weeks ago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[26552]

No. 34.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 30.)

Sir,

India Office, July 29, 1908.

IN reply to your letter dated the 11th May last, inclosing copy of a note from the Turkish Ambassador as to the alleged proceedings of certain Indian officials in the Vilayet of Bussorah, I am directed by Viscount Morley to forward, for the consideration of Secretary Sir E. Grey, copy of correspondence with the Government of India on the subject, including the Report of the Political Agent at Koweit regarding his visit to the village of Intan, which has occasioned the complaint of the Turkish Government.†

* Nos. 3 and 24.

† To Government of India (telegraphic), May 15; Government of India (telegraphic), June 12 inclosures in letters from Foreign Secretary, June 11 and July 2, 1908.

The Political Agent, it will be observed, states that the people of Iutaa "consider the Sheikh of Koweit as their Suzerain rather than the Ameers of Riadh or the Turk at El Hasa," while Sheikh Mubarak, on his side, "looks upon Iutaa as within the Koweit boundaries." Major Cox describes the village as "not in Vilayet of Bussorah, but territory of the Ajman tribe, under Koweit." This view is confirmed by what is said on page 9 of the Political Agent's Report as to the nature of the Turkish visits to the place in the past.

There is thus ground on which to contest the right of the Turkish Government to complain of the Political Agent's action. But no useful purpose would apparently be served by raising the question of the political status of the village, and the result might be that the Turks would take steps overtly to assert their authority there.

It seems to Lord Morley that it might suffice, without directly raising the point whether Iutaa is or is not Turkish, to inform the Turkish Ambassador that the facts detailed in his note have been found on inquiry to be inaccurately reported. The journey was not made by five British officers sent to Koweit for the purpose on a ship of war, but was an ordinary tour undertaken by Major Knox and his wife, who distributed no arms to the inhabitants, and who did not stay with the Sheikh named.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[26776] No. 35.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 415.)
Sir,

Constantinople, July 24, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Cumberbatch respecting the administration of the Beirout Vilayet and the Mutessarillik of the Lebanon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 35.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 42. Confidential.)
Sir,

Beirout, June 30, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a Report on the administrative and economic condition of the Vilayet of Beirout and the Mutessarillik of the Lebanon for the half-year ended this day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 35.

Report on the Administrative and Economic Condition of the Vilayet of Beirout and the Mutessarifik of the Lebanon for the half-year ended June 30, 1908.

PART I.—*Beirout Vilayet.*

Administration.

THERE have been no changes of any importance among high officials to record beyond those in the Judicial Department referred to in my despatch No. 30 of the 15th May.

The Vali, whose character and general abilities are, I presume, placed on record at His Majesty's Embassy, made a tour of inspection in his district in the month of March, and returned to Beirout the second week in April. This is the first time since

his appointment as Vali of this vilayet that he has made this tour, which is supposed to be undertaken annually by all Valis. His journey lay principally through that portion of Palestine which is comprised within the Beirout Vilayet. His visit was timed to fit in with the filling up of numerous posts, in connection with which a venal Vali contrives to profit personally, added to which he found himself called upon to "clinch" numerous pending "cases" of various kinds, in the final settlement of which his decision is not always a disinterested one. He also, it appears, keeps up the ancient Turkish custom of exacting "dish parassi" (tooth money), which in one case is said to have amounted to 50*l.* paid by a successful candidate for the post of Kaïmakam, and at whose house he lodged.

A recent measure connected with the transfer of property, whereby no sale can be registered in the province before the sanction of the Vali is obtained, likewise proved a lucrative source of profit on this journey, as he found it more "practicable" to give his final decision after personal interviews with the interested parties than settling such questions at a distance. Added to all this the Oriental custom of making presents to high officials, whether for favours received or expected, and the fact that a fairly substantial allowance is made by the Government towards the travelling expenses of this tour, it is not surprising that the sum public rumour fixes as the result of his Excellency's "déménagement" is not less than 15,000*l.*

I have not had sufficient time or occasion to judge myself of his Excellency's qualities as a Governor-General, but his action in one or two unimportant cases in which this Consulate-General has been interested rather strengthens the generally accepted impression that he is not the least among the easily corruptible servants of His Majesty the Sultan, and that he is reaping a plentiful harvest. In his personal relations with the Consular Corps his Excellency is most courteous, and as obliging as circumstances will permit. It is interesting to note that, though an Albanian like the Grand Vizier, he is not in the latter's good books, but the reason for this unusual departure from his Highness' general attitude towards his compatriots cannot be explained locally. As an instance of this unfriendly feeling towards Khalil Pasha in high quarters it is said that, though he was instrumental in the building of a very fine school of arts and crafts for Turkish boys which is intended to obviate the necessity of having recourse to the facilities of technical education provided by the Syrian Protestant College and the Jesuit School, his Excellency never received any mark of Imperial or official recognition.

Officials.

The impression so far that has been made on me by the subordinate officials of the vilayet is not a favourable one. Whether it is that, the posts here not being generally coveted owing to the inability on the part of the Turkish officials to live out of the town in the hot summer months, the class of officials is of an inferior quality, or whether it is due to local influences, they strike me on first acquaintance as an inferior set of men as compared to their colleagues of corresponding ranks in Smyrna and other important centres; but, if my informants are correct, they are, with few exceptions, not behind in the art of enriching themselves at the expense of the public needing their services.

Public Security.

Public security in the town of Beirout has not shown any signs of improvement in the state of things recorded from time to time by my predecessor. This is due apparently to an inefficient and corrupt police force, the members of which take their cue from their Chief, and add to their scanty and irregular pay by closing their eyes to the doings of bad characters, chiefly recruited from the powerful corporation of smugglers, whose hold on the town is a permanent source of menace and with whom the police appear unable or unwilling to grapple once and for all.

As an instance of the insecurity of the town, I may mention that a young Englishman was returning home along one of the most frequented thoroughfares at 9 one night in March when he passed four men. One of them retraced his steps, and pulling him back by the arm, demanded a dollar. The Englishman, noticing a long knife in the man's hand, took the wise step of giving him the money and of making no attempt to tackle him, especially as his companions were waiting within a few yards.

This incident is only one of many that are heard of now and then, and it is not surprising that most gentlemen, when obliged to walk out at night, carry a revolver.

Owing to the facility of procuring fire-arms the large Mussulman population is well supplied, and whereas on the one hand the carrying of fire-arms by Christians is more or less prevented, little attention is paid to their possession by Mussulmans. The proof of this partiality was brought home to me in a fairly striking manner by my noticing the great noise made by the continuous rattle of shots all over the town on the occasion of the Mahommedan "Mevlud" anniversary as compared with the comparatively meagre number of shots fired by the Orthodox community at Easter.

The two most recent incidents descriptive of the contempt in which these bands of roughs hold the authorities occurred last month. Two of their number had a quarrel, in which one was killed. The assassin escaped to Damascus, but was arrested and brought back by the police. On the arrival of the train conveying him to Beirout, the brother of the murdered man pushed his way into the railway carriage, which was full of passengers, and fired several shots at the prisoner and severely wounded him. Three other bad characters quarrelled in open market-place about the division of spoils derived from their illicit business connected with the smuggling through of emigrants, as described in another place. They settled the dispute with their revolvers, the result being that one passer-by was killed and another wounded by the bullets flying about in all directions. On the 1st June a respectable foreign lady was returning from her afternoon drive when she was followed by three young natives on horseback, who, besides using indecent language, fired off their revolvers in the air and cut the hood of the carriage with a knife. The lady only escaped from these ruffians by taking refuge in a Consulate, from which she communicated with her own Consular authorities, with the result that the men were arrested. A few days ago the wife of a Consul-General was driving along one of the main streets when a young native youth threw a stone at her which carried away her veil. The cavass got down to catch the boy, but owing to the threatening attitude of the crowd that assembled and the indifference shown by the police guard stationed close by he had to desist. The complaint lodged by the Consul-General led to the dismissal of two policemen and the imprisonment of the boy's schoolmaster. A similar fate was experienced by a European young lady whilst out driving with a junior member of the Consular Corps in the spring.

Smuggling.

The extensive system of smuggling that goes on in this district has been alluded to in previous quarterly Reports and formed the subject of my despatch No. 16 of the 20th February last. During the last three months this lucrative business has been carried on with as great activity and apparent effrontery as ever, and this unsatisfactory state of things is generally put down, not only to the apathy and negligence of the Chief of Police and Harbour-master, to whom it is made worth while to shut their eyes to the movements of smugglers, but also to the inertness of the Commandant of Gendarmerie, who is credited with interested motives in tolerating this wholesale introduction of rifles, revolvers, ammunition, gunpowder, dynamite, and "tumbeki" tobacco. The public is amused by the farce that goes on almost daily in connection with the movements of the Turkish torpedo-boats employed to watch this coast. The officials, who are in league with the smugglers and know where the arms and ammunition are to be landed, order the Captain of the torpedo-boat to proceed to sea, but in the opposite direction to where the landing is to be effected. One or two of these officials are sometimes to be seen proceeding in the right direction to watch proceedings from a distance, and, as soon as the landing has been safely effected, they hurry back to town, where they usually find that the torpedo-boat has returned from its wild-goose chase, and they dispatch it towards the real place of landing, in the vicinity of which the Commander only finds at most a suspicious-looking craft, but with no contraband goods on board. The smugglers in the meantime have had ample time to dispose of their goods in safety.

Through an organized system of agents these goods are distributed all over this hinterland, with the result that it will probably be discovered one day that, whereas the Christian minority is generally unarmed, the whole of the Mussulman inhabitants of this town and district are provided with arms and ammunition and ready to take an active part in any political disturbance, whether as sympathizers with Arab discontent against the Sultan's Government or as implements of the latter against the Christians. It is a subject of general note that the worst characters in this town are credited with being smugglers, and that their trade is considered one of the most lucrative locally, only to be compared in that respect to that of wheelwrights, who benefit so largely by the destructive qualities of the roads in the town of Beirout and its immediate vicinity.

Owing to circumstances before which they had to bow, the local authorities were compelled in March to expel to Rhodes three smugglers and four heathen who had through some "misclance" fallen into the hands of one of the torpedo-boats that happened to be cruising along the coast. The capture and exile was such an unexpected occurrence that it created quite a stir in the town, and no one was more surprised at their summary deportation under peremptory orders from Constantinople as the culprits themselves and their friends and relatives, who, on the day of their embarkation, tried to work up a public demonstration against their forcible removal. The inevitable had to be accepted, and recourse will no doubt be had to the usual methods of reconciling the authorities to the return here sooner or later of these men, as in the case of a notorious smuggler called Abidos Sukdai, whose career has been referred to in previous Reports of this series.

The influence and protection in high quarters enjoyed by these smugglers was most glaringly proved in the case of a notorious individual called Ahmed Beydoun, who, profiting by the protection he enjoyed as cavass of one of the Consulates at Beirout and by his advantageous position as "restaurateur" of the quarantine lazaret, was able to carry on a most successful campaign for several years, not only in the smuggling line, but also in despoiling the unfortunate pilgrims from Mecca who fell victims to his rapacity whilst forcibly detained in quarantine. In March, after great trouble, the Sanitary Inspector, Dr. Cassim Izzedine, succeeded in obtaining instructions from the Grand Vizier to the Vali for this man's forcible ejection from the lazaret, which he had absolutely refused to quit under the Inspector's orders. Owing, however, to his "local influence," the order for the removal of Beydoun and his "stock in trade" had to be repeated three times from Constantinople before it was executed by the Commandant of Gendarmerie.

The only remedy that suggests itself is the removal of the Chief of Police, the Commandant of the Gendarmerie, and the Harbour-master, and the substitution in their places of new men specially commissioned to put down this rampant evil, which is a disgrace to all concerned in the government of this place and district. I have been assured from more than one quarter that Rear-Admiral Faik Pasha was unjustly blamed for this state of things as prevalent when he was dismissed last winter and sent to Rhodes, and that if he were to be reinstated as Commodore at Beirout he would, with the assistance of the Commanders of the torpedo-boats, who are not in league with the smugglers, put a stop to such a gross public scandal.

I must, however, add, in justice to the Governor-General, that during the last days of June an undoubted sign of his awakening to the seriousness of the situation, probably under pressure from Constantinople, has been visible, with the result that three important consignments of arms and ammunition were seized during the night of the 21st June. The first consisted of 17 bundles of rifles and 80 dynamite bombs, the second of 160 rifles and 15,000 cartridges, and the third of 13 bundles of rifles, all landed within the limits of the town. The remarkable part, however, of these proceedings is that only one smuggler was caught.

Clandestine Emigration.

Another flourishing contraband business carried on by the same band takes the form of a clandestine "emigration bureau." Their agents scour the country and take charge of the ignorant and helpless people intending to emigrate, not only as far as Beirout, but till they get on board.

They make each emigrant pay them a certain sum, which they share with the police and port officials, who close their eyes to the clandestine departure of these people, who, if they embark openly, would have to pay into the Government coffers 2*l.* for a special permit and 2*s.* 6*d.* as special boat tax. The amount paid to this self-constituted "emigration bureau" is, of course, considerably less than the 2*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* the Government is defrauded of.

Municipality.

Though fairly well lighted by gas (French Company) and well supplied with water (British Company), the town of Beirout is otherwise far behind other towns of lesser importance in the Empire. The streets are not paved, and are allowed to get into a most disgraceful state, making driving a painful ordeal, not to mention the disastrous effects on carriage springs. To add to the difficulties of circulation, the work of laying down the rails of the new electric tramways (Belgian), which is carried on by fits and

stairs, renders many streets quite impassable. The local custom of throwing refuse into the streets instead of into dust-bins adds to the insalubrity of a town where the simplest rules of hygiene are ignored. The fault is not entirely to be laid upon the President of the Municipality, Abdul Kader Effendi Dana, who, though chosen more for political reasons than on account of any special businesslike qualities he may possess, has recently shown great activity in his duties, and there is every reason to know that he is considerably hampered by want of funds.

Public Works.

The great need of improvements in Customs facilities for the landing, warehousing and manipulation of goods, and the failure on the part of the Government to do any thing to remedy matters are too well known to His Majesty's Embassy to need recapitulation here. The importance as a port of loading and unloading for British and foreign shipping is sufficiently great to justify the introduction of the usual facilities provided in most European ports of any size.

At Haifa, great delays were experienced these last months in the discharging operations of British and other steamers arriving with coal and material for the Hedjaz Railway, owing to the absence of the usual facilities, and many steamers went in demurrage. It is stated that the Hedjaz Railway Administration last month paid 1,500*l.* as demurrage to British steamers, and the Government, needing a scapegoat, sacrificed Rear-Admiral Halil Pasha, who was blamed by the Railway Manager, M. Gaudin, and transferred him to Beirout as Commodore of the Mediterranean Cruising Squadron, which only exists on paper.

The new road between Beirout and Tripoli is nearing completion under the auspices of the Lebanon Government, whilst the one from Beirout to Sidon and Tyre is practically finished. The various new railway projects, commented upon from time to time by newspapers, by which Beirout is to be connected with the above-named places, are not likely to come to a head, as such enterprises are not considered likely to be paying concerns owing to the insignificance of the passenger or goods traffic. The only project that offers any serious prospect of accomplishment is a harbour at Haifa, but of this nothing positive has yet transpired, though the difficulties raised against the purchase of land in the vicinity of the Haifa Railway, now somewhat relaxed, tended to the supposition that some such plan is contemplated. The construction of a safe harbour at Haifa would attract the Damascus and Hauran traffic away from the Beirout–Damascus Railway, and, if Aleppo is connected with Alexandretta or Tripoli, viâ Homs, the effect on the receipts of the Beirout Port and Railway Company would be very serious.

Tourists and Pilgrims.

Tourists, principally British and American, visited this town and district this spring in the usual numbers on their way to and from the various places of interest in the Holy Land and Syria. To this movement has now been added that of Mussulman pilgrims returning from Mecca along the Hedjaz Railway, many hundreds of whom chose this route for their return journey to Egypt owing to the insecurity of the caravan route.

This question of returning pilgrims, inasmuch as it may affect Beirout and other ports on the Syrian coast, needs no comments by me here, as the British Delegate on the International Board of Health will no doubt furnish all useful information on the completion of his present mission to the railway head in connection with the contemplated prophylactic measures against the spreading of epidemics by returning pilgrims.

Commercial Outlook.

The general business outlook is good, owing to the tranquillity that reigns and to the promises of good crops all round, except the silk output, which is expected to fall 10 per cent. short of the average annual supply, because of the bad effect on the silk-worms of cold damp weather followed by very hot winds in May.

SIDON.

Mr. Vice-Consul J. Abela reports as follows:—

General Administration.

The district of Sidon is almost entirely inhabited by Moslem Shiites (Metwalis), who number about 40,000.

They submit to the arbitrary authority of their numerous Beys residing at Nabatieh, Taibeh, and Zararyeh, and their relations with them resemble those of European peasants towards their lords in the age of feudalism. It is obvious that the local authorities do not care to enforce discipline amongst the said Beys, whose influence is consequently increasing, and there is no security in their districts. This feeble conduct of the Government towards the Beys has always been the same, and it seems that their coalition and local influence overawe the Government, who tolerate them, as the Shiites are the most fanatical people in Syria, whose support might be useful some day. For some months there has been a rivalry between the Beys, due to quarrels and fights among their respective protégés. Unfortunately the authorities, both at Sidon and Beirout, avail themselves of this state of things to extract money from them instead of punishing the respective culprits. Their reciprocal accusations have shown that some of them trade in prohibited arms and ammunition, and several are now under arrest at Beirout, but it is expected that the Beys will soon be released.

It is really astonishing the great quantities of contraband arms and ammunition that are landed in this country every year, mostly with the help of the Government officials.

Tribunals.

Lawsuits are as numerous as ever. The Clerk of the Court, being well backed at head-quarters, has lived at Beirout for three years, yet he draws his salary every month, and the Assistant Clerk fulfils his duties as well as his own, to the detriment of the work of the Court.

Taxes.

A year ago the Administrative Council of Beirout had decided to make the district of Sidon contribute £T. 500 for the Hedjaz Railway. This sum is now being collected.

Police Force.

All the police officers have been transferred, having been found guilty of connivance in the trade in prohibited arms.

PART II.—*The Lebanon.*

Administration.

The affairs of the Lebanon have been quiet, the only event of interest during the past six months being the inauguration on the 1st March of the additional "special" taxes referred to in Sir Robert Hay-Drummond-Hay's last Report (January 1908) and in my correspondence with His Majesty's Embassy. There have been no complaints against the Administration in general, and the public peace in the mountain has been generally maintained.

The prompt and energetic action of the gendarmerie, acting under the directions of the Governor-General, in arresting certain turbulent characters who had hitherto evaded justice caused general satisfaction, and the brutal assault on an English lady in the neighbourhood of Beirout has been taken up by the administrative authorities with exemplary promptitude.

Mutessarif.

Youssouf Pasha appears to be on good terms with all parties, though exception has been taken in some quarters to his private *entourage*, which consists of the members of the important Greek Orthodox community at Beirout.

His attitude towards the Consular Corps, though friendly and courteous as regards personal relations, is one of decided independence as regards interference with his administration of the Lebanon.

He is credited with having openly given expression to his views on this point soon after his arrival in 1907, and his reluctance recently to communicate "officially" with us on the subject of the finances of the Lebanon lends strength to this declaration of his, which was of course reported at the time to the Consuls-General, some of

whom resented his want of reserve on such a delicate subject. It is probable that this matter will have to be referred to the Embassies before long, as might be foreseen from my despatch No. 31 of the 18th May.

Kessrewan Kaimakamlik.

The vacancy in the Kaïmakamlik of Kessrewan was filled up in March by the transfer of Habib Bey Bitar (Maronite) from Jezeen to Kessrewan, and the appointment of Assad Bey Laboud (Maronite) to Jezeen.

Suspension of a Member of the Council for Bribery.

No little stir was caused among the officials by the suspension in April by the Governor-General of Shedid Bey Akil, a Maronite member of the Administrative Council, owing to his having been formally accused of having accepted a bribe in order to procure some post which he failed to do.

There having been no precedent to such action on the part of the Governor-General, some discussion arose as to whether his Excellency had not exceeded his powers in suspending the Councillor before submitting the case to the Council of State at Constantinople. It was, however, found that a Vizierial letter exists by which the Governor-General can in cases of urgency suspend a member of the Administrative Council pending inquiry and reference to the Council of State. Up to the present Shedid Bey Akil has prevented the transmission of the Governor-General's Report to Constantinople by keeping away from Babda (the winter seat of the Government), where his presence is required by the Governor-General in order to terminate the formalities of the inquiry. This exemplary action by Youssouf Pasha has had a salutary effect, and it is said that several sums of money have been judiciously returned by their recipients through fear of being denounced.

Shouf Kaimakamlik.

The Kaimakam of the Shouf District, Mir Tewfik Arslan, whose appointment in 1906 was expected to help towards healing the strained relations between the two factions of the Druses, as explained in a previous Report (2nd April, 1906), has succeeded in maintaining his post with satisfactory results as far as his administrative abilities go. He has the confidence of the Governor-General and the loyal support of Nessib Bey Djumblatt, whilst his uncle, the powerful Emir Mustapha Arslan, has had no cause to complain of him. This post is the most important one filled by a Druse.

Rivalry among Druse Chiefs.

An attempt to reconcile the Chiefs of the Djumblatt and Arslan parties has met with a partial success, and the latter have been showing a disposition to entertain more friendly relations with His Majesty's Consulate-General than have existed for some years past owing to their intrigues against the former, which the Consulate-General could not support.

Maronites.

There is also a sensible diminution in the activity of the Maronite clergy in their strenuous efforts to oppose any improvement of the situation of the other weaker sects. This is partly due to the independent attitude of the Governor-General and the lessening of the "unqualified support" of the Maronite Patriarch by the French Consulate-General since the events in France in connection with the *concordat* between France, Russia, and England, also, I think, to a more satisfactory understanding between their Consular Representatives in the affairs of the East, and will, I hope, help in the maintenance of the "equilibrium" so earnestly desired in the Lebanon in the interest of the inhabitants of the mountain as a whole.

There appears to be a feeling that, though the Maronite anti-clerical party may not attain to any important position owing to their powerlessness to undermine the authority of the clergy, it is in the ranks of the younger and more educated members of the Church itself that a "reform" may be expected and the community, as a whole, be released from clerical domination.

Protestants.

The Petition of the Protestants of the Lebanon, addressed to the Governor-General in August 1907, applying for official recognition as a separate community ("millet") and the apportionment among them of Government posts on the same basis as the other sects, *i.e.*, proportionable to the taxes paid by them, has met with no success. At present the only privilege they enjoy is that of having a Protestant to sit on the Courts of First Instance and Appeal, whenever a case comes on for hearing in which Protestant interests are concerned.

According to statistics furnished in 1903 by the Committee of the "Lebanon Protestant Presbytery," the number of Protestant males was 1,508 and the taxes paid by them annually 942 dirhems, *i.e.*, 4,710*l*. Though these figures have probably increased during the last five years, they form a very small percentage of the total population and only reach up to the half of the Moslems, who form the next smallest community in the mountain. Owing to the powerful interests at the back of the numerous American and British Protestant educational and religious institutions established in the Lebanon, it is fondly hoped that some day the Sublime Porte may be induced to consent to an alteration of the original Protocol, whereby the status of the Protestants will be placed on a more favourable footing.

Emigration.

The emigration among all classes steadily continues, but on the other hand the number returning appears to be diminishing, there being apparently a greater disposition to a permanent denationalization than hitherto. This feature of the movement tells upon the remittances of the emigrants to their relatives in their native country, which went, to a certain extent, towards making up for the departure of the able-bodied men and the loss of labour their absence entailed.

Roads.

The construction and maintenance of good roads, which is one of the main features of the Lebanese Administration and compares so favourably with the disgraceful state of the roads in and around Beirout, was duly maintained.

[26817] No. 30.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August 4.*)

(No. 172.)

Sir, *Gulahek, July 15, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 126 of the 21st May, I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reporting the arrest, confiscation, and sale by the Persian Customs authorities of a dhow owned and commanded by subjects of the Sheikh of Bahrein.

This case adds another to the list I have had the honour to report in the last few months where Bahreinese have received improper or harsh treatment at the hands of the Persian authorities, and in which no satisfaction has been obtainable from those authorities.

I have not yet received the amended note promised to me by Mushir-ed-Dowleh in place of that addressed to me by his Excellency on the 9th April last. In view of the recent internal crisis, it has been impossible for me to press this question upon the attention of the Persian Government, but I shall not fail to employ the first opportunity that presents itself to renew my representations on the subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to bring to his notice this fresh case of unjust treatment of the subjects of the Sheikh of Bahrein, and to impress upon his Highness the imperative necessity of giving satisfaction to His Majesty's Government in their determination to obtain the recognition of their right to protect those subjects.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 36.

Consul-General Cox to Mr. Marling.

(No. 77.)

Bushire, June 8, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward copies of correspondence detailing the circumstances of the arrest and subsequent confiscation and sale of a dhow owned and captained by subjects of the Sheikh of Bahrein.

The Customs are technically within the strict letter of their rights in regard to the seizure and confiscation under Article 32 of the "Règlement," but the measures taken appear to me to be exceedingly harsh under the circumstances, and I found the Sheikh of Bahrein, whom I visited a few days ago, much upset at the sale of the dhow, which, I may mention, appears to have been bought below its value by Mr. Brown (Messrs. Wonckhaus' representative at Lingah), no one else being willing to bid.

As this case concerns a Bahrein subject, it is probably useless to protest at the failure of the Customs to send the Consul concerned a copy of the *procès-verbal*, and thus give him an opportunity to appeal (*vide* Articles 105–106 of the "Règlement"), but I trust that, if possible, you will see your way to press for a reduction of the heavy penalty imposed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) *P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 36.

Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali to Captain Prideaux.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

23rd Safar, 1326 (*March 26, 1908*).

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Ahmad-bin-Qasim-bin-Jodar has a boat, a boom, for which he appointed Ali-bin-Abdallah Qatani as nakhoda. This boat sailed for Lingah, and on its arrival there the nakhoda and crew were subjected to great hardship and oppression by the Director of Customs, such as, it is not imagined, is meted out in any country. Thereon the said nakhoda Ali wrote a Petition to the Residency Agent, Lingah, but so far nothing has come out to check the insult which is being cast on him and on his companions the crew of the boat.

A copy of the Petition which was submitted to the Residency Agent is inclosed herewith for your perusal, which contains all particulars of hardships inflicted by the Director of Customs. I also beg to inclose for your perusal the Petition of the owner of the boat, Ahmad-bin-Qasim.

I trust from your justice that you will give full consideration to this case of hardship and oppression meted out to my subjects, and I request you to kindly take up the case.

Inclosure 3 in No. 36.

Petition of Nakhoda Ali-bin-Abdulla-bin-Qattani, addressed to Khan Sahib Agha Badr-bin-Muhammad Amin.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

19th *Safar*, 1326 (*March* 22, 1908).

I BEG to state that we arrived at Lingah on the 28th Moharram, 1326 (corresponding to the 2nd March, 1908), and intended binding some cargo of dates, when all of a sudden a storm set in. I, the nakhoda, was then ashore at Lingah, and my boom contained the crew and the rudder-man. Owing to the severity of the storm, the ropes in the boat were broken off, and the boom sailed to get in a safe harbour at Duwwan. On the arrival of the boat there a man came forward who purchased ninety-two qallahs of Khanaizi dates and five tins of date juice. The said quantity of dates and date juice was loaded at Duwwan on Sunday, the 5th Safar, 1326 (8th March, 1908), at 4 o'clock (Arabic time) in the day. Thereon the Customs man of Duwwan come up and demanded custom duty, 9 rupees, which sum was paid to him in the presence of Sheikh Khalfan, Chief of Duwwan, and in the presence of a number of other people. On the

6th Safar (9th March, 1908), the boat sailed for Mughu and arrived there the same day. The Inspector of Customs called on the crew of the boat in the house of the Mudir of revenue of Mughu, in the presence of Sheikh Ahmad-bin-Rashid-al-Marzuqi and of Ali and Ibrahim-bin-Sultan, and in the presence of a number of other townspeople. He inquired of the crew what quantity of dates they had landed at Duwwan. They replied that they had landed at Duwwan ninety-two qallahs of dates and five tins of date juice, and that they had paid the customs duty as much as was demanded of them by the Customs man at Duwwan, viz., 9 rupees. He thereupon told them that the duty would be more than what they had paid. Then he made calculations and said that they should pay 11 rupees more, and that they should return to Duwwan and pay the money there. In obedience to the order of the Inspector of Customs, the rudder-man himself returned to Duwwan to pay the money to the Customs man there. The latter was not found there, and the rudder-man remained there one day and one night waiting for him. But, seeing that the Customs man was not there, and finding that he could not be delayed there more, he paid 11 rupees to the Chief of Duwwan, Sheikh Khalfan, and got from him a letter on this particular for Sheikh Ahmad, Chief of Mughu. On Wednesday, the 8th of the current month (corresponding to the 11th March) at 11,30 (Arabic time, or half-an-hour before sunset), the gun-boat (? perhaps a launch) "Qilan" approached the boom at Mughu harbour, and struck her against it and broke four pieces of wood off the front side. The Commander of the gun-boat (?) ordered the lascar to board the boom and take out all the ropes, without referring anything about it to him. They were asked why they should do this, and the Commander replied to the crew of the boom that they were not to be listened to. Thus they took off all the ropes, tied the boom to the gun-boat (?) and towed it out to Lingah. Here the boom is still with the customs people, and is kept manned by two armed soldiers.

I beg, further, to inform you that the boom is the property of Ahmad-bin-Jasim-bin-Jodar, a Bahrein subject, and the dates and date juice are my property, which still are 400 qallahs and 30 tins of date juice. Besides, there is in the boom 100 qallahs of dates, sent by Ali-bin-Ibrahim-az-Zaiyani to the care of Hassen-bu-Suniya. We are all Bahrein people, subjects of Sheikh Esa-bin-Ala-al-Khalifa, Chief of Bahrein. I beg to consider our case with compassion.

Inclosure 4 in No. 36.

Ahmad-bin-Jasim-bin-Jodar to Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

23rd Safar, 1326 (*March* 26, 1908).

I BEG to say that I own a boom which sailed from Bahrein laden with cargo of dates and date-juice for Lingah, with Ali-bin-Abdalla-bin-Qatami as her nakhoda. The Director of Customs, Lingah, treated the boat and the crew in a manner which is against the code of justice. It therefore became necessary to bring the matter to your notice, as we are your subjects. Inclosed with this you will find a copy of the Petition which the said nakhoda, Ali-bin-Qatin, submitted to Aga Badr-bin-Muhammad Amin, Residency Agent, Lingah. It contains details of the affair which, God willing, you will read, and I beg of you to consider our case and to relieve us from this aggression, which the Director of Customs, Lingah, meted out to us illegally.

I shall wait for your action.

Inclosure 5 in No. 36.

Captain Trevor to M. Constant.

May 3, 1908.

WE have received reports from Bahrein and Lingah regarding the seizure by the Director of Customs, Lingah, of a Bahrein boat and cargo belonging to Bahrein subjects, viz., Ahmed-bin-Kasim-bin-Jodar, Ali-bin-Abdulla Katani, and others.

It appears that M. Warrin contends that the nakhoda of the boat holds no jowaz from the ports where he sold dates, &c., and sold them at ports where there were no Customs bureaux, and that he, the nakhoda, had participated with the Customs employés in an act of smuggling. M. Warrin, further, does not admit the evidence of the nakhoda's witnesses as to the payment of customs duty to the Customs Mudir at Charek.

The nakhoda, on the other hand, pleads ignorance of necessity for taking out

jowaz, that the Customs tofangchis should have prevented him from landing and selling the goods if it was not allowed, and that, on the contrary, they were present at the landing, and that customs duty was recovered from him by the Kedkhuda. He adds that if he had intended to smuggle he would not have landed the goods in the daytime in the presence of Customs officials.

No *procès-verbal* has been received in this Residency, and, apart from the above, I am not aware of the precise grounds on which your Representative has been acting, but if it is agreed that the facts are mainly as stated, as I understand them to be, the confiscation of the boat and contents, valued at over 600 tomans, seems a very heavy visitation, and I hope you will kindly see your way to reconsider the case, especially as it would seem that some of your own employés were identified with the nakhoda's action. I should have communicated with you earlier but was awaiting further information from Lingah.

I do not suggest that the nakhoda should go scot-free, and if you could impose a light fine, say, of 500 krans, I would readily support it, as I quite agree that there has been at any rate a technical violation of Customs Regulations.

I may add that Major Cox had written to you on the above lines on the 23rd April, but did not send you the letter, as he received another Report from Lingah saying that a further inquiry was being made. I have, however, now heard that the evidence of the witnesses produced by the nakhoda has not been accepted, and that the boat is to be sold very shortly. I trust at any rate that the sale of the boat may be delayed until the matter has been thoroughly thrashed out.

Inclosure 6 in No. 36.

Captain Trevor to M. Zwinne.

May 19, 1908.

REFERRING to your letter of the 14th May, 1908, I have to inform you that I have now received a Report from Lingah that the boom belonging to Ahmed-bin-Kasim-bin-Jodar, Ali-bin-Abdulla Kataui, and others of Bahrein, was sold on the 12th, with all on board, for 1,600 rupees to Mr. Brown of the firm of Messrs. Robert Wonckhaus and Co.

In view of my letter of the 3rd instant, I am very surprised to hear this, and I beg you will be so good as to cancel the sale pending further inquiry into the matter.

Inclosure 7 in No. 36.

M. Zwinne to Consul-General Cox.

Le 21 *Mai*, 1908.

COMME suite à vos lettres des 3 et 19 Mai courant, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le procès-verbal dont elles traitent a été rédigé régulièrement à charge de sujets de Bahrein pour importation frauduleuse de marchandises par voie non autorisée, et qu'en conséquence, conformément au télégramme de l'Administration Centrale du 6 Décembre, 1904, dont le contenu vous a été communiqué par ma lettre du 7 du même mois, et à la Circulaire du 4 Février, 1905, j'ai le regret de devoir vous faire connaître qu'il ne m'est pas possible d'intervenir autrement dans cette affaire.

Veuillez, &c.

[26952] No. 37.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 418.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 25, 1908.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 381 of the 11th instant respecting the recent disturbances in Samos, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch addressed to me by Mr. Consul-General Barnham, to whom I had communicated, for his observations, Sir F. Elliot's despatches Nos. 88 and 93 of the 14th and 17th ultimo respectively. Mr. Barnham has been in correspondence with Mr. Maré on certain points in M. Sofoulis' complaints, to which I drew his special attention, and he has

also discussed these points with his French colleague. He appears to think, as I do, that the Prince of Samos has committed no irregularities which were not justified by the circumstances.

The charges brought against Kopassis Bey by M. Sofoulis in his two letters, which form the inclosures in Sir F. Elliot's despatches, may be summarized as follows:—

Apart from his allegations respecting the cruelty of the Turkish soldiers, with which I have already dealt, he declares—

1. That the people of Samos is being subjected to inhuman persecutions, that peaceful and innocent citizens have been proscribed; that wholesale arrests have been effected, and that those arrested have been subjected to ill-treatment and to the tortures of hunger;

2. That the Turkish flag has been hoisted over the Palace;

3. That Deputies have been forced to resign or have been deprived of their mandates by the Prince, whereas their resignations can only properly be accepted by the Assembly, and they can only be deprived of their mandates after an order of the Court of Appeal; that the Prince ignored the rule that fourteen days' notice must be given for the holding of the elections, and that the present Assembly was convoked during the Turkish military occupation, and is therefore irregular;

4. That Judges and others have been removed from their posts by the Decree of the Prince; and

5. That the Prince has abrogated by Decree certain Articles of the Civil and Penal Codes.

Taking these charges seriatim:—

1. You will notice that M. Sofoulis speaks of the people of Samos as being the victims of the Prince's alleged persecution, thus insinuating that the measures which the Prince has found himself compelled to take were directed against the whole population. As a matter of fact, there has been no persecution, and proceedings have been taken, not against a people, but against a faction which has been guilty of rebellion. Some 230 arrests have been effected, but Mr. Maré states that the person arrested have not been subjected to any ill-treatment.

2. According to Mr. Maré, the Turkish flag was hoisted, not over the Palace, but over the Turkish barracks. There is therefore no justification for the insinuation that there had been a substitution of flags implying a change in the status of the island.

3. Mr. Maré has furnished Mr. Barnham with a list of the Deputies who have been dismissed or have been compelled to resign. It is nowhere stated in the code that resignations can only be accepted by the Assembly, or that members can only be deprived of their mandates by an order from the Court of Appeal; but I notice that persons accused of crimes, if warrants have been issued against them are, under the Electoral Law of 1880, expressly disqualified from sitting in the Assembly. It is possible no doubt that in this matter, as well as in that of the fortnight's notice for the holding of the elections, the letter of the law may not have been strictly observed, for the Deputies dismissed or compelled to resign were so treated because they had been implicated in the rebellion, and, considering the circumstances, the authorities do not seem to have been guilty of any undue relaxation of the sanctity of the Constitution. In any case, as I have before observed, the privileges of the Samians were granted conditionally on their remaining loyal subjects of the Sultan, a condition which the Sofoulists have clearly violated.

4. Mr. Barnham says that Mr. Maré makes no mention of the removal of Judges, but, assuming that M. Sofoulis is accurate in this allegation, I would point out that, under the "Règlement" of 1852, the Prince clearly has the right to remove Judges and, indeed, all functionaries not elected by the people.

5. According to Mr. Maré, certain Articles of the Penal Code were changed, but this was done by the Assembly, and not, as alleged by M. Sofoulis, by the Prince.

As regards the number of troops kept in the island since 1879, Mr. Maré has apparently given Mr. Barnham no particulars. I am therefore repeating my inquiry in order to be able to reply to your despatch No. 243 of the 19th June. There are now 650 there. This is more than the number stated to me by the late Grand Vizier, but they have been maintained in the island at the express request of the Assembly, and,

though it may be necessary for the three Embassies later to remind the Porte of its formal promises and of the Sultan's decision to maintain in the island not more than two companies, I do not think it would be opportune to press for any further reduction for the moment. As you are aware, the bulk of the troops sent to restore order have left the island.

The inclosed extract from a despatch from the French Consul-General at Smyrna, which has been communicated to me by my French colleague, may be of interest.

I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to Athens, omitting the second inclosure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 73. Confidential.)
Sir, *Smyrna, July 21, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 5th instant instructing me to obtain fuller information from Vice-Consul Mare respecting events at Samos.

1. In reply to the question why the seven Deputies mentioned had been forced to resign, and what steps were taken to compel them to do so, Mr. Mare replies:—

"MM. Frandjis, Deputy of Vathy; Chrissakis, of Port Vathy; Sideris, of Chora; and Anssis, of Pilocastro, have been dismissed, the first because he had been condemned fifteen years ago by the Court of Appeal to imprisonment, and the other three because they were accused of having taken part in the recent disturbances.

"MM. Epakilis, also Deputies of Vathy; Dimitrelias, of Port of Vathy; Costopoulos, of Vocari; Hadjidimitrion, of Arvantes; Papahadji, of Cornaradeon; Caristeglou, of Vorsliotes; and Moralis, of Fousni, were forced to resign through threats of imprisonment for having taken part in the riots by the Senator Th. Anezinis.

"MM. Dilanas and Yaghas, Deputies of Marathocampo, have been also imprisoned for the same reason, but I do not know why it was afterwards decided by the majority of Deputies that they should be free during the time of the Assembly.

"MM. Folis and Frangkias, Deputies of St. Constantin and Pyrgos, have been also accused for the same reason, and from what I hear they will be arrested immediately after the close of the Assembly."

Mr. Mare suggests that these Deputies were dismissed expressly for the purpose of obtaining a majority in the Assembly. I have discussed this point with my French colleague, who is of the opinion that the Prince's party was already predominant, and had no need of these votes.

2. As regards the troops now in the Island, he gives the following figures: 250 in the Turkish barracks, 200 in a school in Upper Vathy, 100 on a hill overlooking the port, 30 in the Palace; 40 on duty in the prisons, and about 30 sick; total 650. These figures tally with those received by my French colleague.

3. Mr. Mare says nothing about the Samians being the object of inhuman persecutions.

4. He says, however, that it is untrue that those arrested are subjected to ill-treatment and hunger, the only complaint being that the prisons are too small to accommodate so large a number of prisoners during the summer.

5. He says that more than 230 persons are at present under arrest. The Prince has given orders that the judicial inquiry shall terminate on the 22nd July.

6. Mr. Mare explains that the acts of pillage referred to by him, viz., the breaking open of safes at the Public Treasury and Museum, took place on the second day after the arrival of the troops. He has reported nothing after that date which reflects on their conduct. They seem to be under proper control, and their number does not appear excessive, all things considered. I should mention that these very acts of pillage are said by others to have been committed by Sofoulis' men just before they fled the island.

7. Mr. Mare says that it is quite untrue that the Turkish flag was flown over the Palace, but that it was hoisted over the Turkish barracks. I do not think any exception can be taken to this.

8. Mr. Mare says that Articles 264, 267, 275, and 461 of the Penal Code have been changed by the Assembly (not by the Prince), so that the delay accorded to persons accused while absent for preparing their defence has been shortened in the case of those on trial now.

9. Mr. Mare states that the Assembly alone has the right to dismiss Deputies or accept their resignations.

This is nowhere expressly stated in the code. The relative attributes of the Prince and the Assembly are not defined with sufficient clearness, but it seems to me that as these persons were in open rebellion against the supreme constituted authority the Prince was justified in dismissing them. He might, perhaps, have waited until the result of the judicial inquiry was known.

10. Mr. Mare states that the usual fortnight's notice was not given before the elections were held, but that is unimportant.

11. Mr. Mare makes no reference to the removal of Judges, but in paragraph 10, text IV., "Young," vol. i (p. 118), it is stated that they are nominated by the Prince and removable for misconduct.

Those removed are of course persons belonging to Sofoulis' party. When the results of the judicial inquiry are made known it will be time enough to judge whether those who replaced them have by any gross miscarriage of justice shown themselves unfit for their duties.

12. Mr. Mare does suggest that the Assembly acts under compulsion, but to do is to assume that the majority of the members are in principle opposed to the Government, but have to yield to pressure brought to bear upon them by the Prince, as there can be no question that the majority are loyal to the Prince.

I beg to return herewith the papers which accompanied your despatch under reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Thérapia, le 3 Juillet, 1908.

NOTRE Consul-Général à Smyrne, à qui j'avais demandé de me donner son avis sur les différentes mesures prises à Samos, d'accord entre le Haut Commissaire et le Prince, et portées à la connaissance des trois Ambassades par une notice dont j'ai communiqué le texte à votre Excellence le 17 Juin dernier, m'a fait savoir que ses informations ne lui avaient signalé jusqu'à présent aucune infraction aux prescriptions des statuts de l'île.

Je crois devoir extraire du Rapport de M. Blanc le passage suivant dans lequel notre Agent fait, la Charte Samienne sous les yeux, l'examen des récentes mesures prises à Samos:—

1. *Destitution des Sénateurs et Députés qui ont subi des Condamnations antérieures ou qui ont participé aux derniers troubles.*

Pour ceux qui ont subi, précédemment à leur élection, les condamnations infamantes, il est certain que le droit du Prince de les destituer est incontestable, puisqu'ils n'étaient même pas éligibles, et qu'il a fallu l'état d'anarchie qui existait dans le pays depuis plusieurs années pour que l'on ait pu élire des gens condamnés aux travaux forcés pour crimes de droit commun. Quant à ceux qui ont participé aux derniers troubles et qui ont pris la fuite pour se réfugier en Grèce, il est également évident que le Prince était dans son droit en prononçant leur déchéance et en appelant les électeurs Samiens à les remplacer.

J'ignore si parmi les Députés destitués il s'en trouvait qui, ayant pris part aux derniers troubles, n'en seraient pas moins demeurés dans le pays. Pour ces derniers, il eût été plus prudent d'attendre qu'une décision judiciaire ait pu intervenir pour établir leur culpabilité et prononcer leur déchéance, mais je doute que ce dernier cas se soit présenté, parce que les personnes ainsi incriminées auraient certainement été mises en état d'arrestation et notre Agent Consulaire à Samos nous en aurait avisé.

2. *Destitution de Fonctionnaires.*

M. Missir m'a fait savoir que bon nombre de fonctionnaires compromis dans les derniers événements avaient été destitués et remplacés. Il n'y a rien, ce me semble, qui soit contraire à la Charte Samienne dans cet acte du Prince, puisque l'Article 10 du Règlement Additionnel de 1852 dit formellement que "le Prince nommera tous les fonctionnaires que le peuple n'aura pas à élire."

Le droit du Prince est donc incontestable, et s'il n'en a fait usage que pour sévir contre les fonctionnaires qui s'étaient soulevés contre l'autorité du Gouvernement, on ne saurait lui en faire un grief.

3. *Poursuites Judiciaires exercées contre Sofoulis Hadjidakis et les deux autres Sénateurs.*

J'avais craint un moment que ce fût à une cour martiale que l'on ait voulu confier le soin de juger les quatre Sénateurs qui, après avoir ordonné d'ouvrir le feu contre les soldats et avoir cherché à soulever la population, s'étaient empressés de mettre la mer entre eux et les colonnes Turques envoyées à leur poursuite.

Il eût été difficile de contester à la Porte le droit de constituer une cour martiale dans un pays où elle était obligée d'envoyer un corps expéditionnaire pour rétablir l'ordre. C'est, d'ailleurs, ce qu'elle avait fait en Crète à maintes reprises sans que les Puissances Garantes du Statut Crétois aient jamais songé à protester.

Mais étant donné le peu de garanties, au point de vue de la distribution saine de la justice, qu'offrent les cours martiales Turques, il est évident que la Porte agit sagement en confiant aux Tribunaux du pays le soin de juger par contumace les fauteurs des désordres. Elle ne s'exposera de la sorte à aucun reproche et elle obtiendra une sanction pénale contre ces tristes individus qui, pour la satisfaction de leurs intérêts personnels, ont jeté leur pays dans une aventure aussi lamentable."

[27592] No. 38.

Mr. F. Crow to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)

Sir, *Goldner Adler Hotel, Landeck, Tyrol, August 3, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, and inclosures, which are returned herewith. It would of course be very desirable to punish Gadban in the way suggested by Major Ramsay, and if suitable punitive measures were undertaken by the Turks at our instance the offer would no doubt be beneficial to our interests. But, having regard to Turkish ways and means, I fear the suggestion is hardly practicable, and that, even if the Turks agreed to it, the business would not be properly done. The half-measures they would probably adopt would be worse than none at all. I think a compensation claim is the only practical course; 1,000*l.* would be sufficient, not because Lynch has suffered to that extent, but merely to show that we cannot let these occurrences pass unnoticed. It would also be advisable to demand the surrender of the individuals who fired on the vessel. As the Vali of Bussorah is accused of supporting Gadban, he should be called upon to provide the money in the first instance, and to arrange for the surrender of the culprits as a condition of his retention in office. The details of the compensation claim are inclosed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

DETAILS of Messrs. Lynch's Compensation Claim.

	Amount claimed.	Amount proposed to be paid.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
One voyage, Bagdad to Bussorah ..	538 5 0	400 0 0
" " Bussorah to Bagdad ..	583 8 0	400 0 0
Damage to vessel	200 0 0	100 0 0
Telegrams, &c.	40 0 0	40 0 0
Injured fireman	20 0 0	20 0 0
Incidentals	123 0 0	40 0 0
Total	1,514 13 9	1,000 0 0

[27627] No. 39.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 429.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 29, 1908.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 394 of the 16th instant, on the subject of the attack on the "Blosse Lynch," and the disorder among the Arab tribesmen on the Lower Tigris, I have the honour now to report the receipt of a telegram from Mr. Consul-General Ramsay, reporting that quiet at present prevails. Major Ramsay adds that the Provincial Government is bankrupt, and can provide no money for offensive measures. The Vali is endeavouring to borrow some from the merchants in order to be able to meet immediate necessities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY

[27630] No. 40.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 434.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 31, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting the formation of a Commission to replace the boundary marks on the Russo-Turkish frontier between Mount Ararat and the Black Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 40.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, July 21, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that a Commission, composed of three Turkish and two Russian officers of the Staff, is shortly to meet at Kontek for the purpose of replacing the boundary marks on that part of the Russo-Turkish frontier stretching from a point at the foot of Mount Ararat to Khopa on the Black Sea.

The disappearance of these boundary marks through lapse of time and other causes gives rise, it appears, to occasional disputes between the villagers dwelling on either side of the frontier, and, as I am at present informed, it is with the object of avoiding a recurrence of these disputes in the future that the present work has been decided upon. The Turkish members of the Commission are Colonel Fakhri Bey, Commandant on the Turkish side of the frontier, with Colonel Ismail Hakki Bey and Adjutant Major Ferhi Bey of the Staff. The two last-mentioned officers have recently arrived in Erzeroum from Constantinople, and are now awaiting instructions to proceed to Kontek.

I have been informed by the Commandant, Ahmed Pasha, that the operations of the Commission above referred to, the appointment of which, he believed, was due to a friendly suggestion on the part of the Russian Government, will be confined solely to the work above stated, and will not be concerned with any question of rectification of frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[27649] No. 41.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 453.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 5, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 149 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Konia reporting on the reception of the Constitution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 41.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Konia, August 1, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to the local rejoicings over the Constitution, I have the honour to inform you that two of the Redif regiments from this district lately embodied have now returned, the one from Smyrna and the other from Salonica. They were met by the whole town, including the Vali and functionaries, as well as by the exiles (or rather the late exiles), who really represent the Young Turkey party here. There was a scene of great enthusiasm and much cheering for the Sultan, the army, and for liberty. Cheers for the Sultan are now more common than was at first the case. The regiment from Salonica had been presented by the Committee there with a flag for each man, on which had been printed "Liberty and Progress" or "The Nation and Liberty." These flags were on every rifle. The men had been told to take them to their villages, and they refused to give them to the Konia people. They were in better order and discipline than when they started. Two of these flags were afterwards sent to me as souvenirs, and, as I take it, proofs of this clever means of spreading the Young Turkey idea. The other two regiments have not as yet returned, but are daily expected.

Instructions were given to the Hodjas to preach in the mosques on the new Constitution. They pronounced unexceptionable exhortations to the non-abuse of liberty, to brotherhood with the Christians, to practical equality, and the unchangeable law of religion.

The prisoners in the gaol, who now number some 1,200, shouted for liberty for two days, and finally attacked the zaptiehs guarding them with stones, severely wounding two of them. Firing became necessary, and two prisoners were killed and two wounded. It is now understood that the amnesty is for political prisoners only.

The Mussulman merchants made a demonstration against various corrupt minor officials, dragging them to the Konak. There was great crush, and even the Vali was accidentally jostled by the crowd in the passage before his office. However, their intention was entirely peaceful, and no harm was done even to the offenders. The most hated among them was the President of the municipality, a notorious robber, who has since resigned his office in terror.

The others, such as the Acting Commandant of Police, the Secretary of the Defterdar (who does all the work of the office), and some smaller people, were, at the instance of the Vali, allowed to swear on the Koran that they would take no more bribes. They were very frightened, as were all the functionaries.

It was further proposed that the Vali should himself take an oath to take no bribe, but this by the influence of the exiles was allowed to drop, especially as he is not considered to be in the habit of doing so.

Some of the principal exiles have now gone to Constantinople after receiving a great send off. Those that remain are either looking for money or making arrangements for their families.

Servet Pasha, commanding the division, left yesterday, transferred to Smyrna. He is a great loss to Konia, especially at the present time, being a perfectly honest old-fashioned Turk, and a gallant old soldier universally respected.

I hear from Mersina that the Constitution was received with joy and incredulity there. But there is no report from Adana, where the influence of the army officers would make itself more felt.

There have been, however, no Redifs taken from that district to act on their return as missionaries of the ideas of the Young Turkey party.

There have been no disturbances apparently. I have told Mr. Kolso to telegraph anything important.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

[27827] No. 42.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th August, relative to the Persian Gulf arms traffic.

India Office, August 10, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 42.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 8, 1908.

FOLLOWING is purport of telegram from Cox, dated Shiraz, the 4th instant:—

"I have received communication from Senior Naval Officer informing me that two mail steamers were searched for arms, destined for [? Koweit], by His Majesty's ship 'Sphinx' in Muscat Harbour on the 6th July, and asking to be furnished with my views as to further measures. I am not yet in receipt of Political Agent's Report, but the search, which was successful, will have no doubt a salutary effect on British Indian Company. On the other hand, this course of action if persevered in at present will have a prejudicial effect in all probability on the amenableness of the Sheikh of Koweit and the Sultan of Muscat, which it may be of great importance to His Majesty's Government to preserve, if it should be their wish, consequent on the conclusion of the Brussels Conference, shortly to require either one of these Rulers, or both, to fall in with any change of policy affecting Koweit and Muscat. In these circumstances I am requesting the Senior Naval Officer to suspend activity pending an intimation of the wishes of His Majesty's Government.

"Since the arms traffic to Koweit does not immediately affect British interests as the traffic viâ Mekran does, no practical harm will result from temporary inaction."

Cox's action in directing suspension of activity for the present has been approved by us.

[26317] No. 43.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 10, 1908.

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th ultimo, relative to the right of His Majesty's Government to exercise protection over subjects of the Sheikh of Bahrein in Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran on the subject, with special reference to the recent confiscation and sale by the Persian Customs authorities of a Bahreini dhow as punishment for a technical breach of the Customs Regulations.

It will be observed that Mr. Marling has not yet received the amended note promised by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he proposes to take the first opportunity to renew his representations on the subject.

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it is desirable to await the result of these fresh representations before deciding whether more drastic measures, such as the occupation of an island, or the threat to occupy an island, in the Persian Gulf, already recommended by Mr. Marling, should be taken to enforce the right of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

I am to state, however, that he would be glad to receive an expression of Viscount Morley's views on the question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[26552] No. 44.

Sir Edward Grey to Turkish Ambassador.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August* 12, 1908.

I DID not fail to refer to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India copy of the Memorandum which your Excellency did me the honour to communicate to me on the 6th May last respecting the alleged proceedings of certain Indian officials in the Vilayet of Bussorah, who, it was stated, had gone as far as Intaa, between Koweit and Nejd, where they were reported to have distributed arms and presents.

I now have the honour to state that I am informed by Viscount Morley that the facts have been found, on inquiry, to have been inaccurately reported to the Ottoman Government.

The journey to Intaa was not made by five British officers sent to Koweit for the purpose on a ship of war, but was an ordinary tour undertaken by Major Knox, British Political Agent at Koweit, who was accompanied by his wife, and attended by his Indian cook and sweeper; all the rest of the party were Arabs.

Major Knox did not stay with the Sheikh named, neither were any arms given, but only a few dollars—not more than five—as small presents for services rendered. Some medicines were also distributed gratuitously to the sick.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[28190] No. 45.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 13.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August* 12, 1908.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of letter dated the 8th June, with its inclosures, which has been received through the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, and the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, from the Commanding Officer, His Majesty's ship "Lapwing," respecting the tender of an apology to him by the Kaimakam at El Katif as arranged.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

Lieutenant-Commander Gouldsmith to Commander Litchfield.

Sir, *"Lapwing," at El Katif, June* 8, 1908.

WITH reference to your sailing orders dated the 3rd instant, I have the honour to report that I arrived at El Katif on Friday, the 5th instant, and sent the interpreter to Katif with the open letter from the Vali of Bussorah to the Kaimakam of El Katif.

2. Arrangements were made for the Kaimakam to come on board the following forenoon, in his own boat, to offer the apology ordered. He sent by the interpreter a written apology in Arabic, a translation of which is attached.

3. On Saturday forenoon (6th instant), the Kaimakam, accompanied by the Captain of the Port and the Military Officer Commanding the forces round Katif, the former in plain clothes, the two latter in uniform, sailed off to the ship in their own dhow and called on me.

4. The Kaimakam seemed honestly to regret the behaviour of the former officials of the port, and hoped there would be no re-occurrence in the future. He rather insisted upon me returning his call, and I should imagine he was told to expect it, by orders from Constantinople, especially as he kept on mentioning that the Sultan was very annoyed over the affair.

5. The following day I called on the Kaimakam at his own house and received every hospitality. My boat's crew were also well cared for by the Kaimakam.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. GOULDSMITH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

Kaimakam of El Katif to Captain Gouldsmith.

(Translation.)

Your Honour, 23 *Ayar* (*June* 5, 1908).

YOUR arrival at El Katif has been made known to me by your interpreter, Mr. Kellow. I am very sorry for the unintentional treatment which took place some time ago, and I am ready to visit you, starting at 5 A.M. (English time), and if the breeze permits I hope to reach the ship at 11 A.M.

(Sealed) MUHAMID AMEEN SALMAN.

[28281] No. 46.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received August 14.)

Sir, 3, *Sultze's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, August* 13, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to communicate, for your information, the following telegram from our agents in Bagdad, dated the 12th instant:—

"Arabs on the River Tigris fighting. P.S. 'Khalifah,' with downward mail, detained at Coot. The Vali of Bagdad considers it will not be safe to proceed. We keep her until we are satisfied as to safety."

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[28301] No. 47.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th August, relative to a reported attack by the Bedouin on the town of Katif.

India Office, August 14, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 47.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 13, 1908.

WE have received a telegram from the First Assistant, Bushire, dated 11th instant, of which following is purport:—

"It is reported by Prideaux, who has just returned from visiting Katif in His Majesty's ship 'Lapwing,' that the Bedouin in the Katif oasis and its neighbourhood have risen in rebellion, and have attacked the town of Katif and the Shiah town. A large number of people have been massacred by the rebels, who have also destroyed most of the date trees. For more than a fortnight the garrison of Anieh and village of Saihat have been beleaguered. Katif, moreover, is attacked every night, and the Turks are hard pressed. It is anticipated by Prideaux that garrison will have to abandon the town population to massacre unless reinforcements are sent speedily. He anticipates, further, that an application will be shortly made by the Kaimakam for the assistance of men-of-war, and inquires whether His Majesty's Government would sanction the giving of assistance, and to what extent. The principal merchants of Bahrein have sent a Memorial to Prideaux in which they point out that in consequence of their close trading relations with Katif they themselves will be heavy losers by destruction of property in the oasis, and ruin of Katifies. Prideaux ventures to hope that in the circumstances reported Government may be able to give a favourable reply."

We have asked Bagdad by telegraph to report if above information is confirmed there; and we have informed Bushire that unless the Turkish authorities formally ask for assistance it is out of the question for us to lend it.

[28313] No. 48.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 14.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August 14, 1908.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 13th August, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies. My Lords would be glad to receive the remarks of the Secretary of State on the matter.

A copy has also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *August 13, 1908.*

INFORMATION has been received through His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" from the Consul-General at Bushire that British assistance will shortly be asked for by the Kaimakam of El Katif to prevent the inhabitants of El Katif being murdered, as the Turkish garrison is in sore straits through want of provisions.

In view of this town being commercially closely connected with Bahrein Island, inquiry has been made of the Government of India as to the assistance I could give to the authorities at El Katif. I have arranged with Government of India to use the steam-launch of the Resident of Bahrein, and, in addition, His Majesty's ships "Redbreast" and "Lapwing" are in the vicinity. The steam-launch is the only means of communication across the shoal water near the town. This boat, armed as necessary, will be manned by bluejackets.

The trouble at El Katif seems to be due to the bad pearl fishery season, and a consequent growth of piracy. The authorities at Bussorah have been pressed to send provisions and Turkish ships and troops in relief.

[28281] No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 14, 1908.*

WE hear from Lynch that fighting is going on among the Arabs on the Tigris. As the Vali of Bagdad does not consider it safe for their steamer "Khalifah" to proceed, the vessel is detained at Coot with mail. She will be kept there by their agents until they are satisfied that it is safe for her to continue the journey.

You should, if necessary, ask the Grand Vizier to take such steps as are requisite to restore order and to afford protection to the "Khalifah."

[28380] No. 50.

Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received August 15.)

Sir, *Dock House, Billiter Street, London, August 13, 1908.*

YOU will be aware that for some time past the country outside Jeddah has been in a most disturbed state. The last advices from our firm there inform us that the troubles still continue, that the roads are blocked, and that no one is safe outside the town walls.

We would respectfully ask whether arrangements can be conveniently made that, when His Majesty's vessels are proceeding up or down the Red Sea, some of them can be instructed to call at Jeddah and stay a short time, thus showing the flag there.

We trust our suggestion may have consideration for the further reasons: Pilgrims will shortly be arriving in Jeddah, and the tendency seems for them to travel more and more by tonnage not under the British flag, and, as far as we are advised, it is now some considerable time since any British man-of-war larger than a gun-boat or surveying-ship visited Jeddah.

We are, &c.
(Signed) GELLATLY, HANKEY, AND Co.

[28402] No. 51.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 15.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August 15, 1908.*

WITH reference to telegram dated the 13th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, relative to a possible massacre of the garrison at El Katif, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that while they would approve of the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, taking such action as might be necessary to assist the Turkish garrison, if such should be decided on, yet their Lordships are decidedly of opinion that there are insuperable objections to the landing of men from His Majesty's ships (who are not provided with the necessary equipment for land operations), nor is it desirable to employ bluejackets in military operations.

The assistance from His Majesty's ships must be limited, my Lords consider, to what can be given from the sea, and as El Katif can only be reached by boats drawing 6 or 7 feet of water the assistance possible from the sea will be restricted.

His Majesty's ships "Lapwing" and "Redbreast" will not be able to approach within 7 miles of El Katif.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[28301] No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 15, 1908.*

THE occurrence of serious disturbances at El Katif is reported by His Majesty's ship "Sphinx." The Kaimakam of that place may possibly make a request for assistance from His Majesty's ships. Unless such a request were indorsed by the Ottoman Government it would be impossible for us to comply with it. But if it is put forward by them we will instruct the Commander of His Majesty's ships to take any action that may be possible to save life. There appears to be some doubt as to whether, on account of shoals, it is possible for El Katif to be approached by His Majesty's ships.

[28404] No. 53.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 224.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August 16, 1908.*

HIS Majesty's Vice-Consul reports that the Vali of Diarbekir favours the reactionary fanatical party, between whom and the supporters of the reform movement there is considerable friction. The situation is unsatisfactory.

The mob has been pillaging at Severek, where the bazaars have been burnt.

[28405] No. 54.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 225.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August* 16, 1908.

I HAVE received the following information, which I am communicating to the Porte, from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van:—

The Kurds are said to be pillaging and burning property in Tiari.

There has been a fight, near Shatak, between Kurds and Armenians; two of the former and eleven of the latter were killed. On hearing of Captain Dickson's visit to the place the Kurds dispersed. The troops, who were sent to re-establish order, violated the women and plundered the village.

[28406] No. 55.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 226.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August* 16, 1908.

SITUATION in Mosul.

The Vali, who was appointed only a short time ago, is, according to a report from His Majesty's Vice-Consul, on friendly terms with the least respectable people in the place. Mr. Wilkie Young adds that the state of affairs gives increasing cause for anxiety.

[28450] No. 56.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 454.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 7, 1908.

WITH reference to Mr. Barclay's telegram No. 182 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch for His Majesty's Consul at Damascus with regard to the murder of Sultan-bin-Rashid by his brother Soond.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 56.

Consul Devey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Damascus, July* 24, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency certain information that reached me from a trustworthy source respecting recent affairs of the Nejd, ending in the murder at Hail of Sultan-ibn-Rashid by his brother Soond, who has now succeeded him in the Emirlik of Hail.

After assassinating Mut'ib, as reported in my despatch No. 16 of the 8th April, 1907, Sultan was very prosperous, and succeeded in drawing to his side almost all the natives of Kassim, besides the important town of Bureideh, and many of the strong tribes of that neighbourhood, *e.g.*, Muteir and Oteibeh, against his rival Abdul Aziz-ibn-Soond, who, finding himself deserted by his strongest allies, was forced to retreat to his head-quarters at Riadh without giving battle to Sultan, who had then most of the advantages on his side, and who, confident that the loyalty of the natives of Kassim was secured for himself, returned early in last winter to Hail proposing a further expedition against Riadh for the early spring.

In February 1908 the natives of Kassim invited him from Hail to march with them for the projected aggression upon Ibn Soond, but he, instead of responding readily, put it off for March, and then for April, till they lost all confidence, and announced to him that if he would not come at once they would abandon his cause. Upon this threat he opened negotiations with Ibn Soond, who was already marching against Kassim, treating for peace and unity by abandoning to him the Kassim and its surrounding tribes, and reserving for himself Jebel-Shammar and its dependencies. Ibn

Soond accepted, and completed his march, and reduced all the natives of Kassim to submission to his authority. It is evident that Sultan-ibn-Rashid, out of timidity, or prudence, or peaceful disposition, preferred to remain quietly in Hail and ameliorate home conditions—an inclination which did not suit any of his own adherents and caused great dissatisfaction among his tribesmen and subordinates who, by their antagonistic action towards him, provoked eventually his abdication in favour of his brother Soond-ibn-Hamoud-er-Rashid. He then attempted to retire to Teima, at three or four days' distance, taking with him all the treasure of the Emirate, together with the best horses and camels, thus depriving his brother and successor of all elements of power. After his departure for Teima his brother was induced by the Chiefs of Hail to pursue him and retake the spoil carried away, and he was brought back in chains to Hail. Had he ever reached Teima it is conjectured he might soon have absconded for Egypt.

As soon as he was in power, Soond-ibn-Rashid wrote to Ibn Soond at Kassim, announcing to him the abdication of his brother Sultan and his accession to the Emirlik of Hail, declaring at the same time his readiness and earnest desire to accept the terms of the arrangement proposed and adopted by his brother and predecessor. Ibn Soond, on receiving the news, wrote back demanding the immediate release of Sultan, so that he might come over to Kassim and live in safe and honourable condition with himself (Ibn Soond). The new Ibn Rashid, fearing that his brother might be returned to power some day through the help of Ibn Soond, sent, twenty days ago, and had him slain in prison, as also his one young son. After this news shall have been carried to Ibn Soond, probably he will have been very angry and decided to march against Hail if he should have found at Kassim sufficient force to march with him. This last point is doubtful perhaps, as Sultan was obnoxious to the people of Kassim, who will not be sorry for his decease.

Soond-ibn-Rashid is now the sole Chief and master of Hail, and there is no other candidate disputing his right to the Rulership except a child, also named Soond, aged 9 years, the only surviving son of Abdul Aziz-bin-Rashid, who was carried away to Medina eighteen months ago, when his three brothers were treacherously murdered by this latest victim, Sultan-ibn-Rashid, now in his turn murdered by his own brother.

These events seem to be leading towards the supremacy of Ibn Soond, and his effective ascendancy over the whole of Nejd, a position held by his ancestors throughout last century and even before.

Any further events bearing on this subject will be reported in due course.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. P. DEVEY.

[28453] No. 57.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 457.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 10, 1908.

I HAVE received news from Bitlis to the effect that the situation in the town and district is very unsatisfactory, and that the Government have been unable to put a stop to the robberies of Kurds, the Vali also admitting that he was powerless to act effectively.

The robbers Kassim and Riza Bey were oppressing Armenians, and 150 Armenians were reported to have been massacred at Yozim, in Sort, and the Hamidieh were raiding more than ever in the north of the vilayet.

When I saw the Grand Vizier to-day I told him that I was extremely unwilling to initiate my relations with his Highness with anything of the nature of a complaint, but I thought it right to inform him, in the most friendly manner, of the reports that had reached me.

His Highness thanked me, but said he had had no news in corroboration of these statements. He would, however, look into the matter, and steps must certainly now be taken to do away with the Hamidieh Regiment, which was always giving trouble. If my information came from an Armenian source it might be taken for granted that the number of Armenian sufferers had been much exaggerated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—I have this morning (the 11th August) received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting that the Armenians imprisoned at Birlis have been released, with the exception of 50 who are under charges of murder.

G. L.

[28459] No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 463.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 11, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the Acting British Consul at Jeddah respecting the situation in the Hedjaz, reporting Bedouin attacks on Medina, and an act of piracy committed on a British Indian dhow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 58.

Acting Consul Hussein to Mr. G. Bareley.

(No. 33.)

Sir, *Jeddah, July 30, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report that news was received here on the 25th instant that on the 12th instant a large number of the Masrah division of the Harb tribe committed a night attack on the camp of the Turkish soldiers at Bir Rumah, about 2 miles from Medina, and were repulsed with very heavy loss.

It is reported that the authorities received intelligence of this intended attack a few hours before it was delivered, and orders were issued to the troops to light the camp lights at sunset as usual, and leave the tents and take positions on the hills surrounding the camp as soon as it was dark.

This order was carried out perfectly, and at about 11 P.M. the Bedouins (1,000 to 1,500 in number) charged the camp from all sides, quite unaware of the stratagem of their opponents, and found themselves under deadly fire poured from the surrounding hills, while the camp, the object of their attack, was deserted. It is said that 300 to 350 Bedouins were killed and wounded, and 500 rifles were left behind. Three Bedouins were caught and were taken to Medina, where, on being examined by the Mohafiz Farik Osman Pasha, they stated that the tribes of the surrounding country were being incited to attack the troops, the railway line, and Medina by Beni Ali, a tribe living at a distance of a few miles from Medina, and that this tribe also promised to supply food to the attacking force of the Bedouins. After examination, these three prisoners were beheaded, and their heads were exhibited on the gates of Medina for two days. A column was sent to the villages of Beni Ali tribe, and twelve Notables of the tribe were brought as prisoners. Yesterday evening, again, news came that on the 17th instant Medina was again attacked by a large number of Bedouins, and that they were again repulsed with heavy losses. The rail-head is about 20 miles from Medina and is expected to reach Medina by the middle of August; and so everything will be ready for the opening ceremony of the line at Medina on the 31st August.

For the last twenty days or so the road between Yembo and Medina was open, and three or four large caravans of merchandize had passed. Yesterday news came from Yembo that the last caravan left that place on the 23rd instant, but could not go through. Two days after leaving Yembo the camelmen received news that the road was blocked by the Bedouins of the Ahamdah tribe (a division of Beni Salim) at a place called Meduan, two marches from Medina, and so they did not proceed farther. They were trying to arrange terms with the blockading tribes for permit to pass unattacked. It is not yet known whether they have succeeded and gone through.

Jeddah-Mecca road remained unattacked for a fortnight, but again a robbery was committed on the 28th instant on a caravan going from here, at Jeradah, the place of previous attacks, about 10 miles from here, and thirty-five loaded camels were carried away. The merchandize was sugar and some other articles belonging to Turkish subjects.

A dhow (large sailing-boat), loaded with grain and belonging to a British Indian, was coming from Lohaya, on the Yemen coast, which port she left on the 20th ultimo,

and on the morning of the 1st instant, while anchored at Moajjiz, near Shageg, between Lohaya and Confidah, she was attacked by armed pirates of the Metemeh tribe. The captain and the crew, six in number, were overpowered, and, having been relieved of all their belongings, were sent ashore and left to their fate. They walked for two days along the coast, and lived by begging from the Arab villages they passed through; and on the third day they met two sailing-boats bound for Jeddah, and were taken on board and brought here. The owner of the dhow, a British Indian, who is at present staying at Jeddah, reported the piracy to this Consulate, and lodged his claim of 240*l.* for compensation. I communicated to his Excellency Ahmed Ratib Pasha, who is now in Jeddah, and impressed on him verbally the desirability of settling this claim quickly. His Excellency gave 20*l.* to repatriate to India five sailors of the dhow who wanted to go to India, and I sent them to Bombay by the steam-ship "Ahmadi" on the 29th instant.

The captain of the dhow, who is son of the owner, is staying here with his father.

Ahmed Ratib Pasha has promised to settle this indemnity claim, which is for 240*l.*, within a month, and, fearing that if the matter was reported to the Embassy it will create long and disagreeable correspondence between him and the Porte, he has requested me not to report the matter to Constantinople. Under these circumstances, respectfully, I venture to request that a month's time may be allowed to pass without taking any steps in the matter at Constantinople, and I will try to recover the indemnity within that time; but if the Vali fails to fulfil his promise within a month, then necessary representations may be made to the Sublime Porte.

A representative party of some hundred men from Mecca is to go to Medina to be present at the ceremony of opening the railway line, and the Grand Shereef is making arrangements to send this party by the eastern route, as passage of the party to Medina by the usual Sultani route is, under the present conditions, impossible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MOHAMMED HUSSEIN.

[28463] No. 59.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 467.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 11, 1908.*

IN my despatch No. 449 of the 4th instant I gave an account of the reception of the Sultan's Iradé re-establishing the Constitution in the Asiatic provinces of Turkey. I continue to receive reports in the same tone from His Majesty's Consular officers over almost all parts of the country.

Whereas doubt and disbelief in the news had checked any display of feeling at Kharput, when at last news of the events at Constantinople arrived there by the mail a semi-official celebration took place (on the 7th August), and crowds of Moslems and Christians paraded the town, which was illuminated and decorated, amidst the greatest enthusiasm.

The Armenian political prisoners at Trebizond were liberated on the 5th August.

A great demonstration was held at Tripoli in Barbary, Turks and Arabs equally taking part on the 26th July, services of thanksgiving being celebrated in the mosques, followed by a procession through the town, cheers being especially raised in front of the British and French Consulates.

At Smyrna there was the usual period of incredulity followed by an outbreak of the greatest enthusiasm, when all barriers of race and creed were forgotten. A service was held in the chief mosque, attended by the Vali and all his officials, when a sermon was pronounced on the benefits of counsel and its harmony with the tenets of Islam as shown by the example of the Prophet himself. The commander of the troops and a member of the Council of Administration, together with two other persons, who were charged with being Palace spies, were placed under surveillance, while the former, who had retired to Konia, was there arrested on a charge of peculation and brought back. There was some difficulty in liberating the political prisoners, as the criminal prisoners vowed to kill if they were not also released. These were, however, pacified by a promise that their cases should be reheard if they were suffering from injustice, and they then allowed their political comrades to leave.

But when on the 6th August the Smyrna reserves returned from Salonica, they threw open the gaols and all escaped, though they were warned that in future

offenders would be dealt with summarily and most severely. One prisoner only remains; he committed a murder subsequent to the proclamation of the Constitution and he is to be hung. Nearly 3,000 criminals in all have been released in the Smyrna Vilayet.

The Mutessarif of Mitylene was dismissed for forbidding the people to wear the Reform colours.

Some confusion was occasioned at Erzeroum on the receipt of the order to proceed to the election of Members. The original Regulations had been destroyed in a fire in the Government building, but at last discovery was made of the Member for Kars, which in 1877 was still part of the Turkish Empire. He could not, however, throw much light on the procedure to be adopted, as he could only recollect that he had been suddenly summoned from his business, and directed by the then Vali to proceed to Constantinople, as he had been elected to represent the district of Kars.

No celebration of the event took place until yesterday, when general rejoicing took place both among the soldiers and the population. The prevailing feeling is reported by Mr. Consul Shipley as being one of universal satisfaction and relief.

The Valis of Diarbekir and Mosul are both endeavouring to check the progress of the movement, although the people are universally in favour of it, with the exception of fanatics and corrupt officials. The Vali of Mosul is reported to have endeavoured to stir up the animosity of the Mahommedans against the Christians, and has been threatened with immediate expulsion by the League.

For some unknown cause, the Constitution was not promulgated in Jerusalem till the 8th instant, when it was received with great enthusiasm. Perfect order was maintained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[28615] No. 60.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

Sir, *India Office, August 14, 1908.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to inclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated the 8th August,* as to the discovery by His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" in Muscat Harbour of arms on board two mail-steamers destined for Koweit.

Having regard to the importance at the present juncture of considering the susceptibilities of the Sultan of Muscat and the Sheikh of Koweit, Viscount Morley proposes, subject to the concurrence of Sir E. Grey, to send to the Government of India the telegram of which a draft is inclosed,* to the effect that the suspension for the present of the activity of the naval authorities in such cases is approved by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[28416] No. 61.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August 15, 1908.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 15th August, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

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* Printed separately.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 15, 1908.*

WITH reference to my previous telegram regarding El Katif, the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, reports as follows:—

The position is that a large number of Bedouins are attacking the place and the neighbouring village, and that the small Turkish garrison is able to hold out only with the greatest difficulty. No trade with Bahrein Island is now possible; we hear of atrocities. On our side we are standing by assisting refugees where possible, and keeping a watch on the Bedouin pirates and watching how affairs develop. At present "Redbreast" and "Lapwing" are sufficient. The Political Resident at Bahrein Island suggests the following action, in case the Government approve a request for armed assistance by the Turkish authorities—a boat expedition to be fitted out with guns from His Majesty's ships "Sphinx," "Lapwing," and "Redbreast" to disperse the Bedouins around the town, and to enable the troops in El Katif to occupy the strategic position.

The following could be landed from His Majesty's ships: four Maxims, two field-guns, and forty small-arm men approximately. I do not think that the Arabs will face guns of the soldiers, and think, therefore, that the above should suffice in addition to Turkish troops, which may be sent to reinforce the garrison.

It is expected that two guns will leave Bussorah the 16th August, but this is doubtful owing to the irresolution of the Wali. Instructions are requested in anticipation of a request by him for assistance. Subject to Government approval, do you concur in action, as detailed above, being taken at El Katif on receipt of request for assistance?

I have instructed him to await Admiralty directions before taking any action.

[28417] No. 62.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August 15, 1908.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 15th instant, from the Admiralty to the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Admiralty, August 15, 1908.*

WITH reference to your telegrams Nos. 97 and 100 regarding El Katif.

The Admiralty have informed Foreign and India Offices that, if naval assistance is required by Turkish authorities, they wish that it be limited to what is possible from boats and that bluejackets must not be landed.

[28417] No. 63.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 17, 1908.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, respecting the situation at El Katif. In reply, I am to request that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will be so good as to make it clear to the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, that he is not to give assistance to the Turkish authorities unless the Porte apply to His Majesty's Government on the

subject and until he is authorized to do so by their Lordships, after consultation with this Department.

I am to add that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, assistance by any of His Majesty's ships should be strictly limited to saving life.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[28788] No. 64.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 229.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August* 18, 1908.

WITH reference to your telegrams concerning El Katif numbered 153, 154, 155, the Sublime Porte are aware that a British man-of-war is on the spot, but have made no request for help. I understand that a battalion is being sent from Bussorah to the scene of the fighting.

[28816] No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated to-day, relative to the disturbances at Katif.

India Office, August 18, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 18, 1908.

PLEASE refer to your telegram of the 13th instant as to affairs at Katif. Without express sanction from here no assistance should be afforded to the Turkish authorities.

[28615] No. 66.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, relative to the discovery by His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" in Muscat Harbour of arms on board two mail-steamers destined for Koweit.

I am to inform you in reply that Sir E. Grey shares the opinion expressed by Viscount Morley as to the attitude which should be adopted by His Majesty's Government with regard to such cases at the present juncture, and that he concurs in the terms of the telegram which his Lordship proposes to address to the Government of India on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[28788] No. 67.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1908.

WITH reference to my letter of the 17th instant, respecting the situation at Elkatif, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inclose, to be laid before the Lords

Commissioners of the Admiralty, decypher of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.

I am to request that, should their Lordships have no objection, the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, may be informed by telegraph of the purport of Sir G. Lowther's message.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[28281] No. 68.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant respecting the present situation on the River Tigris.

I am to inform you, in reply, that a telegram was sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the 14th instant, informing his Excellency of the contents of your letter, and instructing him to request the Grand Vizier to take the necessary steps for the protection of your steamer and for the restoration of order in the district.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[28948] No. 69.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th August, relative to the Katif disturbances.

India Office, August 19, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 69.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 19, 1908.

WITH reference to our telegram of the 13th instant as to Katif, we repeat for your information the following telegrams which we have received from Bushire and Bagdad :—

1. From Bushire, dated 15th August—

"Wali of Bussorah assures Consul that a relief force, consisting of 150 men, two guns, will leave to-morrow for Katif."

2. From Consul-General, Bagdad, dated 15th August—

"Nothing seems to be known by Bagdad public of Katif affair. The Wali is reticent, and is inclined to treat affair as unimportant matter. According to Commander Pasha, the Civil officer at Katif, who had a force consisting of seventy men, asked about the 3rd August for reinforcements and food. 200 soldiers were dispatched from Bussorah in the Turkish gun-boat 'Kalid Bahr,' and in a few days' time 100 men are to leave Bagdad for Katif, with one gun."

[29060] No. 70.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams to the

Viceroy, dated the 30th ultimo, and from the Viceroy, dated the 19th instant, relative to the reported intention of a German mining firm to prospect on the northern shores of the Gulf of Aden.

India Office, August 20, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 70.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 30, 1908.

INFORMATION has reached me from an unofficial source that a certain Frankfort mining firm proposes to prospect "on the north shores of the Gulf of Aden, outside the so-called British Protectorate." The prospecting party are partly English. Matter will require watching.

Are you aware of any scheme of the kind, or of German prospecting projects in Oman or the Hadramaut?

Inclosure 2 in No. 70.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 19, 1908.

WITH reference to inquiry made in your telegram of the 30th ultimo, we have to report that no information on the subject of German projects in Oman or Hadramaut has been received by us.

The Resident at Aden reports that Sika—a small island off the coast of Hadramaut, opposite Bir Ali, longitude 48° latitude 14°—was visited by two Germans in March last, their ostensible object being archæological research. They returned to Europe, as they were watched, and Sultan did not cordially receive them.

[29121] No. 71.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 21.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 20, 1908.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to inclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India as to the outbreak of disturbances in the Katif oasis, together with a copy of a telegram sent in reply approving the instructions issued by the Government of India.

This reply is in accordance with the telegram sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, No. 153, dated the 15th August.

A copy of this letter has been communicated to the Admiralty with reference to a telegram addressed to them by the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, dated the 13th instant, of which a copy was furnished to the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 71.

Government of India to Viscount Morley, dated August 13, 1908.

[See Inclosure in No. 47.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 71.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 18, 1908.

PLEASE refer to your telegram of the 13th instant as to affairs at Katif. Without express sanction from here no assistance should be afforded to the Turkish authorities.

[29065] No. 72.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th August, relative to Turkish aggression in the Aden hinterland.

India Office, August 20, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 72.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 19, 1908.

WE have received the following telegram dated the 17th August from the Bombay Government:—

"Resident at Aden telegraphs to following effect under date 16th August:—

"'I have received communication from Sheikhs of Rubeaten complaining that the Turkish Kaimakam of Rada and Officer Commanding Turkish troops have summoned them with a view to the exacting of tribute. Sheikhs forward three letters in which it is distinctly stated by Turks that Rubeaten is part of the district of Rada. Sheikhs state that they have secured the assistance of Yaffais against possible aggression by Turks. It is possible that there will be collision between our tribes and Turks. It is clearly shown in paragraphs 11 and 12 of letter dated the 30th April, 1905, from Commissioner of Aden Boundary Commission to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, that Turks admitted that Rubeaten belongs to Yafa, and therefore is within our sphere. I am informing Sheikhs that Rubeaten is in our sphere, and that their grievance has been referred to Government. Consul at Hodeidá being absent in the interior till the end of next month, we cannot communicate.'"

In reply, we have sent the following telegram to the Government of Bombay, dated the 19th August:—

"Sheikhs of Rubeaten: Your telegram of 17th instant.

"It is understood that subsequently to writing letters no action has been taken by Turks, and that they have not entered into Rubeaten territory. It appears from weekly letter dated the 8th instant, that the Sheikhs have been told that they should reply that they are under British protection. Unless it be considered by the Bombay Government that further action is necessary, the Government of India are of opinion that all that is necessary is to inform the Resident that for the present the reply of the Sheikhs to the letters of the Turkish local authorities would seem to be sufficient, but that he should report at once any further movement on the part of the Turks. The Resident can, if he thinks it necessary, draw the attention of the local Turkish authorities to the facts, provided that this Government is not in any way committed to take action by the form in which his communication is made."

[29067] No. 73.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 20th instant, relative to the attack on Katif.

India Office, August 20, 1908.

[Inclosure in No. 73.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) *August 20, 1908.*

INSTRUCTIONS as to Katif, conveyed in your telegram of the 18th instant, have been noted.

Report received from Resident, Bushire, dated the 18th instant, states that the dispatch of troops from Bussorah has been postponed, and that Consul has telegraphed about the matter to the Embassy at Constantinople.

[29078] No. 74.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, August 20, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant respecting the present situation on the River Tigris.

We are pleased to state that arrangements were subsequently made by the local authorities which enabled our steamer, the P.S. "Khalifah," to proceed on her voyage.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[29168] No. 75.

Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 7.)

Batoum, August 12, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish Consular officers in the Caucasus have publicly notified all political exiles in the country that, by virtue of the Sultan's Proclamation granting them amnesty, they are at liberty to return to Turkey.

The measure affects a very large number of Armenian refugees who were compelled to flee to the Caucasus some years ago, and who will now readily avail themselves of this remission of punishment by the Turkish Government to return to their long-cherished homes in Asia Minor.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. STEVENS.

[29197] No. 76.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 22.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, August 21, 1908.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 19th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the following telegram has been sent to the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, viz.:—

"With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 78, Foreign Office report that Porte has not requested British assistance at El Katif, though aware His Majesty's ships in vicinity. Porte is sending battalion from Bussorah."

The receipt of the telegram has been acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[29284] No. 77.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 477.)

Constantinople, August 14, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting the release of political prisoners and the attitude of the Mussulman population with regard to the proclamation of the Constitution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Consul Shipley to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 42.)

Erzeroum, August 3, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the exact number of political prisoners whose release I reported in my telegram of the 30th ultimo amounted, I have since been officially informed, to ninety-two, of whom sixty were Armenians and thirty-two Mussulmans. By far the greater part of these prisoners had been arrested on the charge, in the case of the Armenians, of attempting to cross over from Russia into Turkey, in defiance of the Regulations and, in the case of the Mussulmans, of aiding and abetting the former in so doing. Some twenty, however, principally Christians—among them an Armenian Catholic priest—were, I understand, under detention on the accusation of being engaged in treasonable correspondence, or of being in the possession of seditious literature, while four, it is interesting to note, who were Russian Armenian subjects, had been captured as far back as October 1903, in the combat which took place at Komassor, in the Pasen district, near the Russian frontier, between the Turkish troops and a band of some sixty Armenian revolutionaries, the details of which were reported by Mr. Hampson in his despatch No. 36, of the 6th October of that year, to the late Sir N. O'Conor. Including the above four, the total number of Russian subjects under detention and now released amounted to six; the remaining two being Mussulmans.

Naturally the unexpected release of so many prisoners of their nationality has given the deepest satisfaction to the Armenian community of Erzeroum, and I have reason to believe that, by direction of the Patriarchate at Constantinople, prayers are to be offered up in the churches for His Imperial Majesty. On the other hand, as reported in my telegram above referred to, the proclamation of the Constitution, although followed up by the pardon of the eighteen persons, among them being several of the most prominent and respected members of the Mussulman community—condemned to perpetual detention for their connection with the disturbances in this city of the past two years, has, so far, been received by the Mussulman population with a singular lack of public rejoicing, and without any telegram of thanks to the Sultan. As far as I can gather, this would seem to be due in part to the fact that, though in reality, I believe, most contented with the change, they appear to be awaiting further developments before committing themselves to an open expression of opinion of one kind or another, and partly to the fact that the expectation which, as reported in my despatch No. 41, of the 27th ultimo, was confidently entertained by them, that the majority of the seventy-one prisoners condemned in February last in connection with the disturbances above alluded to would also be released, has not been realized. The attitude of the Mussulmans in this latter respect, however, does not appear to me to be entirely irreconcilable, seeing that, apart altogether from the eight individuals condemned to death as being the actual murderers of the police officials in October 1906, the prisoners whom they apparently desire to see pardoned

include thirteen sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for complicity in the above-mentioned crime, and eleven to fifteen years for the murder of the Armenian Krikor in September 1907. On the other hand the dissatisfaction felt by them owing to the non-release of the fourteen prisoners condemned to one year's imprisonment only is more intelligible, nor does the explanation which, I understand, has been officially put forward, viz., that the offence of the prisoners in question was not purely political but consisted of disobedience to the orders of the Government, appear to be entirely satisfactory. I am informed, however, by the Governor-General that there is every probability that they will be pardoned at the next anniversary of the accession to the throne of His Imperial Majesty, if not sooner, as in any case they have already completed considerably more than a third of their sentence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[29292] No. 78.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 488.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 18, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to report further, in continuation of my despatch No. 467 of the 11th instant, on the progress of the constitutional movement in the Asiatic provinces.

Towfik Pasha, the commander of the troops at Smyrna, whose arrest I reported last week, as well as certain other officers and officials, especially the head of the police at Aidin, were degraded from their rank and sent off to Salonica.

On account of his advanced age the degradation of the Pasha took place in private, and the proceedings affected him so deeply that he threw himself out of the window, breaking one leg and damaging his spine.

The prison is being demolished, and the site is being used for a public garden. The Greeks are showing considerable indiscretion, making undue parade of the Hellenic flag and so forth, but the temper of the Turks is admirable.

Strikes have taken place, as at Constantinople, among the stevedores and porters on the quay with the object of obtaining higher pay, but the League has until now been successful in preserving order.

The demonstrations of joy at Beirout were headed by the army officers, though the delight at emancipation from the oppression of the Yildiz régime was universal.

The local branch of the League of Union and Progress numbers 120 members, with an executive Committee of six officers and six civilians.

Rejoicings shared equally by Christians and Moslems lasted for over a week, culminating in a fête at which 15,000 people were present. It terminated in a tableau in which a mollah and a priest embraced one another, while a Turkish officer stood behind with a drawn sword signifying that he protected both alike. Prominent among the speakers who have liberally availed themselves of the opportunity for the display of their talents has been the well-known editor of the Cairo paper "El Moayyad," Ali Yussuf.

The introduction of the Constitution is regarded as a triumph for British policy. Several of the high officials have got into trouble, the Chiefs of Police and Gendarmerie and the Director of Telegraph and the President of the municipality being especially objects of general dislike; the three former have been arrested and sent to Salonica. The Vali and the Commandant of the troops were most unfortunate; they could not credit the news of the change, and hesitated to take part in the festivities. The latter telegraphed to the Sultan for instructions, and received a reply directing him to thank the officers for their conduct in holding rejoicings, upon which the officers telegraphed their enthusiastic thanks to the Sultan, together with a petition that their chief might be removed.

The Vali was dismissed and proceeded to take refuge in Mr. Consul-General Cumberbatch's summer residence, but, hearing that orders had been issued for his arrest and transport to Constantinople, he decided to take to flight, but was caught on the coast near Beirout as he was embarking on a small sailing-boat with the object of getting to Cyprus.

The people of the Lebanon are doubtful as to the effect the Constitution will have on their particular franchises. The strong Maronite party are opposed to sending representatives to the Chamber, while the Druses, the Orthodox Greeks, and the

other elements of the population desire to do so. The Governor-General has so far made no public proclamation of the reforms.

The release of Fuad Pasha from his six years' confinement at Damascus was the subject of a great demonstration in that town, and the Marshal was greeted with no less joy and enthusiasm at Beirout and at Constantinople, where he arrived on Saturday night. His Majesty's Consul at Damascus reports that every sign of genuine satisfaction and true content has been remarked, especially among the military officers. Izzet Pasha is a native of their country, and his partisans have entirely disappeared, while those who were opposed to his policy and his practices triumph openly at his downfall.

His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Konia reports that the League are practically masters of the town, and that the Vali, who is in no very strong position, seeks their advice and support.

They are also supreme at Cesarea, Mersina, and Adana, and order is maintained in all these places, though sundry unsatisfactory officials have been dismissed, notably Bahri Pasha, Vali of Adana.

The usual demonstrations took place at Samsoun. The members of the Administration were made to swear loyalty to the Constitution, but one of the Judges was exempted from this on account of his justice and impartiality. On the other hand, the President of the municipality had the opposite reputation, and was made to take the oath three times.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[29295] No. 79.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 491.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 18, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 477 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum stating that all the prisoners condemned in February last for their connection with the disturbances of the last two years at Erzeroum have now been released.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[29296] No. 80.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 492.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 18, 1908.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 152 of the 14th instant informing me that Messrs. Lynch's steamer "Khalifah" with mails had been detained at Kut owing to disturbances among the Arabs on the Tigris, I have the honour to report that I have now received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad stating that the "Khalifah" has reached Bussorah in time to catch the British mail. It appears that the steamer was detained at Kut by Lynch's agent on the receipt of news that the Arabs were fighting near Ali Gharbi.

I mentioned the subject in a general way to the Grand Vizier, who read to me a telegram from Bussorah to the effect that there had been some little trouble, but that vessels were now running as usual.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[29302] No. 81.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 498.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 18, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 488 of this day's date, reporting on the progress of the reform movement in the Asiatic provinces, news from some of the

outlying districts—Van, Diarbekir, and Mosul, &c.—shows that the full meaning and sincerity of the recent changes in Roumelia and the capital were not at first realized. This is due partly to the backward state of things in those regions and the inability of the populations, whose race hatred had for years been fostered by the old Palace régime, to accommodate themselves to the new idea of a common country, based on the principles of justice, equality, and fraternity. The active propaganda of the League of Progress and Union, moreover, has not yet been extended to the distant Asiatic provinces. The League has been remedying this state of things by telegraphing to the bigger centres and by dispatching delegates to explain to the populations the true significance of the constitutional movement.

At Mosul, where the brother of the notorious Izzet Pasha was Vali, a certain Tewfik Bey, sent to restore order in the district of Berwari and repress the outrages of Kurds against the Nestorians, openly sided with the former and assisted in the pillage of Christian villages.

At Diarbekir, owing to the conduct of the Vali, who is a reactionary of the old régime, there were strong fanatical manifestations against the Christians, the possibility of a serious collision being feared.

At Shatak, south of Van, the Kurds apparently interpreting the changes at head-quarters as an opportunity of giving vent to their hatred of the Armenians began attacking the latter. Troops sent to restore order appear to have sided with the Kurds, who killed eight Armenians. A party of eight revolutionaries effected their escape after killing three Kurds, whereupon the troops pillaged a village and violated the women. At Tiari (in the Van Vilayet) the Kurds got out of hand and committed the usual depredations on the Christians, burning also the house of an English missionary.

I have called the attention of the Porte to these incidents, which seem to have been inevitable during the period of transition. The central authorities, who are fully occupied with urgent affairs in the capital, are showing energy and goodwill and are already remedying the state of affairs in the regions alluded to above. At Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, &c., the Armenian and other political prisoners have been released, and the Moslem and Christian elements are giving themselves up to common rejoicings on the same lines as those which have taken place at Constantinople, the sea coast towns, &c.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[29479]

No. 82.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 238)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August 24, 1908.*

VICE-CONSUL at Jeddah telegraphs as follows:—

"Great excitement prevails in the town of Jeddah, and piratical attacks have been made on sailing-vessels in the harbour. It is very desirable that a British war-ship should be present for the protection of British interests."

[29572]

No. 83.

Mr. G. Mackenzie to Foreign Office.—(Received August 25.)

Tempsford Hall, Sandy, Beds, August 23, 1908.

Dear Sir Charles,

I PASS on the inclosed, received by last mail, as it may interest you.

Mirza Hamza came by steamer viâ Bombay, and when in London came to see me several times. He is supposed to have come to Europe for medical advice, and is now in Germany. He told me he intended to do the Hadj and go to Mecca on his way back to Mohammerah.

Lyle is one of our partners in Bussorah, and a personal friend of the Sheikh of Koweit, whom he has frequently visited. He did come home viâ Bagdad and Constantinople, but in no way connected with business, nor did he call upon any one when there. In fact, we at home had no idea that he intended taking that route.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) GEORGE S. MACKENZIE.

Inclosure in No. 83.

Translation of an Article in the Arabic paper "El Liwaa," published in Cairo, dated 26 Jemad-el-Evvel, 1324 (June 25, 1908).

POLITICS IN MESOPOTAMIA.

AT the end of last month Mirza Hamza, agent of Sheikh Khazal, the Ruler of Mohammerah, left for India *en route* to London. It is rumoured that he is travelling on a tour and for a change, but this is only a falsehood, and he has not left here for anything but a political business in hand of ruinous results for Mesopotamia.

Mirza Hamza left on behalf of his Sheikh, and Mr. Archibald Lyle, agent of Gray, Mackenzie steamers in Bussorah, on behalf of the Sheikh of Koweit, or the Sultan of Koweit, as some people pretend to call him.

The said agent travelled viâ Bagdad with the pretext that in doing this his intention is to go to Constantinople. Just a few days before his departure the owner of Koweit invited him for a consultation in closing an Agreement with England. When the Sheikh of Mohammerah saw his friend entering into an Agreement with England, he also, who had been preparing himself for this for some time, wished to join him in the shameful act.

Also Mr. Crow, British Consul in Bussorah, left for London on a six months' furlough, and it is known to everybody that he left for the purpose of fulfilling the Agreement between his Government and the two Rulers of Koweit and Mohammerah. Woe to them, if they only knew what England did with people, when they dared to do this disgraceful act. It is their want of sincerity to their respective Governments and lack of patriotism that prompted them to this act. They are left to their discretion to act as they wish, and there is nobody to prevent them. In this they are justified.

As for the Turkish Government, which is a praiseworthy one, it is a Government of honour for Islam. If it was the misconduct of some of the officials, who forget everything and wink their eyes at everything to such an extent of indifference that it resulted in the inclination of Koweit to England, we ask our Lord the Sultan—whom God may exalt!—to send to these countries officials true to their Government and nation, so that internal disorders may subside.

We do not know what the two Sheikhs expect in delivering themselves up to England. England has introduced herself in their affairs, and British underhand politics are already in activity in Mesopotamia, especially in Koweit and Mohammerah, causing ruin and destruction. England is introducing arms in Mesopotamia from the two places above mentioned to such an extent that you find even a boy not yet 14 years of age armed with a rifle.

All this is caused by the two Sheikhs, and we are not alarmed for their account, but for our fatherland and our own selves, because if England strengthens her position in Koweit and Mohammerah internal disorders will increase in Mesopotamia more than they are at present. What is the advice, what course is to be taken, and what is to be done?

England is carrying out her underhand politics and instigating internal quarrels, the transport of arms on her steamers, to an extent that Mesopotamia is full of fire. "Fe inna Pillah ve inna ileyhi el rajioun" ("We are God's, and to him we belong"—from the Koran). We wish that the sincere men of the Turkish Government in Constantinople attempt to amend the calamity before it grows larger, and free Mesopotamia from this great affliction, so that general order and quietude may be restored among its people. And all are in the hand of God.

(Signed) KAROUN.

Bussorah, 6 Jemad Evvel, 1326 (June 5, 1908).

[29479]

No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 25, 1908.*

SITUATION at Jeddah.

With reference to your telegram No. 238 of the 24th instant and to your despatch No. 463 of the 14th instant, in view of imminence of pilgrim season and disturbed

state of affairs, a request has been made by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, and Co. that instructions may be given to any of His Majesty's steam-ships which may be passing through the Red Sea to show the British flag at Jeddah.

Is such a course of action desirable, in your opinion?

[29684] No. 85.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 239.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August 26, 1908.*

DISTURBANCES at Jeddah.

I have instructed His Majesty's Consul to report how things are now, but the cable is broken, so that telegraphic communications are interrupted.

My view, requested in your telegram No. 175 of yesterday, is that the Turkish Government would be greatly annoyed if we sent a war-ship to Jeddah. All the Ministers have strong hopes that these local ebullitions of excitement will quickly subside. Might I suggest, however, that if one of His Majesty's ships happened to be proceeding through the Red Sea, she should stop at Suakin until she received further instructions, and find out how events are progressing.

[29838] No. 86.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 27th instant, relative to the Jamshedi exodus to Russian territory.

India Office, August 27, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 86.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 27, 1908.*

JAMSHEDIS. His Majesty's Consul-General, Meshed, telegraphs on the 25th instant to following effect:—

"Information given in previous telegrams is confirmed by special Military Agent. He puts number of Jamshedis at 3,000, and says that on their raids they carried off various flocks belonging to Afghans, and that in reprisal for this Turcoman flocks were carried off by Afghan cavalry. The Governor of Kushk, who made a complaint direct to the Afghan frontier official, was only told that the whole situation arose from Jamshedis being granted Russian protection."

[29962] No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 29.)

Sir, *India Office, August 27, 1908.*

I AM directed by Viscount Morley to inclose, for the information of Secretary Sir E. Grey, copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated the 19th instant, as to a complaint made by the Sheikhs of Rubeaten that the local Turkish authorities claim to exact from them tribute on the ground that Rubeaten is part of the Rada district.

In paragraph 12 of Mr. Fitzmaurice's letter to the Government of India, dated the 30th April, 1905, attention was drawn to the fact that in the *procès-verbal* the Ottoman Commissioner's admission that Rubeaten with Nawa and Dabiani belongs to Yafa was conditional on Juban remaining part of the Kaza of Rada. Reliance upon the *procès-verbal* as proving the contention that Rubeaten does in fact belong to Yafa

involves, therefore, the "express surrender" of Yafa's rights to Juban, which the wording of the *procès-verbal* as arranged by Mr. Fitzmaurice was intended to avoid. To this there seems no objection, for the Government of India in their telegram of the 15th April, 1905, communicated to the Foreign Office with this Office letter of the 18th April, 1905, recognized the cession of Juban.

Subject to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, Lord Morley proposes to send to the Government of India the telegram of which a draft is inclosed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 87.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 19, 1908.*

WE have received the following telegram, dated the 17th August, from the Bombay Government:—

"Resident at Aden telegraphs to following effect, under date 16th August: 'I have received communication from Sheikhs of Rubeaten complaining that the Turkish Kaimakam of Rada and Officer Commanding Turkish troops have summoned them with a view to the exacting of tribute. Sheikhs forward three letters in which it is distinctly stated by Turks that Rubeaten is part of the district of Rada. Sheikhs state that they have secured the assistance of Yafais against possible aggression by Turks. It is possible that there will be collision between our tribes and Turks. It is clearly shown in paragraphs 11 and 12 of letter dated the 30th April, 1905, from Commissioner of Aden Boundary Commission to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, that Turks admitted that Rubeaten belongs to Yafa, and therefore is within our sphere. I am informing Sheikhs that Rubeaten is in our sphere, and that their grievance has been referred to Government. Consul at Hodeida being absent in the interior till the end of next month, we cannot communicate.'"

In reply we have sent the following telegram to the Government of Bombay, dated the 19th August:—

"Sheikhs of Rubeaten. Your telegram of 17th instant. It is understood that subsequently to writing letters no action has been taken by Turks, and that they have not entered into Rubeaten territory. It appears from weekly letter, dated 8th instant, that the Sheikhs have been told that they should reply that they are under British protection. Unless it be considered by the Bombay Government that further action is necessary, the Government of India are of opinion that all that is necessary is to inform the Resident that for the present the reply of the Sheikhs to the letters of the Turkish local authorities would seem to be sufficient, but that he should report at once any further movement on the part of the Turks. The Resident can, if he thinks it necessary, draw the attention of the local Turkish authorities to the facts, provided that this Government is not in any way committed to take action by the form in which his communication is made."

[29967] No. 88.

Mr. Alt to Foreign Office.—(Received August 29.)

Sir, 14, *Queen Victoria Street, London, August 28, 1908.*

REFERRING to the interview I had yesterday with Mr. H. C. Norman upon the subject of the notorious case of the seizure by the Turkish Government on the 26th December, 1888, of the Haidar Pasha to Ismidt Railway, which was then held by me and my associates under an Imperial Firman as locataires with right of preference for all extensions of the line, and to the Award, dated the 22nd February (5th March), 1892, of a Commission which was appointed to investigate our claims, I desire to call the attention of the Secretary of State to the terms of that Award, which, by unanimity of the members, allowed the locataires the sum of £T. 131,476 in respect of the line Haidar Pasha to Ismidt, and also that, the members of the Commission representing us, viz., Sir Henry Fawcett, British Judge of the Supreme Court, and

M. Kvassay, the Austro-Hungarian Consul-General, unanimously awarded £T. 120,000 in respect of compensation for the loss of our rights over such extensions, but in which part of the Award the Turkish members did not acquiesce.

I further desire to point out that, although the Award was dated the 22nd February, 1892, and interest upon the amount was accruing, it was not until the 30th January, 1895, that the sum of £T. 130,000 only was paid me.

Under the terribly corrupt system of Government which then prevailed at Constantinople, and which has continued until the present time, it has been hopeless to make any attempt to obtain a settlement of the second part of the Award.

Under the changes, however, which have now taken place in Turkey, which promise so much for a purer system of Government, I venture to think that the time has arrived when His Majesty's Government can effectively revive the very hard case of the Haidar Pasha to Ismidt Railway claims, and the payment of the amount awarded for our loss of rights, inadequate as such amount must appear in view of the enormous benefits which have been derived by the German group, to whom our property and rights were handed over. For this purpose I beg to annex a statement of the amount due as it now stands,* say, to the 30th September next, showing that the original award of £T. 120,000, plus interest at 5 per cent. per annum, now amounts to £T. 152,003·96. It is for the payment of this sum that I beg His Majesty's Government to apply to the Sublime Porte, which I hopefully assume will in future deal with the affairs of the Turkish Government, subject only to the constitutional assent of His Majesty the Sultan.

I need hardly say that His Majesty's present Ambassador in Turkey, Sir Gerard Lowther, K.C.M.G., C.B., must be fully acquainted with the history of my struggle during ten years, against every form of intrigue and corruption, to obtain permission, in the interests of British capital and labour, to prosecute the work of extending the railway. If such permission had been granted there can be no doubt that long ere now the line would have been completed to the Persian Gulf.

It is, perhaps, desirable that, for the present at least, the purport of this communication should be dealt with confidentially, and that the Secretary of State may desire to ascertain the views of Sir Gerard Lowther as to the best mode of procedure to be adopted in prosecuting the claim. For this purpose I should be glad to wait upon you at any time for an exchange of views, or to furnish any further information which may be required. In the meantime I shall not myself communicate with Mr. Edwin Pears, our representative in Constantinople, or with any other person there.

Trusting that the Secretary of State may be pleased to give favourable consideration to this appeal for belated justice from the Turk, and that he will succeed in obtaining it, I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. ALT.

[30147] No. 89.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 505.) *Constantinople, August* 22, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an extract, communicated to me by the American Ambassador here, from a despatch from the American Consul at Kharput, respecting the operations directed by the Government against the Dersim Kurds. It shows that the Kurds live by looting.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 89.

Extract from a despatch of American Consul at Kharput, Turkey, to American Ambassador at Constantinople, August 3, 1908.—(*Communicated to Sir G. Lowther by the American Ambassador at Constantinople.*)

. . . I should state in the beginning that it has, of late, been rather difficult to secure reliable and authentic information, but the following has been confirmed, and may be so considered.

Up until within the last few days there have been many small engagements

* Not sent.

between the Imperial troops and the Kurds, with varying success. Most of these skirmishes took place in the region round about Hozat, the seat of the Government for the Dersim. In one engagement the Kurds captured two cannon and a quantity ammunition, while the loss on both sides in killed and wounded was not large and was about evenly divided. The great problem that confronts the Kurds is that of the food supply. They have made desperate efforts to capture some of the caravans of supplies for the Turkish soldiers, but thus far without success.

Following these minor engagements the Government submitted three propositions to the Kurds, but evidently with little expectation that they would be accepted. The propositions were as follows:—

1. Surrender all rifles.
2. Furnish regiments of soldiers for use in Yemen.
3. Pay back taxes for a period of ten years.

The first two of these proposals were, of course, of a nature entirely unacceptable to the Kurds, and the third demand was one utterly impossible for the Kurds to comply with in their present condition.

Following the rejection of these proposals, the Government ordered an attack by the twenty battalions of its troops now stationed in the various parts of the Dersim. Continuous fighting has now been going on for a period of four days, and I exceedingly regret that at this writing I am unable to furnish any reliable news as to the outcome.

The hope of the Kurds is that they will be able to put up a strong enough defence, and to resist long enough, so as to attract the attention of the foreign Powers and secure their intervention. The leader of the tribes sent me word a few days ago that their condition was now very similar to that of the Armenians at the time of the massacres, and that it was hoped that the foreign Powers would at an early date intervene in their behalf, that they were fighting for their homes, &c.

The Kurds have also expressed the hope that if they continue the fight long enough an Imperial Commission may be sent from Constantinople to investigate their condition and secure for them in the future better treatment by the Government.

Yesterday a telegram from Constantinople to the Commander of the troops in the Dersim stated that the progress of the affair was unsatisfactory to the Government, and instructed him to exert every effort to bring the matter to a successful conclusion at an early date.

At this writing it seems that the Kurds must eventually make overtures for peace, on account of the great shortage of their supplies. All roads leading to the Dersim are in hands of the Imperial troops, and it is well-nigh impossible for the Kurds to receive supplies from the outside. As your Excellency is no doubt aware, the Dersim contains but little arable land, and the population are dependent on other regions, now cut off them, for their supplies.

[30346] No. 90.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 30th instant, relative to the Abu Musa oxide.

India Office, August 31, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 30, 1908.

YOUR telegram of the 18th instant as to the affairs at Abu Musa. We have received the following information from Cox:—

"Mining operations at Abu Musa consist of the employment of Persian diggers, some twenty in number, who have to be recruited from Lingah or its neighbourhood.

The Sheikh himself being hopelessly unbusinesslike, the only satisfactory arrangement I can propose, pending final Concessions being issued, is that we should arrange, with the Sheikh's concurrence, that the work of excavation should be taken in hand by one of his brothers, that working expenses should be provided or guaranteed by us, and that we should reimburse ourselves when the mineral is disposed of by sale. Until a new Concession is granted, the transport of the stuff to the coast will not be possible, as transport animals, &c., will have to be provided. When the proposals contained in our despatch of the 23rd were submitted, we contemplated that a settlement of the German case would have been arrived at in time to allow of arrangements being concluded with Strick or other British firm before the arrival of the season for mining operations. We regard the temporary expedient which Cox now suggests as somewhat unsatisfactory, and, unless the settlement of the German case is likely to be delayed for some time longer, we do not recommend its adoption. If you are of opinion that there is no longer any objection to negotiations with British firms being opened, you will perhaps cause inquiries to be instituted in accordance with the suggestions made in the fourth paragraph of the letter of the Resident in the Gulf, dated the 8th June last."

[29684] No. 91.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, certain correspondence, including three telegrams which have been exchanged between this Department and His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, respecting the present state of affairs at Jeddah.*

It will be observed that both His Majesty's Consul at that port, and also Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, and Co., complain of the situation, and that the latter ask that some of His Majesty's ships should be instructed to call there while passing up or down the Red Sea.

Their Lordships will, however, note that Sir G. Lowther considers that such a course would probably be resented by the Sublime Porte, and suggests that, instead of calling at Jeddah, ships might stop at Suakin and there make inquiry as to the situation.

I am accordingly to inquire whether any of His Majesty's ships will shortly visit the Red Sea, and, if so, whether their Lordships would be prepared to instruct the Commander of one of them to carry out the suggestion contained in the third paragraph of Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 239 of the 26th instant, but to abstain from calling at the port of Jeddah itself without further instructions.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[30757] No. 92.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 23rd July, relative to the acquisition by the American Mission of landed property at Bahrein.

India Office, September 3, 1908.

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* Nos. 50, 82, 84, and 85.

Inclosure 1 in No. 92.

Captain Trevor to the Government of India.

Sir, *Bushire, June* 28, 1908.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department letter dated the 1st October, 1901, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence which has passed between the Political Agent, Bahrein, and myself, on the subject of the further acquisition by the American Mission of landed property at Bahrein.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. P. TREVOR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 92.

Major Prideaux to Major Cox.

Sir, *Bahrein, June* 20, 1908.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your Office indorsement, dated the 9th August, 1901, on the subject of the acquisition of land in Bahrein by the Arabian (American) Mission, I have the honour to report that the Chief of Bahrein, being desirous of bestowing a third piece of ground on the same Society in recognition of the medical services conferred on his family by Dr. Thoms, has asked me to obtain the sanction of the Government of India to the issuing of the Sanad (translation inclosed) which he has drafted in consultation with me.

2. In view of the statement made in the last paragraph of Colonel Kemball's demi-official letter of the 1st August, 1901, to the address of the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, that the Government have no objection to the Mission acquiring sites for their residence and hospital, I have informed the Chief of my confidence that they will be equally complacent in the matter of a playground for the Mission school, which is the purpose to which the land now being acquired is to be put, I understand.

3. I hope you will find it possible to accord the required sanction, in the name of the Government of India, at an early date, as the missionaries are desirous of taking possession of the ground without delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. B. PRIDEAUX.

Inclosure 3 in No. 92.

Statement by Esa-bin Ali-al-Khalifa.

(Translation.)

In the Name of God, the Compassionate and the Merciful!

I, ESA-BIN ALI-AL-KHALIFA, do hereby state that I have given to Dr. Sharon Thoms, the American, who is the agent of the American Charitable Society, a piece of ground attached to the hospital on the west side, the length of which is the length of the (hospital) wall, and its width 50 dhiras from the end of the wall to the end of 50 dhiras. With it are also 10 dhiras of road on the west side. This has been given as a gift on condition that it will not be ceded, sold, mortgaged, or given away to any foreigner, without consulting me, in accordance with the existing Treaty engagements in force, nor shall there be done anything on the ground causing harm to the public. It will be an appendage to the said hospital and the school. Let it be known.

Recorded on the 13th of Jumadi-al-Awwal, 1326 (corresponding to the 13th June, 1908).

(Signed) M. T. HUR, *Interpreter,*
Political Agency, Bahrein.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 92.

Captain Trevor to Major Prideaux.

Sir, *Bushire, June* 28, 1908.

IN reply to your letter dated the 20th June last, I have the honour to inform you that under the ruling of the Government of India, laid down in Foreign Department letter dated the 1st October, 1901 (a copy of which is forwarded for your information and guidance, in referring future cases), there is no objection to the Chief of Bahrein bestowing a plot of ground, adjoining the Mission hospital on the Arabian (American) Mission at Bahrein, on the terms mentioned in the inclosure to your letter.

It is presumed that the boundaries of the plot will be clearly marked.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. P. TREVOR.

[30819] No. 93.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, September 4, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 93.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 3, 1908.

PLEASE refer to our telegram of the 10th June last as to Muscat award. Sultan has verbally asked for a copy of Arabic Proclamation. Cox inquires whether there would be any objection to complying with His Highness' request. Provided that the copy is for personal information of Sultan only, we do not see any objection.

[30820] No. 94.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, relative to the dispatch of troops to Katif.

India Office, September 4, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 94.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 3, 1908

AFFAIRS at Katif. Please see my telegram of the 20th ultimo.

Following information received from First Assistant, Bushire, in telegram dated the 1st instant:—

"Three hundred and twenty men left Bussorah for Katif on the 26th ultimo with two guns."

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[30820] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 203.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1908.

CONSUL-GENERAL at Bushire has telegraphed to the Viceroy that 320 Turkish troops have started for El Katif. They left Bussorah on the 26th ultimo accompanied by two guns.

[29962] No. 96.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, relative to the complaint of the Sheikhs of Rubeaten against the local Turkish authorities in connection with the exaction of tribute.

I am to inform you in reply that, in view of the considerations set forth in your letter, Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the telegram which Viscount Morley proposes to address to the Government of India on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[30952] No. 97.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 516.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 26, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to address you further on the subject of the effect of the re-establishment of the Constitution in those parts of the Empire especially inhabited by Armenians, in continuation of my despatch No. 498 of the 11th instant.

At Erzeroum, the official promulgation of the Constitution was greeted with great enthusiasm by large crowds of Mussulmans and Christians without distinction, who paraded the town, raising cheers for the Sultan, liberty, and justice.

While the Moslems experience the greatest relief from the abolition of the old spy system, incalculable benefits accrue to the Armenians from the relaxation of the restrictions upon travel. They used to rely, in great part, for their livelihood upon periodical visits to the Caucasus, where work was plentiful, and they are now at liberty to resort thither as before.

There are no signs in the town of any improper use of the newly-acquired freedom. A Committee has been formed for the discussion of matters of general interest, but at present they are wisely confining their efforts to inculcating the necessity for moderation and self-restraint. On the 20th instant the officers took a solemn oath of fidelity to the Constitution.

The Vali of Van has been dismissed, to the general satisfaction of the province, but no successor has yet been appointed.

At Kharput, the news of the reforms brought terror to the Armenians, who thought of the days succeeding the promulgation of the Armenian reforms of 1895. Gradually it became evident that these were of a different nature, and satisfaction became general. All political prisoners were released on the 19th instant. There is a considerable reactionary party in this town—the Mufti, for instance, when he heard the news, exclaiming, "This is the end of Islam!" And on the 22nd August they brought a number of armed Mussulmans into the town, which gave rise to a certain uneasiness owing to the absence of an adequate Government, but the feeling appears to have been merely transient.

The latest despatch which I have received from Bitlis is dated the 21st July, *i.e.*, prior to the Constitution, but already then there was a distinct improvement in the situation. The Modky Kurds had become very much quieter, in fear, no doubt, of the measures which they understood the Government were preparing to take against them, and they began to telegraph complaints to Constantinople of depredations committed against them by other Kurdish tribes.

An excellent impression was further caused by the arrest of the murderers of the Abbot Zakaria Vartabed, of the Monastery of Surp Akhberic, and by the punishment of sundry other Kurds for acts of robbery and violence.

Several members of the League have arrived at Samsun, where they have harangued large audiences, pointing out that the Constitution was wrung from, and not granted by, the Sultan, and asserting that the Armenian troubles of twelve years ago would have been averted had the advocates of reform at that time pressed, not for partial, but for general reform.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[30960] No. 98.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 524.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 31, 1908.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 229 of the 18th instant, concerning the Arab outbreak at Katif, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah has telegraphed to me stating that 150 Turkish soldiers, without artillery, started for that town on the 21st August.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[30964] No. 99.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 528.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 31, 1908.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 517 of the 26th instant on the subject of the reception of the Constitution in the Asiatic provinces, I have the honour to transmit herewith to you a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo upon the progress of affairs in that vilayet. Mr. Longworth's account is typical of what has occurred almost all over the country, and I think the wave of pro-British feeling is certainly not confined to Aleppo. Similarly the tendency to reaction has been perceptible in many places, but the League are taking every prudent and careful measures to prevent such a swing of the pendulum. Their first care has been to appoint, so far as possible, reliable and honest men to responsible posts. They have caused the local branches of the League to supervise the action of the authorities without, however, interfering with their functions more than was inevitably necessary; and they have lately sent a circular telegram, which has received a wide publicity in the press, to all the centres warning all patriots to abstain from interference with the authorities, from arbitrary action, and from proceedings which might disturb the public order. All complaints should be addressed through the legal channels to the competent authorities, while complaints about high officials should be addressed to the Committee at Salonica.

They end with an exhortation to be patient and moderate.

I have also the honour to forward copy of a despatch from the Acting Vice-Consul at Haifa, which relates the only incident, so far, in which religious animosity has been stirred up.

At Bussorah the news of the promulgation of the Constitution was, as usual, regarded with incredulity and then with astonishment, but Bussorah is too far off from Constantinople to reflect its views, and the people look upon the new order of things with apathy, as it exercises no palpable influence on their own fortunes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 99.

Consul Longworth to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Aleppo, August 20, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Excellency's telegram of the 1st and to mine of the 3rd instant, in transmitting herewith copies of despatches received from the Vice-Consuls at Antioch and Alexandretta, reporting upon the manifestations of public joy at the re-establishment of the Constitution suspended since 1876.

It is not perhaps too early for me to offer a few observations on the changed aspect of affairs in this vilayet, arising from the sudden subversion of what may be called the espionage system of government in Turkey.

The Vizirial telegram announcing the revival of the Constitution was received here with astonishment bordering on incredulity. Such a sudden break with the past was wholly unexpected at Aleppo, for none knew then of the revolt in Macedonia. It was only when detailed news of the movement and its progress poured in from Salonica, Adrianople, and Constantinople that a burst of joy broke out in all directions.

The staff officers of the garrison were the first to throw off the mask and give vent to their suppressed feelings. They boldly and publicly advocated the cause of liberty and justice, and they led the whole divisional army, from the Commanding General to the last recruit, to swear on the Koran to defend the Constitution with the last drop of their blood.

A local Committee was speedily formed which placed itself in touch with the central leagues for "Union and Progress." Self-constituted though it be, its twenty-one members represent with fairness the public, the army, and the clergy, without distinction of race or creed. A strong body of men thus stepped forward, who with tact and zeal organized festive demonstrations, harangued the people on the true meaning of liberty, warned the reactionists from disturbing the peace, and exacted the dismissal of not a few corrupt office-holders. The danger lay in their usurping such powers as would paralyze the Executive and bring about a state of anarchy. Most of them, however, were amenable to reason, and on my counselling moderation turned their efforts from hampering the authorities to assisting the Vali in a manner strictly advisory.

A cause of great rejoicing in many a home was no doubt the amnesty granted to all political prisoners and exiles. The Armenians so released numbered twenty-two at Aleppo and thirty-four at Marash. The ones here were on quitting gaol embraced publicly by army officers and Mussulman Notables, amid the loud cheers of the populace.

It is significant as well as gratifying to learn that in this critical moment of their history Moslems, Christians, and Jews turn instinctively to us for countenance and support. Happily we were not insensible to their pro-British feelings, and stretched out promptly in the nick of time the sought-for helping hand. Sir Edward Grey's words in the House of Commons were, I understand, read everywhere with the utmost interest and relief, as was also, it is said, the description of your Excellency's enthusiastic welcome at Constantinople. What seems to be felt generally is that expressed by a Staff Colonel who headed one of the deputations to this Consulate, "We are now sure," he remarked, "that all will go well."

The advent of the new era was made the occasion of an exchange of visits between me, the Governor-General, and the Military Commandant. The reception accorded me at the barracks was most cordial, and so far out of the ordinary that troops of all arms were drawn up as a guard of honour. It gave both me and my American colleague Mr. Jackson, who accompanied me, much pleasure to see nothing but glad faces around us and to hear the warm patriotic words of not only young officers, but grey-haired veterans.

The stirring events of these days have affected but slightly my relations with the authorities. The main difference is whatever influence I may have had before had to be exercised most discreetly, lest umbrage were taken at my interference or harm befell those who followed my advice. It is not so now that Palace spies and nominees have been dismissed, and all officials have or pretend to have at heart the welfare of the country and its people.

Our prestige in general among the various races has, I am told, increased enormously. Can it be otherwise known, as it is now generally, that His Majesty's Government is watching with great interest and sympathy the development of the

movement, a movement which is progressing rapidly and smoothly towards the extension of political freedom and the establishment of a humane Government.

The present is still a period of doubt and uncertainty, but the outlook, in this vilayet at least, need no longer, I think, be regarded with misgivings. Reactionists there are no doubt in numbers—men whose interests are bound up with the late corrupt system, men that are animated by a spirit of fanaticism, men that are opposed to female emancipation, and men that are by nature aggressive. Any one of them may possibly some day incite the Mahommedans to bloodshed and plunder, for here, as elsewhere, the dull-witted majority follow the keener-witted minority, all of whom are not guided by disinterested motives and patriotic sentiments. The reformers, however, lack not vigilance, vigour, and decision, and so long therefore as the soldiery and the clergy—the hitherto main props of absolutism—are true to their newly-imbibed principles of Liberalism, Federal States are more likely to spring up in Turkey than a return to the old régime of oppression, corruption, and misgovernment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. Z. LONGWORTH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 99.

Vice-Consul Douek to Consul Longworth.

Antioch, August 11, 1908.

Sir,

I BEG to report that yesterday at 9 P.M. a part of the town near the Sirayeh was decorated in honour of liberty. All the officials of the Government, the German Vice-Consul, and myself were present in answer to invitations. At 10 P.M. some persons spoke to encourage the inhabitants; the subject of their speeches was "liberty and the reforms." After three or four persons had delivered their orations a crowd of people rushed up holding the Turkish banner in their hands and asked the Kaimakam, the Kadi, and many other officials to take an oath that they will never henceforth take any bribes, and that their judgments, their acts, and their treatment of the people would be in accordance with law. They were compelled to yield to their demand, because they saw that if they should object the result would be very serious.

The manner in which the people spoke was very determined. All those who were invited to take part in the demonstration fled away when they heard the shouting, and saw the rushing of the people, and so the illumination ended.

The news, I beg to add, that His Majesty's Government will fully support the movement has given great joy and satisfaction to every person in my district.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DAVID DOUEK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 99.

Acting Vice-Consul Catoni to Consul Longworth.

Alexandretta, August 18, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the news announcing the revival of the Constitution in Turkey has been received with great enthusiasm by all the inhabitants of Alexandretta and its district. The people here manifested their joy by festivities and illuminations, where many speeches were delivered to the crowds by officers of the army, officials of the Government, as well as by some civilians, all welcoming the new Constitutional Government. I am very glad to report also that the crowds, in cheering their liberty and the army, gave three long cheers for his Britannic Majesty's Government.

The people are keeping calm, and they view the Constitution as a new era of prosperity for trade, industry, and all commercial and financial enterprises.

A point which they are anxiously awaiting to see settled by the new constitutional Government is the grant of the long-expected Concession of a railway from Aleppo to Alexandretta.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH CATONI.

Inclosure 4 in No. 99.

Newspaper Extract.

LE COMITÉ OTTOMAN "UNION ET PROGRÈS."—La Circulaire suivante a été adressée, suivant nos confrères Turcs, à la date du 20 Août, aux Comités de Monastir, d'Useub, de Janina, de Scutari, d'Albanie, d'Andrinople, de Smyrne, de Konia, de Brousse, de Beyrouth, de Damas, d'Alep, de Jérusalem, de Trébizonde, et d'Erzeroum :—

"Les Comités de Constantinople et de Roumélie reçoivent des télégrammes critiquant les actes du Gouvernement. Tous les patriotes désirent la prompte application des réformes assurant le progrès du pays. Le Cabinet est animé des meilleures intentions. Tous les services publics seront réorganisés dans un très court délai. Cependant les Ottomans devront toujours conserver l'attitude calme et modérée, dont ils ont donné jusqu'ici des preuves admirables. C'est cette attitude de modération qu'a observée et observe le Comité Ottoman. Il faut donc laisser autant que possible libre le Cabinet dans son action et l'aider même à mettre à exécution les bons projets qu'il a préparés. Le Comité s'opposera à toute ingérence dans les affaires du Gouvernement. Car, vouloir faire justice par soi-même, en insultant, en attaquant, et en chassant les agents de l'autorité, c'est compromettre l'œuvre entreprise et amener l'anarchie. Ces procédés sont diamétralement contraires aux devoirs que réclame le patriotisme bien compris.

"Les fonctionnaires de l'ancien régime seront sans doute éloignés si l'on voit qu'ils ne veulent pas se corriger, mais c'est une opération qui ne peut pas s'effectuer du jour au lendemain. Il faut donc s'abstenir de tout acte arbitraire et de tout procédé susceptible de compromettre l'ordre public. Toute plainte devra être adressée par la voie ordinaire à l'autorité compétente. Lorsqu'il s'agit de fonctionnaires occupant des postes importants, on doit s'adresser au Comité Central de Salonique.

"En tout cas, dans l'intérêt du salut public, on doit montrer de la patience, de la modération, et de la réserve."

Le Comité Ottoman de Constantinople annonce qu'il vient de former une Commission composée d'hommes dignes de confiance pour venir en aide aux fugitifs et aux exilés. Cette Commission commencera ses travaux à partir de Mardi prochain. Les intéressés devront s'adresser, les Dimanche, Mardi, et Jeudi à la maison No. 17, Rue Chérif Effendi, à Nour-Osmanié, Stamboul, pour se faire inscrire.

Inclosure 5 in No. 99.

Acting Vice-Consul Abela to Consul-General Cumberbatch.

(No. 61.)

Haifa, August 17, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that during the first few days after the granting of the Constitution the inhabitants here did not show any signs of satisfaction, as they were not sure of the seriousness of the news. But when they read about the demonstrations which had been taking place at Beirout and Damascus and other places, they began to make some rejoicings, though some of them were not really pleased with this change. The naval and military officers connected with the Hedjaz Railway here have been the first to show satisfaction at having a Constitution. The local authorities in general are not delighted. On the 9th instant the President of the municipality invited all the young men of the town, both Christians and Moslems, to an entertainment on Mount Carmel, the invitation being to the low classes only, with a view of making peace between the two parties. To return the compliment, some wealthy Christians yesterday entertained all the Mahommedan, Christian, and Jewish inhabitants of all classes, together with the local authorities and naval and military officers. The Mushir Riza Pasha was also present (he was appointed two days ago to command the IInd corps at Adrianople, and will leave Haifa next Wednesday). Many speeches were made concerning the Constitution.

An incident took place last week which had a rather disagreeable effect. A Mussulman Sheikh, more than 80 years old, having the important religious title

of "Nakib-el-Ashraf," of the Sanjak of Acre, was accused of having cursed the Constitution, and he was brought to the Konak. Many Mussulmans were against him, but when a young Christian, the prosecutor, began to insult him before the crowd, calling him "traitor," the Mahommedans became exceedingly angry. The Sheikh was arrested and put in prison for three days, but was acquitted by the Court last Saturday, when more than 1,000 Mahommedans were waiting for his acquittal. He was acclaimed by the crowd, who cried, "Long live the nation of Mahommed and the Sultan!"

The local authorities are very weak and helpless, and not in a position to calm the excitement of the people if occasion should require.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. ABELA.

[30969] No. 100.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 533.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 1, 1908.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 516 of the 26th ultimo on the state of affairs in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, I have the honour to report that Tahir Pasha, the Vali of Bitlis, who has been engaged on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, and was recently ordered to return to his post at Bitlis, has been transferred as Vali to Erzeroum. The Mutessarif of Marash, Reshid Pasha, has been named Vali of Van.

No new Governor-General has yet been appointed to Bitlis, and it seems that the present *I'om loreas*, Feizi Bey, if supplied with more troops and authoritatively supported, would be as good a man for the post as any other.

Whereas in my above-mentioned despatch I was able to report a much more satisfactory state of things in that district, I regret to say that the improvement was only temporary. The Moday Kurds again broke out, and committed every kind of outrage. In the Moosh plain Kassim Bey was tyrannizing over the Armenians in the old way, and the most oppressive methods of tax-collecting came into operation.

At Boulanik the advent of General Ahmed Pasha and a Commission of Inquiry seems to have incited the Hamidieh to further violence, and they thus in one way and another materially increased the miseries of the Armenians. From Melasgerd robberies of cattle were reported. Finally, at Vazim, in the Kaza of Bavani, Sanjak of Sert, the Kurds came to demand the usual Hafir tax, the Armenians complained to the Kaimakam, who obtained the return of half the £T.40 thus paid, and the Kurds, under their Chief Jemil, decided on revenge. They raided Vozim, and tortured the young men and women of the place, until one, unable to stand the pain and dishonour any longer, succeeded in shooting Jemil. Thereupon the Kurds made a descent upon the village and killed 150 of the inhabitants, the remainder fleeing to the mountains. Their village is now deserted.

Such was the state of affairs when the news of the re-establishment of the Constitution arrived. While the Christians were filled with joyous anticipation, the fanatical section of the Moslems jibbed at the idea of equality; the numerous ranks of robbers and murderers experienced great anxiety as to what might be about to befall them from the mysterious change and kept quiet. The Kurdish Beys and Aghas were much annoyed, as they feared it would mean a régime of law and order instead of a state of disturbance in which they could continue, as in the past, to oppress the defenceless Armenians and the subject Kurdish tribes.

At Diarbekir the usual incredulity and astonishment were caused by the news; the Vali showed the same reactionary tendencies as so many of his colleagues, and the local members of the League have denounced him and demanded his recall. The people are unanimously in favour of the movement, the fanatical party and a few corrupt officials alone excepted.

Celebrations of the Constitution at Kharput had been checked by the Vali, but were held on the receipt of a telegram from the Commander of the IVth Army Corps on the 8th August. Public opinion here seems to be similarly divided and to follow an exactly similar course as at Kharput.

The Government, incited, doubtless, by the League, has ordered the arrest of

Ibrahim Pasha, the Chief of the Milli Kurds so famous for his exploits in the Vilayet of Diarbekir. If he is successfully caught, the effect, not only in his own district, but as far as Bitlis, Van, and Mosul, will be excellent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[30975] No. 101.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 539.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 2, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting on the desire of certain subjects of the Chief of Bahrein to be registered at the Consulate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 101.

Acting Consul Geary to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Bussorah, August 8, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that certain subjects of the Chief of Bahrein have asked to be registered at this Consulate. They are in possession of passports from their Chief and also a document signed by Major Prideaux, Political Agent at Bahrein, recommending them to the good offices of British Consular officials. The Ottoman Government attempted to enforce military service in the Turkish army on one of these men, and this incident was the cause of an appeal for protection at this Consulate. As they would appear to have no shadow of a claim to British nationality, I naturally refused their demand, but I would request instructions as to what degree of official or semi-official protection, if any, should be afforded to such claimants.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR B. GEARY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 101.

Sir G. Lowther to Acting Consul Geary.

Sir, *Therapia, September 2, 1908.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 51 of the 8th ultimo re pecting the protection of Bahreinese. You are in error in believing that they have no claim to British nationality.

Since the beginning of the last century His Majesty's Government have on nine occasions repudiated Persian claims to sovereignty over the Island of Bahrein, and on nineteen occasions the claims of Turkey, while in 1871 the Grand Vizier gave a formal assurance "that the Porte entertained no intention whatever of obtaining the supremacy over Bahrein."

In October 1893 a question arose regarding the forced enlistment of natives of Bahrein into the Turkish army. A note was accordingly addressed to the Turkish Ambassador on the 14th April, 1894, which, after drawing his Excellency' attention to previous communications, distinctly stated that His Majesty's Government did not admit the claim of Turkey to consider Bahrein as part of the Turkish Empire, and that if natives of the island applied to British Consuls in Turkey for protection, the latter could not refuse their good offices on behalf of such persons.

A question of British protection over Bahreinese in Turkey arose in 1892 over the restitution of taxes levied at Bussorah, and His Majesty's Ambassador reminded the Porte that, Bahrein being under British protection, His Majesty's Government could not admit Turkish interference with the natives of the island.

The question of British protection of Bahreinese in the Ottoman dominions again arose in 1893, and His Majesty's Government maintained the right of British Consular Representatives to give their good offices to Bahreinese applying for them, and the

Porte was subsequently informed that His Majesty's Government would extend their protection to them whenever there was occasion.

The intervention of British Consuls in Turkey on behalf of Bahreinese was again insisted upon in 1896.

You should therefore extend protection to the natives of Bahrein in conformity with these precedents.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[31158] No. 102.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, September 5, 1908.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 31st ultimo, inclosing a copy of correspondence respecting the present state of affairs at Jeddah, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that orders will be sent to His Majesty's ship "Sappho," which is due at Port Said about the 9th instant, to call at Port Soudan and report by telegraph the facts of the case, and whether any serious danger to British interests at Jeddah is anticipated. The "Sappho" will be instructed not to proceed to Jeddah, but it is undesirable she should be delayed for any length of time at Port Soudan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[31233] No. 103.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Smyrna, September 7, 1908.*

AIDIN Railway strike.

Manager of Imperial Ottoman (Aidin) Railway gives me following message for communication to the Council of the Railway in London, which please allow to be conveyed to them:—

"What I mean is that protection will be necessary for us if you do not comply with the men's demands. The local garrison of Smyrna is quite inadequate, and it is doubtful whether the Turkish Government will see to our safety."

I am in communication with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on this subject.

[31340] No. 104.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 8.)

India Office, September 7, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to the telegram of the Government of India, dated the 10th June last, as to the postponement of the issue of the Proclamation of the Sultan of Muscat regarding the award of The Hague Tribunal, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to inclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India,* suggesting that a copy of the Proclamation in Arabic should be communicated to the Sultan for his personal information only.

Viscount Morley would be glad to learn whether Sir E. Grey sees any objection to this suggestion being approved.

In his note of the 15th May last the French Ambassador expressed his willingness

* See Inclosure in No. 93.

that the Proclamation should be issued without delay, but its issue was to have been arranged by the two Consuls, and the matter has been delayed by the French Consul's death.

I am, &c.
(Signed) COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[31158] No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 8, 1908.*

SITUATION at Jeddah. Your telegram No. 239 of the 26th ultimo.

Owing to defective harbour accommodation at Suakim, visit of war-ship to that place is impracticable. His Majesty's ship "Sappho" is, however, due at Port Said about the 9th instant, and orders will be issued for her to proceed to Port Sudan, and to report whether danger to British interests is anticipated. It is undesirable that she should be long delayed at Port Sudan, and she will be instructed not to proceed to Jeddah.

[30126] No. 106.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 249.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 8, 1908.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 214, it is undesirable that Captain Haworth should remain at Hamadan, where his presence might be misunderstood, as that town is in the Russian sphere. It will be better to abstain from action proposed pending decision as to Julfa–Mohammerah Railway.

[30067] No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 251.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 8, 1908.*

LAST paragraph of Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 163.

What is the present situation regarding exchange of telegraphs?

[31341] No. 108.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 253.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 8, 1908.*

SIR A. NICOLSON'S telegram No. 164.

You should defer making communication respecting Turco-Persian frontier.

[31394] No. 109.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 9th July, relative to the request of Sheikh Sa'adun of the Muntifich for British protection.

India Office, September 7, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 109.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bushire, June* 17, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter which has been received, dated the 10th June, 1908, from the Political Agent, Koweit, reporting the reply given to Sheikh Mubarek as to British protection for Sheikh Sa'adun of the Muntifich.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. P. TREVOR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 109.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Koweit, June* 10, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to report that at an interview with Sheikh Mobarak the other day, the latter asked me what were the chances of the British Government according their protection to Sheikh Sa'adun of the Muntifich.

2. I replied that I was unaware of the views of my Government on this question, and could not express an opinion.

3. The Sheikh continued to press for an expression of my private opinion on the reception such overtures were likely to meet with, and I informed him that he could perhaps form some idea of my personal opinion by the reply that I gave to a message from Sheikh Sa'adun, who expressed a wish to see me. The reply was that I could not understand what business a messenger from Sheikh Sa'adun could have with me, when the Muntifich lived in Bussorah wahyat, and any business that they might have with the English would naturally go through the British Consul at Bussorah. I trust that the reply given may be approved.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. G. KNOX.

[31395] No. 110.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 16th July, relative to tribal affairs on the Aden–D'thala road.

It is requested that the MS. portions of these papers, which are sent in original, may be returned to this Office when done with.

India Office, September 7, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 110.

Government of India to Government of Bombay.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Simla, July* 10, 1908.

I AM directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter dated the 31st March, 1908, in regard to the present condition of tribal affairs on the Aden–D'thala road.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Government of India have some doubt as to the desirability of withholding the additional stipend proposed by the Resident at Aden for the Kotaibi Chief, since such action might render the acceptance of the proposed agreement by the Kotaibi Chief difficult to obtain. Subject to this remark, they concur generally in the proposals of the Resident as amended and modified by the Government of Bombay.

3. In his weekly letter, dated the 14th March, 1908, the Resident intimates that he is awaiting orders on his letter dated the 29th February, 1908, before submitting his final proposals for the consideration of Government. I am to request that the Government of India may now be furnished with these proposals, together with the recommendations of the Bombay Government thereon, and with a copy of the Agreement as finally accepted by the Chiefs concerned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. R. JELF,
Under-Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 2 in No. 110.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

(Secret.)

Sir, *Bombay Castle, March* 31, 1908.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 9th March, 1908, regarding tribal affairs on the Aden–D'thala road, I am directed to state, for the information of the Government of India, that the Governor in Council concurs generally in the views expressed by Major-General de Brath in his letter dated the 29th February, 1908. The proposed inter-Tribal Agreement seems satisfactory, and I am to observe that there is no objection to the Political Resident witnessing it as suggested.

2. In regard to the four recommendations submitted by the Political Resident in paragraph 10 of his letter above referred to, I am to say that his Excellency in Council supports recommendations (iii), relating to the continuance of the stipend at present paid to the Alawi Sheikh, and (iv), the presentation of fifty rifles and 5,000 rounds of ammunition to the Kotaibi Sheikh. This presentation was to have been made on the occasion of the Sheikh signing the Agreement proposed at the time of the evacuation of D'thala, but, owing to the negotiations falling through, the Political Resident did not avail himself of the sanction communicated in Foreign Department indorsement dated the 16th November, 1907.

3. The question regarding the levy by the Kotaibi Sheikh of the transit dues hitherto levied by the Alawi Sheikh appears to his Excellency in Council to be a matter which should be left to the Chiefs concerned. As regards the Resident's recommendation (ii), I am to state that His Excellency in Council does not consider that the additional stipend suggested therein should be given to the Kotaibi Sheikh, at least at present, and I am to suggest that this matter might await consideration pending the consolidation by the Sheikh of his recently acquired position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. O. QUIN,
Acting Secretary to Government.

Inclosure 3 in No. 110.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

(Secret.)

Bombay Castle, March 9, 1908.

WITH reference to Captain O'Connor's letter dated the 8th February, 1908, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter dated the 29th idem, from the Political Resident, Aden, and of its accompaniment, in regard to the present condition of tribal affairs on the Aden–D'thala road.

2. I am to state that any remarks which the Bombay Government may desire to make on these papers will be submitted to the Government of India hereafter.

Inclosure 4 in No. 110.

Major-General de Brath to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, February 29, 1908.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your Secret endorsement dated the 14th February, 1908, regarding tribal affairs on the Aden–D'thala road, I have the honour to submit the following Report on the present condition of affairs on that road for the information and the orders of Government.

2. It will be remembered that prior to the recent withdrawal from D'thala and other posts on the road, it was recommended that agreements should be entered into with certain of the Chiefs which should afford some real guarantee of security to the trade that follows that route. With that object certain draft Agreements were drawn up and proposals were submitted to render some further assistance to the Kotaibi, Haushabi, and Alawi Chiefs, who, it was considered, were not in a position satisfactorily to fulfil their obligations without it. Existing agreements with the Abdali Sultan and the Ameer of D'thala were deemed sufficient so far as they were concerned.

3. At the same time it was recognized that our withdrawal was likely to entail a recrudescence of hostilities between the Kotaibi and the Alawi tribe, who had for years past been at feud with one another, and only temporarily and partially restrained during our occupation of certain posts in the hinterland. And, in order as far as possible to avoid this contingency, it was arranged that certain posts on the road, which were built upon debatable territory, such as the Dar-al-Qabtan and the Dar-al-Taiz, should be destroyed. To this course both the Chiefs concerned agreed at a meeting convened by the Abdali Sultan at Lahej, in September last; and the Political Agent, D'thala, was a witness to the Agreement.

4. Further, it will be remembered that upon our withdrawal from the Suleik fort and at the last moment when the Kotaibi was actually completing his part of this Agreement, the Alawi Sheikh went back on his word, behaved with the greatest insolence and loss of self-control, and vigorously opposed the demolition of the Dar-al-Qabtan. In the end Major Jacob narrowly escaped being shot by one of the Alawi's supporters, but the dar was demolished and the withdrawal completed without further incident.

5. The hurried manner of our withdrawal, however, had the effect of giving all the Chiefs concerned, except Abdali Sultan, an exaggerated idea of their own importance and a false impression of our attitude; and in consequence the proposed Agreements remained unsigned.

6. The situation has now so far changed that the Agreements then contemplated are not entirely suitable. Hardly had the Alawi and Kotaibi dars been blown up than the Alawi Sheikh, notwithstanding the fact that he had actually received certain pecuniary assistance previously stipulated to enable him to rebuild his dar in territory that was not debatable, re-occupied the site of the Dar-al-Qabtan as well as that of the Dar-al-Taiz, which had been originally constructed and subsequently demolished by the Kotaibi tribe. This and other acts of hostility naturally brought about retaliation by the Kotaibi, who had hitherto behaved with singular forbearance and good faith. Having assembled the Radfan tribes and received help from the Amir, whose suzerainty he acknowledges when convenient, the Kotaibi fell upon and defeated the Alawi, and dispossessed him of his territory. The Alawi fled and his country is still occupied by a mixed force of Abdali, Amiri, and Kotaibi, apparently with the object of maintaining the *status quo* pending some sort of permanent settlement.

7. The question now arises what that future settlement is to be? The Kotaibi is in possession, and having lost two of his own sons in the fight is implacable, and claims to retain the Alawi territory that he has conquered. As I presume Government are not prepared to turn him out, should he maintain this attitude, it seems to me that not only the easiest, but the safest course is to recognize the *de facto* possessor who has shown himself strong enough to hold his own. The Amir who has helped the Kotaibi and who hopes to benefit by his success supports him. The Kotaibi, who was, perhaps, not altogether justifiably prevented from levying transit dues so long as we were in the hinterland, has now reimposed them, and claims the right to do so like all the rest. The Abdali Sultan admits the force of the Kotaibi logic, but for some reason that I have not so far grasped, looks to a time when a part at least of his lost territory shall be restored to the Alawi.

8. Now it is admitted on all hands that the measures that have been taken in

the past have failed to secure the peace and safety of the road, and that trade has suffered in consequence. Transit dues in excess of those agreed to and sanctioned in 1888 have undoubtedly been levied from time to time illegally, though it is a matter of no small difficulty to ascertain the actual amounts that are so levied, as the dues are collected in many places, and no one Chief knows how much is levied by each of the others. Pillage and murder have increased, and compensation for injury is hard for traders to come by. This is more especially the case when the offence has been committed by a tribesman in the territory of another Chief, as each seeks to evade his responsibility for the acts of his tribesmen when committed beyond the limits of his own country. No arrangement which fails to settle this question of compensation can ever prove satisfactory for long.

9. I understand the policy of His Majesty's Government to be, that having laid down in the interest of trade what transit dues may be levied, and having given to each Chief concerned a stipend and assistance in arms commensurate with the responsibilities imposed upon him by the care of the section of the road committed to his charge, we should then abstain from interference as far as possible and allow the Chiefs concerned to settle among themselves all questions of compensation. It must, however, not be overlooked that the sufferers will sometimes be British and sometimes Turkish subjects, and that in all cases not only will the parties who suffer appeal to the British Government for protection, but each Chief in turn will do the same and look to us to hold the scales evenly between them. These appeals we cannot afford to ignore without loss of prestige.

10. As the result of the Alawi débâcle, the Abdali, the Amiri, the Kotaibi, and Alawi Sheikhs have all appealed to me to effect a settlement between them. I have accordingly summoned them before me and explained to them that it is they and not we who are primarily concerned because the stoppage of trade, which must infallibly result from insecurity on the road and the imposition of unauthorized dues, will be directly reflected by diminished receipts from transit dues; and that so long as each continues to disavow his responsibility for the acts of his own tribesmen unless they be committed in his own territory, so long will a premium be placed on disorder. I pointed out that so long as the Alawi and Kotaibi both had armed posts upon the road there would always be trouble. This they do not deny. I added that the Alawi had shown himself impotent to maintain himself and entirely untrustworthy, and I expressed my unwillingness to assent to the imposition of any additional road dues which are, in my opinion, already too heavy. Beyond this I only urged co-operation among themselves whereby each party should engage to be responsible for the acts of his tribesmen wherever committed. I further urge that they should agree to the prompt payment of compensation by the Chief within whose limits an offence was committed, and that they should bind themselves jointly to enforce recovery from the Chief of the tribe to which the offender belonged should the former show himself backward in paying up. I added that I felt sure that Government would agree to any reasonable decision that they might jointly arrive at so long as it made for peace and permanency. At their request I embodied in a draft the provisions of a joint Agreement (see (A) attached) that seems to me to offer some real chance of success if it only be acted upon in good faith. This they have discussed among themselves, and have professed their readiness to conclude. By their desire I have agreed, on their executing such an Agreement, to witness it, and I have expressed my readiness to recommend to Government—

(i.) That the transit dues heretofore levied by the Alawi shall in future pass to the Kotaibi Sheikh;

(ii.) That the additional stipend recommended in my letter dated the 9th June, 1906, for the Alawi as representing the responsibility formerly imposed upon him by the safeguarding of the road of which he will in future be relieved, should pass to the Kotaibi in consideration of his increased responsibilities;

(iii.) That the Alawi's present stipend should be continued to him in consideration of the original Resolution of Government in the Political Department dated the 14th May, 1875, under which it was granted;

(iv.) That the arms recommended for the Kotaibi in my letter dated the 27th January, 1907, should be given to him.

11. The matter is still under the consideration of the Chiefs concerned, and I hope I may be able to bring them to some sort of agreement. But they are as short-sighted as children, each filled with a profound distrust of one another, and only unanimous in their determination to obtain some increase to their allowance, even though they may

have nothing to offer in return. In order that I may be in a position to carry out the wishes of Government I request to be informed at an early date how far a settlement on the lines I have indicated will meet with their approval and how far the conclusion of such a settlement will be left to me.

Inclosure 5 in No. 110.

(A.)

Agreement.

WE, whose names are hereunto appended speaking for ourselves and for those tribes whose suzerainty we claim, for our mutual advantage, to foster trade, and to secure to us the benefits that we severally derive from the dues that we are permitted to levy by the British Government on caravans passing through our limits, hereby agree and mutually covenant as follows:—

(i.) We will protect from outrage and violence all travellers passing to and from Aden, and we will each of us be responsible to each other and to the British Government for the security of the road within our respective limits which are defined as follows:—

Amiri	..	..	..	..	..	Sana to Safa Hilla.
Kotaibi	..	..	..	..	..	Safa Hilla to Al Hijjar.
Haushabi	..	..	..	..	..	Al Hijjar to Nobat Dakim.
Abdali	..	..	..	..	..	Nobat Dakim to Dar-al-Amir.

(ii.) If any loss or injury be sustained by any traveller on the road, the Chief within whose limits the offence has been committed shall forthwith compensate the sufferer for the damage which he has sustained whether to his person or his property. This compensation shall be paid whether the offence be committed by his own tribesmen or by the tribesmen of any of the parties to this Agreement.

(iii.) If any loss or damage be inflicted by one of our own tribesmen on any person while in the limits of any other Chief, who is a party to this Agreement, then it shall be incumbent upon us jointly to compel the Chief whose tribesmen have offended to reimburse to the Chief within whose limits the offence has been committed, the amount of compensation which he has paid to the sufferer under clause 2 above.

(iv.) We agree mutually with each other, and with the British Government, to levy no dues on trade passing through our limits except those which have been sanctioned by the Political Resident. We further agree, in our mutual interests and for the benefit of trade, that all these dues shall be collected and levied at one place alone, viz., at our joint customs-house at

(Signed) ABDALI.
AMIR OF D'THALA.
HAUSHABI.
KOTAIBI.

[31418] No. 111.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 9.)

Sir, *India Office, September 7, 1908.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 3rd instant, inclosing copy of a letter from Mr. F. C. Strick as to the ownership of the Islands of "Jezirat Nabiya Tamb" (locally called "Little Tamb") and Sirri in the Persian Gulf.

The first of these islands is understood to be a small uninhabited island,* 8 miles west of the Island of Tamb proper, and it was visited with the larger island in 1904 by the Bushire Director of Customs, when the hoisting of the Persian flag took place,† which was afterwards the subject of protest by His Majesty's Government. The status

* See p. 1909 of geographical volume of "Captain Lorimer's Persian Gulf Gazetteer," of which a proof has been supplied to the Foreign Office.

† See letter of Residency Agent at Lingah to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball, dated April 4, 1904 (Foreign Office "Persia and Arabia" Print, June 9, Section 1).

of the island is presumably the same as that of Tamb itself, and Viscount Morley concurs in the terms of the reply which it is proposed to make to Mr. Strick regarding it.

He also concurs in the terms of the reply regarding Sirri.

I am, &c.
(Signed) COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[31533] No. 112.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 10.)

Sir, *India Office, September 9, 1908.*

IN continuation of previous correspondence, ending with your letter dated the 23rd July last, as to the situation at Abu Musa, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to inclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Government of India, together with subsequent telegraphic correspondence on the subject.

To the proposal to defer for the present the institution of suits by Esa-bin-Abdul Latif and Nejef-bin-Ali against Hassan Sammiyeh, and to leave it to the Resident's discretion whether to advise Esa and Nejef to apply to Hassan for a statement of the accounts, Viscount Morley sees no objection, and he is prepared, if Sir E. Grey concurs in this view, to send immediate instructions to the Government of India to that effect.

There remains the question of the renewal of mining operations on the island. The present position is that His Majesty's Government are pledged by their communication to the German Government, dated the 10th July last, "to use their good offices in order that temporary arrangements may be made whereby Messrs. Wönckhaus will be enabled to procure a limited amount of red oxide to place them in a position to fulfil such contracts as they may have entered into before the cancellation of the lease." The nature of these temporary arrangements has not, however, so far been determined with precision.

One of the suggested alternatives is to ascertain from Messrs. Strick or some other British firm whether they would be prepared to take charge of the mining and selling operations on the Shaikh's behalf, but the question arises whether it is desirable to take steps in that direction while the matters at issue between the British and German Governments are still unsettled. It is not perhaps likely that the settlement will be concluded at any very early date.

The other alternative is the plan put forward by the Resident for one of the Shaikh's brothers to take in hand the work of excavation, His Majesty's Government providing or guaranteeing working expenses, and reimbursing themselves when the mineral is sold. The Government of India regard the proposal with some misgiving, which Lord Morley is disposed to regard as justified. The transport to the sea coast of the mineral excavated would apparently be for the firm of Messrs. Wönckhaus themselves to arrange.

Lord Morley would be glad to learn the views of Sir Edward Grey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 112.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

My Lord, *Simla, July 29, 1908.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with the Viceroy's telegram, dated the 13th July, on the subject of the Red Oxide Concession on the Island of Abu Musa, we have the honour to forward, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, a letter which we have received from our Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

2. Subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, we propose to inform Major Cox, in reply to his letter—

(i.) That the arrangement which he suggests for the renewal of mining operations after the hot weather is approved;

(ii.) That negotiations with Messrs. Strick or other firms for the undertaking of a contract for the management of the mining and sales on behalf of the Sheikh of

Shargah must be postponed until the questions at issue between the British and German Governments have been settled;

(iii) That in the circumstances now explained it will be desirable to defer for the present the institution of suits by Esa-bin-Abdul Latif and Nejef-bin-Ali against Hassan Samaiyeh, and that he may use his discretion as to advising Esa and Nejef to apply to Hassan for a statement of the accounts.

3. We should be glad to receive a reply to this despatch by telegram.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MINTO.
KITCHENER.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
C. H. SCOTT.
H. ADAMSON.
J. O. MILLER.
W. L. HARVEY.
J. S. MESTON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 112.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, June* 8, 1908.

BEFORE leaving head-quarters, I have the honour to bring the Abu Musa question up to date, as to details with which this Residency is at present concerned.

2. I attach a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Dr. Listemann, which includes action on the instructions conveyed in Foreign Department telegram of the 4th instant.

I have also spoken to my German colleague in the same sense, and shall do my best to see that the arrangements desired by His Majesty's Government are carried out smoothly.

3. As regards the recommencement of mining operations, after another visit to the Island I have come to the conclusion that the existing heaps can be marked with whitewash and photographed if necessary, and that this having been done, mining might be renewed as soon as the hot weather is over. The newly-mined mineral could be heaped on another side of the mine, and kept quite separate from the present heaps.

4. The Sheikh of Shargah, who has already been approached by two or three native applicants for a contract, has, without committing himself to anything specific, authorized me to ascertain from Messrs. Strick, or other British firm, the terms on which they would be prepared to take charge of the mining and selling operations on his behalf. These could best be ascertained by His Majesty's Government in London. The simplest way should seem to be for the firm to take such a percentage on the sale price of the oxide, delivered on board, as would cover their working expenses and give them a reasonable margin of profit.

5. The claims of Esa-bin-Abdul Latif and Nejef-bin-Ali against Hassan Samaiyeh: My primary object in advising that they should enter suits against Hassan was to obtain possession of Hassan's account-books before they were manipulated. But before the reply of Government on that point was received, Mr. Brown had returned to Lingah and commenced sedulously preparing the accounts. On my last visit to Lingah (the 8th May) Abdulla-bin-Hassan, who had before pleaded that they were scattered and not made up, smilingly intimated that the account-books were now "quite ready," and I have no doubt they are.

Esa-bin-Abdul Latif is an unsophisticated person, and his father, whom I consulted, said that he was not capable of going to Bushire and prosecuting the suit against Hassan, who will no doubt be strongly supported and advised by Mr. Brown; and, on the other hand, our Agent said he could ill afford to employ the expensive services of a barrister from Bombay.

Mr. Tigrane Malcolm, of Bushire, to whom it was suggested that a power of attorney should be given to prosecute the suit for them, proves unwilling, on account of advancing age and other absorbing business, to take the matter up.

It would obviously only weaken our position to allow the parties to institute the suits now and fail ignominiously, and I am therefore inclined to think, subject to hearing the views of Governments, that now it has ceased to be of any advantage

to obtain possession of the books, which have doubtless been manipulated long ere this, it may be wiser to defer suing Hassan until after the present dispute is disposed of. Or, if preferable, Esa and Nejef might ask Hassan in a friendly way to give them a statement of the accounts, and then, if they are not satisfied with them, they can move us again.

I shall be glad to be favoured with the views of Government on this point, as Esa and Nejef will be expecting to hear from me on the subject.

Inclosure 3 in No. 112.

Major Cox to Dr. Listemann.

(Confidential.) *June* 8, 1908.

BEFORE leaving for summer quarters, I have the honour to communicate to you one or two details regarding the Abu Musa question, which has been under correspondence between us.

Shortly after addressing you my last communication, on the 2nd May, I received instructions from my Government that I was to advise the Sheikh of Shargah to allow any oxide already mined and accumulated on the island to be removed by Messrs. Wönckhaus.

In order not to lose time, I called at Lingah and saw Abdulla-bin-Hassan, and inquired from him whether, if permitted by Sheikh Shargah and desired by Messrs. Wönckhaus, he and his father were prepared to undertake the loading and shipment as before, and inquired how long he would require. He replied, after consulting Mr. Brown, that they estimated that there was 3,000 tons of marketable oxide accumulated, and that they would *primâ facie* be ready to ship it; but explained that it would be impossible for coolies to work on the island for the next three or four months owing to the unbearable heat, and that, further, Mr. Brown had had no intimation of any wish of his principals to send another steamer at present.

Under these circumstances, I have the honour to request that you will be good enough to request Messrs. Wönckhaus to give me due notice when the firm wish to ship again, so that the necessary arrangements can be made as before.

With regard to the loading gear and animals remaining on the island, I have to inform you that I visited the island after seeing the Sheikh of Shargah, and satisfied myself that all the gear left by Hassan Samaiyeh had been effectively built up in one of the mud godowns by Abdulla-bin-Hassan's superintendence, and that donkeys on the island belonging to Hassan are thriving. The Sheikh of Shargah has appointed a caretaker, and I gave him due instructions in person.

Inclosure 4 in No. 112.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 18, 1908.

PLEASE see your letter in the Foreign Department, dated the 23rd July, as to affairs at Abu Musa.

From Resident's letter of the 8th June last, I understand him to recommend that mining operations should be renewed by agency of Messrs. Strick or some other firm. If Messrs. Strick or some other firm are not employed, by what agency do you contemplate that such renewal should take place?

Please communicate with Cox, if necessary, and let me have reply by telegraph.

Inclosure 5 in No. 112.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 30, 1908.

YOUR telegram of the 18th instant as to the affairs at Abu Musa. We have received the following information from Cox:—

"Mining operations at Abu Musa consist of the employment of Persian diggers, some twenty in number, who have to be recruited from Lingah, or its neighbourhood.

"The Sheikh himself being hopelessly unbusinesslike, the only satisfactory arrangement I can propose, pending final Concessions being issued, is that we should arrange, with the Sheikh's concurrence, that the work of excavation should be taken in hand by one of his brothers, that working expenses should be provided or guaranteed by us, and that we should reimburse ourselves when the mineral is disposed of by sale.

"Until a new Concession is granted the transport of the stuff to the coast will not be possible, as transport animals, &c., will have to be provided."

When the proposals contained in our despatch of the 23rd were submitted, we contemplated that a settlement of the German case would have been arrived at in time to allow of arrangements being concluded with Strick or other British firm before the arrival of the season for mining operations.

We regard the temporary expedient which Cox now suggests as somewhat unsatisfactory, and, unless the settlement of the German case is likely to be delayed for some time longer, we do not recommend its adoption.

If you are of opinion that there is no longer any objection to negotiations with British firms being opened, you will perhaps cause inquiries to be instituted in accordance with the suggestion made in the fourth paragraph of the letter of the Resident in the Gulf, dated the 8th June last.

[31555] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 544.)

Sir, *Therapia, September 5, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirout, informing me of the increase of the feeling in the Lebanon in favour of sending representatives to the new Turkish Parliament.

Mr. Cumberbatch states that the Governor of the Lebanon has received instructions with regard to the election of Members similar to those sent to the Valis of Beyrout and Damascus, and he inquires what view His Majesty's Government take of the new movement.

The privileged autonomous position of the Lebanon exists under the auspices of the Governments of Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Their chief privileges are (1) the possession of an Administrative Assembly; (2) a special judicial organization which cannot be altered without the consent of the Powers; (3) a fixed rate of taxation and a settled method for the employment of the revenue; and (4) exemption from military service.

The people of the Lebanon did not send representatives to the last Turkish Parliament, and it appears to me that a complete change in the status of the Lebanon would be involved by the representation of the province in the new Parliament; that such a change could not be effected without the consent of the guaranteeing Powers; and that it would be liable to create an awkward precedent for other parts of the Turkish Empire which for one reason or another have a special status.

The French is the Embassy most interested in this question, and my French colleague shares my view that representation implies withdrawal of the old privileges, which cannot, however, be withdrawn without an agreement between the Powers.

I gathered, at a recent visit to the Porte, that the desire to be represented in the new Parliament was only spread among a small section in the Lebanon, and that even these people hoped to maintain their special privileges.

I have not yet replied to Mr. Cumberbatch's despatch, but it seems likely that he will be approached by the leaders of the various sects in the Lebanon before they enter upon any active measures for the election of members, and it would appear desirable to direct him, in that eventuality, to point out to his interlocutors that such action would entail a change in the status of the Lebanon, and would consequently require the consent of the guaranteeing Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Beyrout, August 20, 1908.*

WITH reference to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 51 of the 1st instant, reporting the manner in which the news of the revival of the Ottoman Constitution had been received in Mount Lebanon, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that public opinion in favour of sending representatives to the new Parliament has grown stronger not only among the Druses and other minor sects, but also among the Maronites, led by the anti-clerical or Liberal party, who are being joined in their agitation for representation by many Maronites, hitherto belonging to the adverse Clerical party, but who are desirous of showing an inclination to associate themselves with the Liberals, many of whom are Freemasons.

As far as I can learn, the intentions of the movers in the agitation for Parliamentary representation are to bring their wishes before the Administrative Council of the Lebanon by Petitions or through deputations, and if the Governor-General does not proceed with the elections, concerning which he has received the same instructions as the Valis of Beyrout and Damascus, they will petition the Ottoman Government and the foreign Powers. The feeling in the mountain has been sufficiently demonstrated by the formation of Committees here and there to fraternize with the Society of "Union and Progress," and already two banquets in honour of the Committee have taken place in the mountain, one at Djuni and the other at Souk-el-Gharb. I have abstained from expressing any opinion as to what I think might be the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject of the participation of the Lebanon in the new constitutional rights, in so far as it may in any way affect the autonomous position hitherto enjoyed by the Lebanon, but in view of the active steps being taken by the leaders of the various sects to bring the matter forward it would be useful to me to be prepared to state whether His Majesty's Government will support the wishes of the Druses and other sects to send Parliamentary representatives to Constantinople, and I should feel much obliged if I could have a reply from your Excellency by telegraph for my guidance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[31731] No. 114.

Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin Company to Foreign Office.—(Received September 12.)

THE Right Honourable the Lord Rathmore, President of the Council of Administration, has given instructions by telegraph that the inclosed copy telegram from Smyrna should be forwarded to His Majesty's Foreign Office immediately.

Lord Rathmore also expresses his thanks for Mr. Tilley's letter.

(Signed) THOS. H. COOKE, *Secretary.*

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, September 12, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 114.

The Agent at Smyrna to Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin Company, London.

(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna [Undated.]*

LARGE section of men extremely insubordinate, and some aggressive. I promised men yesterday that till your arrival they should have day's pay for 8½ hours' work. They had no other grievance, but last night from 9·30 over sixty took possession of engine shed, prevented engines being lit, intimidated drivers, and removed orders posted for to-day. I advised Commissaire, and saw Consul, who at midnight made urgent representations to Vali. This morning men will not work because they say

we have broken agreement, which is false. Position becoming intolerable; working cannot continue under present conditions. Considerable unjust and increasing irritation against Company because of stoppage of traffic. Telegraph Directors, and keep your office open for telegrams night and day till further advice.

[31340] No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Foreign Office, September 12, 1908.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the French Ambassador and, with reference to his Excellency's communication of the 18th May last, has the honour to state that, owing to the demise of the French Consul at Muscat, the issue of the Proclamation respecting the award of The Hague Tribunal has not yet taken place.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government would suggest that an Arabic translation of the Proclamation in question should be communicated forthwith to the Sultan for his personal information only, and would be glad to learn whether the French Government see any objection.

[31789] No. 116.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 545.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 6, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your despatch No. 347 of the 25th ultimo, in which you intimate that the recent introduction of a constitutional régime into this country seems to offer a favourable opportunity for securing the settlement of outstanding claims against the Turkish Government.

With regard to the Abbott case, I have written to His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica, directing him to endeavour to obtain from Mr. Abbott some contribution towards the expenses incurred by His Majesty's Government on his behalf, for the reasons given in your above-quoted and previous despatches

With regard to the claim in respect of the attack on the "Blosse Lynch," I have the honour to draw your attention to the Confidential despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, forwarded to you in Mr. Barclay's despatch No. 394 of the 16th July last. According to this it appears that Messrs. Lynch gained rather than lost by the recent disorders in Mesopotamia, and the question of pressing a claim was one, not for obtaining recompense, but for imposing a deterrent upon similar attacks in the future. Under the new régime, moreover, it seems that we may count much more on the good-will and probity of the Turkish authorities.

Further, it must be borne in mind that the present movement is being attended by a considerable revival of national feeling, with a consequent tendency to restrict the privileged position of foreigners. Now, Messrs. Lynch's steamers ply, under a foreign flag, in the internal waters of Turkey, which the present régime is not unlikely to view as an infringement of their sovereign rights.

Moreover, the Firman upon which Messrs. Lynch's rights are based is loosely worded, but certainly gives the right to navigate, not on the Tigris, but on the Euphrates.

Under these circumstances it would seem advisable in their own interests that Messrs. Lynch should limit their claim to actual losses, which, however, according to Major Ramsay's report, were nil, and that they should endeavour to gain the good-will of the new Government without the intervention of this Embassy.

I have hopes that the general reforms which are now being gradually taken in hand for the whole country may obviate the necessity for making representations as to the security in Mesopotamia and in the vicinity of Salonica, as directed in your despatch, for I fear that at the present juncture such representations would be neither very well received nor very effectual.

The remainder of the British claims against the Turkish Government are described on pp. 5, 6, and 7 of the Annual Report.

Satisfactory progress is, on the whole, being made with No. 3 (Red Sea piracy claim).

I will not fail to take the earliest convenient opportunity for presenting the

remaining outstanding claims, including that for the refund of the excess duty levied on dates at the Katif Customs, to the Turkish Government, but it must be borne in mind that they are at present in the greatest straits for money to furnish the most necessary payments, such as salaries and arrears, a loan being offered them at this very moment only upon arduous terms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[31792] No. 117.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 549.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 8, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting on the disturbances at El Katif.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 117.

Consul Geary to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 60.)

Sir, *Bussorah, August* 15, 1908.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 53 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that the Political Resident and Consul-General at Bushire sent me a telegram on the 11th instant, to be communicated to the Senior Naval Officer, who is at present at Bussorah, in command of His Majesty's ship "Sphinx." In this he reported that the population of Katif, who are protected by a small and quite inadequate garrison, are in a most precarious position, as the town is surrounded by Bedouins, whose number is estimated at 2,000. Unless reinforcements arrived it was anticipated that the whole population might be massacred. In these circumstances His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" took up her position as near Katif as possible, but owing to the peculiar position of the town no gun-boat can come within range or nearer than 6 miles of the buildings. I am now told that His Majesty's ship "Redbreast" is also in readiness to render assistance if required.

I thought it well to interview the Vali of Bussorah, as the Kaimakam of Katif is subordinate to Hassan Bey. He appeared to welcome our action in the matter, and told me that they were preparing to send reinforcements from here either in the gun-boat "Kilid-el-Behar" or in a hired lighter, there being a difference of opinion on this point between the military and civil authorities. The Turkish gun-boat draws 12 feet, and cannot approach nearer to Katif than Ras Tenora. Here the soldiers must be landed in boats, and in the process might be exposed to the fire of the Arabs under Jasin-bin-Mohamed Abdul Wahab, who holds Darin, and is in league with the besiegers.

He asked me whether it would be possible to obtain the assistance of the Government launch, which is at the disposal of the Political Resident at Bahrein. I told him that I could give him no information on this matter without instructions from higher authorities. Major Cox, in his telegram, had mentioned that the Government of India were being asked how far we could proceed in affording assistance to the Turks in view of our important commercial interests.

A despatch from Bahrein, subsequent to the telegram from Bushire, emphasizes the urgency of the case, and I pressed the Vali to dispatch reinforcements immediately. Although he has promised to do so, I am somewhat distrustful, as there are only about 250 soldiers in Bussorah, and the Vali is not desirous of denuding the town of troops. This deficiency is likely to be repaired by the arrival of reinforcements from Bagdad, but in the meantime it is quite possible that the garrison at Katif might be reduced to extremities, and compelled to evacuate the town, and I am accordingly continuing to urge the Vali to dispatch all that can be spared to the scene of action.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR P. GEARY.

[31888] No. 118.

The Agent at Smyrna to the Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin Company, London.—(Communicated by Lord Rathmore, September 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, September 12, 1908.*

NEW Agreement signed to-night with assistance of Consul-General. Men resume work to-morrow morning, permanency doubtful, but no more trouble apprehended for some days.

[31784] No. 119.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 260.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 13, 1908.*

RAILWAY strike on Aidin line.

I am informed by Consul-General Barnham that settlement has been arrived at.

[32133] No. 120.

Mr. H. V. Skinner to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

Auf Eichberg, Lauterbach (Hessen), Germany, September 7, 1908.

Sir,

BY forwarding the inclosed newspaper cutting,* I do not infer that the contents of this article are in any way correct, as it may only be the usual spiteful outlet of a feeling which at present so many German papers, even those of a very high standing, have and publish against England. But should there be some truth in what this article states, I think it then my duty, as a true Englishman and supporter of His Majesty's Government, to state such facts as have come under my personal notice, leaving it to His Majesty's Foreign Office to make use of such information as may be considered advisable.

The fact that the German Government, in the interest of its trade and commerce as well as its political standard, is making every endeavour to gain the firmest footing everywhere throughout Turkey and Asia Minor cannot be denied, I can substantiate this fact by experience gained through a long sojourn in Asia Minor, and by keeping in close touch with it yet. It is also a fact that English influence is on the decrease on account of the former, and something ought to be done to recover lost ground. This can be best accomplished by means of railways, harbour works, and enterprises of a similar nature as these.

Now, if it is correct what is stated in the inclosed article, that it has been the intention of His Majesty's Government to build a railway from Alexandriette, with Cyprus as a basis for this undertaking, I should like to point out that though such a railway to the Persian Gulf could not be well constructed by the British Government, it could be done easily enough by means of a British Company, if instead of Alexandriette the town of Tripolis were chosen as a starting point.

Tripolis is far more suitable for this purpose than Alexandriette, on account of its harbour being the best on the whole Syrian coast, and which, with a comparatively small outlay of capital, could be turned into a most magnificent harbour capable of holding the largest fleet, whereas Alexandriette is anything but a good harbour.

The distance from any point of Cyprus to Tripolis is also much less than to Alexandriette, which is clearly an advantage.

There is at present an excellent opportunity for carrying out the aforesaid railway by taking up the Concession from Tripolis to Homs, and from thence to Deir on the Euphrates, carrying it along this river to the Persian Gulf.

This Euphrates Railway, as it might be called, would in a great measure counterbalance any advantages which the Germans may derive from the construction of the Bagdad Railway, and it will have the greater advantage, for whereas this railway has no open seaport, Constantinople being a closed port, the Euphrates Railway has as its starting point a splendid harbour on the open sea, the Mediterranean, which is only a few hours distance from all the Egyptian ports and the Suez Canal, making the

harbour of Tripolis and also the railway of immense strategical value in times of peace and war for obvious reasons. The importance of its commercial value, once the Mediterranean is connected with the Persian Gulf, is so great and known so well that I need not make any further comments upon this point.

The question how this undertaking is to be accomplished, I will briefly answer thus:—

Influential people in good financial positions in Tripolis approached me (*vide* annexed letter*) last year to take up this scheme and form an English Company. I took this business to a firm of very high standing in London, *i.e.*, Messrs. Carlton, Greig, and Co., 16, Tokenhouse Yard, Lothbury, who thought of carrying it out jointly with a well-known contractor, Captain Lowther, brother of the Speaker in the House of Parliament. Unfortunately the business fell through for some pecuniary reasons. The capital required for the first section from Tripolis to Homs, 60 miles in length, is *circa* 400,000*l*. The whole line from Tripolis to the nearest point on the Persian Gulf, which is Bussorah, or if navigation up the Euphrates is possible as far as Kornah, will be about 1,000 miles long, and taking 8,000*l*. per mile as the probable cost of construction, a capital of more or less 8,000,000*l*. will be necessary to complete the whole railway, including harbour at Tripolis; but there is no doubt that the railway in the hands of an English Company would not only be of the greatest advantage and indefinable benefit to our country, but would also yield material benefits and profits to investors in time.

My friends in Tripolis are quite ready to obtain the Concession from the Ottoman Government and afterwards transfer the said Concession to an English Company, and there will be no difficulty in carrying this business promptly and speedily through, provided the necessary capital can be arranged, which I should say ought not to be a difficult matter to arrange if His Majesty's Foreign Office will undertake to interest those persons who have the command of the money market or are the leaders in it.

As I know that it is not advisable for any direct correspondence of any kind on this subject coming to me in this country, I beg to suggest that in case any steps are taken for carrying out this most important scheme, notice of it might be sent through Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Campbell, K.C.G., Royal United Service Institute, Whitehall, who will communicate with me in case it is necessary.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HARRY H. V. SKINNER.

[32088] No. 121.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 15.)

Sir, *Admiralty, September 14, 1908.*

REFERRING to your letter of the 31st ultimo and to Admiralty letter 5th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 13th instant from His Majesty's ship "Sappho" at Port Sudan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 121.

Commander Hodges to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. "*Sappho*," *at Port Sudan, September 13, 1908.*

I HAVE asked His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah to send me all information possible respecting disturbances or piracy at that place. Nothing is known on the subject by the authorities here. I am informed by the Ottoman Telegraph Company that communications in cypher cannot be accepted.

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* Not printed.

[32143] No. 122

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 262.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 15, 1908.*

I HAVE received a telegram viâ Suez from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Jeddah, dated the 12th instant, informing me that the town is in fear of a Bedouin attack, and that there has been a recurrence of the piratical robberies.

I am informed by the Sublime Porte, to whose attention I called the matter, that troops will start to-day to deal with the situation.

[32155] No. 123.

Vice-Consul Dunlop to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Port Said, September 15, 1908.*

THE "Hodeidah," Turkish transport vessel, with 418 troops on board, has left this port for Hodeidah.

[32178] No. 124.

Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin Company to Foreign Office.—(Received September 16.)

COPY of telegram forwarded to General Manager to-day. With Lord Rathmore's compliments.

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, September 14, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 124.

Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin Company to General Manager in Smyrna.

(Telegraphic.) *London, September 14, 1908.*

PENDING present position and danger Company's interest, Council cannot consider application Liberal Committee for subscription, and with earnings uncertain and no surplus funds here consider inevitable all Egerdir rolling stock and building works must cease. Director and Secretary leaving Saturday. Council quite prepared meeting reasonable demands men, but if men insist controlling road and Government does not protect, you must submit to men forcing stoppage all traffic and later claim compensation.

[31555] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 339.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 16, 1908.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 544 of the 5th instant, relative to the increase of feeling in the Lebanon in favour of sending representatives to the new Turkish Parliament.

I approve the terms of the reply which your Excellency proposes to return to the request of His Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut for instructions as to the attitude which he should adopt in the event of his being approached by the leaders of the various sects before they proceed to the election of members.

Should the Sublime Porte approach your Excellency privately on the subject, you should return to them a reply couched in language similar to that which you propose to recommend to Mr. Cumberbatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[31533] No. 126.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 16, 1908.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, in which you inclose correspondence with the Government of India upon various aspects of the situation which has arisen in connection with the export of red oxide from the Island of Abu Musa.

I am to state, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in the instructions, as indicated in the second paragraph of your letter under reply, which Viscount Morley proposes to send to the Government of India.

As to the question of the renewal of mining operations on the island, I am to state that, if the Government of India can arrange for Messrs. Strick to work the mines temporarily, and supply M. Wönckhaus with sufficient red oxide to fulfil his contracts, Sir E. Grey would have no objection to such a course. I am to add that he considers that work should be started as soon as the season permits.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

[32088] No. 127.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 231.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 17, 1908.*

DISTURBANCES at Jeddah. Please refer to my telegram No. 214 of the 8th September.

His Majesty's ship "Sappho" has left Port Soudan, having been unable to obtain any information there.

[32429] No. 128.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 264.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 18, 1908.*

PIRACY at Jeddah, the subject of your telegram No. 231.

I learn that a battalion of troops will leave for Jeddah at once; they are starting from Haifa.

[32506] No. 129.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 19.)

Sir, *Admiralty, September 18, 1908.*

WITH reference to Admiralty letters of the 5th and 14th instant respecting the disturbances at Jeddah, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's ship "Sappho" was ordered to proceed to Aden on the 16th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[31789] No. 130.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 19, 1908.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the claim which your Company desire to bring against the Ottoman Government on account of the recent attack on your steam-ship "Blosse Lynch," I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward

Grey to inform you that he has received a further despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.

In this despatch Sir G. Lowther draws attention to the fact that under the new system of government which has been inaugurated in the Ottoman Empire it will be possible to count much more than in the past on the good-will and probity of the authorities in dealing with questions of this kind, but that at the same time the change is attended with a considerable revival of Turkish national feeling and, in consequence, with a tendency to restrict the privileged position of foreigners. His Excellency points out that the fact that your Company's steamers ply on the internal waters of Turkey under a foreign flag is therefore not unlikely in present circumstances to be viewed as an infringement of the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Government, and, further, that the Firman on which the rights of your Company are based is loosely worded, but certainly gives the right to navigate on the Euphrates, and not on the Tigris.

In these circumstances it would seem advisable in the interests of your Company that they should limit their claim to actual losses incurred, and that they should rather endeavour to gain the good-will of the new Ottoman Government than ask for the intervention of His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople.

It might even be well to consider whether the unsettled state of the country and the consequent closing of the river to sailing-vessels during several months did not to some extent bring profit to your Company, and, if so, whether it is necessary to insist at all on the loss.

Sir E. Grey, who entirely concurs in the observations of Sir G. Lowther, consequently thinks it best, in the interests of your Company, to instruct his Excellency not to press your claim officially on the Sublime Porte, but to recall it to their notice in a friendly manner, if on consideration you still wish this done, and to suggest to it, when opportunity offers, that the Valis of Bagdad and Bussorah should be warned of the serious consequences which might follow a further incident such as the attack on your vessel.

It is reasonable to expect that such a warning will have more effect in present circumstances than it would have had a short time ago.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

[32594] No. 131.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 555.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 9, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, reporting on the revolt of Ibrahim Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 131.

Colonel Surtees to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 9, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on or about the 30th ultimo Ibrahim Pasha, Chief of the Milli tribe of Kurds, moved eastwards from Aleppo with some 600 horsemen towards the Pass of Tel Akhmer.

The detachment of Imperial troops stationed at Rakka and a battalion of infantry from Aintab received orders to bar his path, whilst a battalion at Zov was instructed to move to Harat with the intention of preventing him from rejoining his tribes should he succeed in forcing the Pass of Tel Akhmer. Ibrahim Pasha seems to have crossed the Euphrates about the 2nd instant, moving on Tel Akhmer.

Two squadrons of cavalry were moved from Diarbekr to Viran, and an infantry battalion has marched from Mardin, whilst another from Lerodj is held in readiness.

The Redifs of Diarbekr, Mardin, Midiat, and Lerodj have been ordered to mobilize.

Ibrahim Pasha is stated to have now reached Viran, where his force has been swelled by tribesmen recruits to some 4,000 men.

Orders have been issued from Constantinople to conduct the operations against Ibrahim Pasha with energy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES,
Colonel, General Staff, Military Attaché.

[32599] No. 132.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 560.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 13, 1908.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 360 of the 1st instant, on the subject of a raid by the Kurds on the Nestorian Christians of Tiari, I have the honour to forward to you herewith extracts from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van, giving such account as he has been able to prepare—mainly from information supplied by the members of the Archbishop's Nestorian Mission—of the actual facts.

The state of affairs that Captain Dickson describes is extremely bad, but it must not be forgotten that the Tiari district lies at the extremity of the Empire, and is one of its most inaccessible regions. The deplorable conditions now prevailing there are to be traced directly to the disgraceful misgovernment of the old régime, as I have already had the honour to point out.

At the beginning of August a telegram on this subject from Captain Dickson was made the subject of a representation by this Embassy to the Porte, by whom telegraphic orders were immediately sent to the authorities of Van and Mosul, but the evil had already been done.

From other despatches, however, which I am sending by this messenger, you will perceive that the effects of the constitutional régime are slowly but surely reaching out to these remote parts of the Ottoman dominions, and the results already attained, according to these reports, give every reason to encourage the hope that the ruthless extermination of the Christians by the Moslem elements in the distant Asiatic provinces, which seemed to have become a regular system, has come to an end.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 132.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir G. Lowther.

(Extracts.)

THE Tiari country, the scene of the recent disorder, is some seven days' journey from Van, and chains of high mountains, infested by turbulent Kurds, separate the two districts; there is little means of communication, and the post between Van and Julamerk (the seat of government for these parts) is most erratic.

The general situation is this: in the region of high mountains south of Julamerk the Nestorian Syrian tribes, chief of which is the Tiari tribe, live in a semi-independent condition; they are cut off by high mountains from all civilization, and are seldom visited by Turkish officials; there is little but their religion to distinguish them from their equally wild Kurdish neighbours, with whom they are perpetually fighting and quarrelling. These Tiari and kindred Syrian tribes differ from other Christian communities in this country in that they are possessed of certain rights and liberties, acquiesced in, if not officially recognized, by the Government; for instance, they pay, through Mar Shimun, their ecclesiastical and civil ruler, tribute instead of taxes, and have the right to carry arms. This latter privilege accounts for the fact of their continued existence, for they are fairly well able to take care of themselves, and have thus, under most adverse circumstances, preserved themselves from extinction at the hands of their Kurd neighbours and rivals.

High Turkish officials much resent the existence of Christian peoples occupying such a semi-independent position, and would much like to see their privileges curtailed, and the ashiret, or tribal Syrians in the "rayah" position of the Armenians and other Christian tax-paying slaves. Whenever there is any disorder in the Nestorian districts, the part played by the Syrians is painted in the darkest colours, and there is talk of

the time when the Government will send troops to disarm the Syrians. The Government, however, realizes that the official disarmament of Tiari would present difficulties, and that it is a much simpler method, and one that attracts less attention and protest, to secure the gradual extinction of these tribes by letting the Kurds do what they can to overrun the districts.

To justify the Kurdish attacks on the Syrians, the Government welcome exaggerated stories of the shooting of Sheikhs, Seyids, and other holy men while in the act of praying, the desecration by Nestorians of Moslem holy places, and of Syrian raids on Kurdish villages. As a matter of fact, the Syrians have sometimes been guilty of raiding Kurds, but these acts have invariably been provoked by previous Kurdish outrages, and have been undertaken in retaliation, or in attempts to regain their own property; however, it serves the purpose of the Government to listen to false or biassed evidence that enables them to hold the Nestorians guilty, and to encourage the Kurds in doing the Government's work of subjugating these Christians. Further, there are many instances of cases where Government officials have directly connived at Kurdish outrages.

The following are the facts, as I learn them from letters of members of the Archbishop's Assyrian Mission:—

Reshid Bey is Mira (Chief) of the Kurds of Berwari. (Berwari is a district in the Mosul Vilayet, running east and west along the southern border of the Nestorian country. It separates the latter from the rich Mesopotamian plains, and all traffic between Mosul and Tiari has to pass through it. There are no Turkish officials in the district, though the Kurds dwelling there are supposed to pay a tribute to the Government.) This man has for some time past been in the habit of stopping caravans, and has made it impossible for corn to be brought up to Tiari from Mosul. This he has done in consequence of a quarrel that he has with the Agha of Chal (Chal being a district of both Kurds and Nestorians, a little to the south-east of Tiari, and on the eastern bank of the Zab) about a salt mine, which he claims, but which the Chal Kurds and Syrians refuse to hand over to him. Thus, in the first instance, the quarrel is between the Berwari and Chal Kurds, the latter being supported by the Pinyanish Kurds, and by the Syrians or Nestorians.

The Mira of Berwari and his men have recently made many raids, killing Tiari men, and driving off many of their sheep, in several cases under treacherous circumstances; *e.g.*, last autumn Reshid Bey, after receiving payment for allowing the Tiari sheep to pasture in Berwari, and promising them protection, allowed them to be pillaged and the shepherds killed by Sutu, the Agha of the Oramar Kurds; also one Yosip, a Sub-Chief of Tiari, was murdered in cold blood, at a time when the Tiari and Berwari tribes were friendly. Various feuds, quarrels, and claims for compensation having accumulated between the two tribes, the Rev. W. H. Browne urged the Nestorian Patriarch, Mar Shimun, to go down to the districts this spring to attempt to bring about a reconciliation; and on the 18th May Mar Shimun, having received assurances from Reshid Bey and the Sheikh of Barmanis that they would meet him, proceeded from Kochanis to Lizan, in Lower Tiari.

This Sheikh of Barmanis is a man of great influence and reputation for sanctity among the Kurds of these parts, and is said to have been the supporter and instigator of the Mira throughout.

Both the Mira and the Sheikh failed to keep the appointment (Mr. Browne suggests owing to intrigue at Mosul), and Mar Shimun, after a fruitless journey, returned to Kochanis about the 18th July. Then the men of Lower Tiari, who had already unsuccessfully tried all possible means to obtain redress for their wrongs from the Government, exasperated by the insincerity of the Mira, and the failure to come to terms, and arrange compensation for their losses, raided Berwari as soon as Mar Shimun had returned homewards, carrying off some 2,000 sheep; thirteen Barwari and three Tiairi men were killed, among the former being a brother and a cousin of the Mira, while another brother was wounded.

There followed a second raid soon after, carried out by some "hotheads" of Lower Tiari, in which no spoil was secured, but two more men, Seyids, were killed. The Mira then, in the name of Islam, summoned all the surrounding Kurds to his help, sending round six blood-stained sets of Seyid's clothes as a sort of "fiery cross"; it was reported that from 5,000 to 10,000 answered the summons, and the whole force assembled at Deshtin, to the south-east of Lizan, some troops from Mosul being reported as being with them.

Tiairi prepared to resist the invasion, and the Chal and Pinyanish Kurds offered their support to the Nestorians. At this stage Malik Ismail, one of the principal Nestorian

Chiefs, asked Mr. Browne to write to me to secure fair play for the Tiairi men, only asking that the Mosul Government should be prevailed on not to support the Mira, but to let them settle the matter between themselves without interference.

Mar Shimun sent down orders that the Nestorians must only fight if attacked; at the same time he received advice from the Mutessarif of Bashkala urging that he, with the Kaimakam of Julamerk, should go down and try and arrange a reconciliation.

This Mar Shimun and the Kaimakam agreed that they could not do while two angry forces were facing one another, and they urged that the Mosul Government should first disperse the Mira's forces. Mr. Browne urges that throughout the affair the Mosul Government took the side of the Kurds, and that, though they sent troops to Berwar, these troops made no effort to disperse the Kurds, but were only there to prevent Tiari men from entering the Berwar country, and that they actually took part in the subsequent plundering of the Lizan Valley. It is also said that certain Turkish officials from Mosul, who were with the Mira's troops, went through the Tiari Valley, spreading false reports as to the dispersal of the Mira's army and as to reconciliation. In consequence the Tiari force diminished; then, by a combination of treacherous and false reports, coupled with bad generalship on the part of the Tiari men, on the 1st August the Berwari men were able to sweep down the Lizan Valley from Zawitha (nearly, but not at the head of the valley) to the Zab, pillaging and burning villages and standing crops, destroying the irrigating canals and wooden aqueducts, and laying waste 700 houses and 7 churches, whose fittings and books were destroyed, and in the course of three days rendering some 11,000 Syrians homeless and destitute.

The malicious character of this raid is unparalleled in the annals of Kurdish and Syrian warfare in recent times. It has always been considered unfair for raiders to destroy what they could not carry off, and dishonourable to damage growing crops or water conduits, or burn houses. In this, as also in the gathering of Kurds from all quarters by the proclamation of a "jehad," this affair bears some resemblance to the raid of Bedr Khan Beg on the same ground in or about 1847.

Amongst the houses looted and burnt Mr. Browne reports one in the village of Mergi registered as the property of the Archbishop's Mission.

When the Mira's men reached the Zab they met for the first time with some resistance from the hitherto completely out-manœuvred Syrians, and a rumour that reinforcements were coming to the Tiari men caused the Kurds to retire and disperse to their own districts.

[32143] No. 133.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 21, 1908.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the situation at Jeddah, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that a gentleman connected with the firm of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, and Co. called at this Office on the 15th instant in connection with this subject.

He stated that his firm did not anticipate any really serious trouble at the present moment, and that they therefore attached less importance to the presence of one of His Majesty's ships at or near Jeddah now than to an occasional visit of such a ship for the purpose of showing the British flag and of thus upholding British prestige in that region.

I am accordingly to inquire whether there would be, in the opinion of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, any objection to the occasional visit to Jeddah of one of His Majesty's ships in normal times for the purpose indicated.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

[32851] No. 134.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards

herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosure in letters from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 13th and 20th August, relative to the recent events at Katif.

India Office, September 21, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 134.

Rear-Admiral Sir G. Warrender to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Colombo, August* 8, 1908.

THE Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf reports piratical acts El Katif, and asks for the use of the launch of the Political Agent at Bahrein. If launch could be lent, I would commission her as tender for the time being with naval crew and flag.

Inclosure 2 in No. 134.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, August* 11, 1908.

NAVAL Commander-in-chief telegraphs, dated the 8th August:—

"The Senior Naval Officer . . . . crew and flag."

Provided launch is duly commissioned, and has proposed naval crew and flag, there is no objection.

Please instruct Political Agent, Bahrein, to place launch at disposal of Senior Naval Officer, and telegraph compliance if you see no local objection to the course proposed, repeating your telegram to his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-chief, East Indies squadron.

Inclosure 3 in No. 134.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

Bushire, August 9, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a Memorandum on the recent events at Katif, based on the information received from the Political Agent, Bahrein.

Memorandum.

During the last ten days the ill-feeling between the townspeople in Katif and the Bedouin has grown very acute. It appears that the quarrel created by the affair reported in paragraph 1,330 of this Residency diary No. 27, for the week ending the 5th July, 1908, was only nominally patched up through the medium of the Kaimakam and Haji Mansur Pasha, and the parties have been only waiting for a favourable opportunity to renew hostilities. This ill-feeling has been stimulated by some trouble which arose recently between the Katif people and the Subai' and 'Amair coastal Bedouin in consequence of the former refusing to allow the Subai' and 'Amair to enter the tribal date groves for the collection of their supplies of the date fruits. These Subai' and 'Amair have joined hand with the Bedouin of the interior, and a large combined force has collected all around the oasis. They commenced by making inroads into the date gardens and killing Bahranis (Shias of Katif) by twos and threes. The latter joined in resistance, but were several times beaten back, losing, it is said, thirty to fifty men killed each time. The losses on the other side had been comparatively small. The Bahranis then lost heart, and the Turkish soldiers stationed in 'Anik have attempted a demonstration by marching into the desert without producing the desired effect. The situation has since become critical. The oasis is overrun with with Bedouin who are committing all sorts of outrages. Hundreds of Katifis are said to have been killed, thousands of date-trees to have been stripped of their fruit and cut down, and twenty-eight villages to have been looted and burnt down. About 800

refugees, men, women, and children, mostly of the pearl-fishing class, came over to Sanabis in Bahrein on the 29th July, 1908, and dispersed about the village, many of them occupying houses vacated at this period of the year by their owners in favour of more airy habitations along the sea-shore.

The Bedouin are said to have got hold of all the places in the oasis with the exception of the 'Anik and Katif forts. The seriousness of the situation is enhanced by the Bedouin taking to the sea to plunder and kill the Katifi pearl divers there. A boat containing twenty-three Katifis is said to have been surprised near Darin by the Bedouin, and slaughtered to a man.

Merchants in Bahrein, British subjects and foreigners, who have large interests at stake in Katif, have memorialized the Political Agent, begging that a gun-boat be dispatched in their interests to Katif to relieve the situation. The Agency launch was therefore dispatched by Lieutenant-Commander Gouldsmith, R.N., on the 30th July under the command of Lieutenant Prideaux-Brune, R.N., of His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" to get correct and up-to-date news from the Kaimakam of Katif. She returned on the 1st August with information which seems to indicate that the Sunni residents of Darin, the home of Mohammed Abdul Wahhab Pasha, are, either willingly or unwillingly, in co-operation with the Bedouin and disregardful of the authority of the Kaimakam. It is alleged that the piratical Bedouin are making free use of the Darin boats in their operations against the villagers and townspeople of oasis. It is also said that a number of Koweit boats are said to be drawn up at Darin, and that the boatmen are sitting inactive upon the island. The Kaimakam is apprehensive lest they join the other Arabs in an assault against the fort.

A boat laden with forty rifles is said to have left Muharraq for Katif on or about the 30th July and to have been surprised by the Bedouin near the harbour of Katif. The nakhoda, Hamad-bin-Abdullah-al-Hasan, was slightly wounded in trying to save the rifles, which, however, fell into the hands of the Bedouin who warned the nakhoda to take his boat back to Bahrein and warn others there not to come towards Katif.

It is believed that the Katifis have applied to the Nejd Amir, Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud to send a force to their assistance. The Kaimakam sent on the 1st August a telegram to the Bahrein post-office for Bussorah applying urgently for reinforcements, including a man-of-war and some artillery.

His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" and the Bahrein Agency launch were about to proceed to the vicinity of Katif on the 2nd August to check maranders from adventuring on the sea.

[33003] No. 135.

Mr. W. J. Alt to Foreign Office.—(Received September 23.)

14, *Queen Victoria Street, London, September* 22, 1908.

Sir,

REFERRING to my communication of the 28th ultimo, I find that in typing this letter the total amount of the Haidar Pacha to Ismidt Railway Claim of principal and interest was not clearly set out, and the statement referred to does not appear to have been annexed. I now beg, therefore, to amend the letter accordingly.

I inclose two statements, the first showing that the original Award was 120,000*l.*, and that the interest at 5 per cent. per annum, amounting to 152,003*l.* 19*s.* 3*d.*, makes the total claim 272,003*l.* 19*s.* 3*d.*, and the second showing the interest calculations from the 5th March, 1892, to the 30th September of this year.

Regretting the error in the original letter, and confirming the hopes of myself and those interested with me in the unfortunate business, that the claim will be favourably considered and supported by the Secretary of State, I have, &c.

(Signed) W. J. ALT.

Inclosure in No. 135.

Statements respecting the Haidar Pacha to Ismidt Railway Claim.

(1.)

	£	s.	d.
Original amount awarded to the Locataires, 5th March, 1892 ..	120,000	0	0
Interest upon this amount at 5 per cent. per annum from date of Award to 30th September, 1908	152,003	19	3
Total	272,003	19	3
Total amount of claim	272,003	19	3

(Signed) W. J. ALT.

(2.)

Interest on 120,000*l.* at 5 per cent. per annum from the 5th March, 1892, to the 30th September, 1908, half-yearly rests:—

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
5 per cent. on	120,000	0	0	from 5th March to 30th September, 1892	3,127	8	0
"	123,427	8	0	from 1st Oct., 1892, to 31st March, 1893	3,085	13	8
"	126,513	1	8	from 1st April to 30th September, 1893	3,162	16	6
"	129,675	18	2	for 6 months to 31st March, 1894 ..	3,241	17	11
"	132,917	16	1	" 30th September, 1894..	3,322	18	11
"	136,240	15	0	" 31st March, 1895 ..	3,406	0	4
"	139,646	15	4	" 30th September, 1895..	3,491	3	5
"	143,137	18	9	" 31st March, 1896 ..	3,578	0	0
"	146,716	7	9	" 30th September, 1896..	3,667	18	2
"	150,384	6	11	" 31st March, 1897 ..	3,759	12	2
"	154,143	18	1	" 30th September, 1897..	3,853	11	11
"	157,997	10	0	" 31st March, 1898 ..	3,949	18	9
"	161,947	8	9	" 30th September, 1898..	4,048	13	8
"	165,996	2	5	" 31st March, 1899 ..	4,149	16	1
"	170,146	0	6	" 30th September, 1899..	4,253	13	0
"	174,399	13	6	" 31st March, 1900 ..	4,359	19	10
"	178,759	13	4	" 30th September, 1900..	4,468	19	10
"	183,228	13	2	" 31st March, 1901 ..	4,580	14	4
"	187,809	7	6	" 30th September, 1901..	4,695	4	8
"	192,504	12	2	" 31st March, 1902 ..	4,812	12	4
"	197,317	4	6	" 30th September, 1902..	4,932	18	7
"	202,250	3	1	" 31st March, 1903 ..	5,056	5	1
"	207,306	8	2	" 30th September, 1903..	5,182	13	2
"	212,489	1	4	" 31st March, 1904 ..	5,312	4	6
"	217,801	5	10	" 30th September, 1904..	5,445	0	8
"	223,246	6	0	" 31st March, 1905 ..	5,581	3	2
"	228,827	9	3	" 30th September, 1905..	5,720	13	8
"	234,548	3	4	" 31st March, 1906 ..	5,863	19	1
"	240,411	17	5	" 30th September, 1906..	6,010	5	11
"	246,422	3	4	" 31st March, 1907 ..	6,160	11	1
"	252,582	14	5	" 30th September, 1907..	6,314	11	4
"	258,897	5	9	" 31st March, 1908 ..	6,472	8	8
"	265,369	14	5	" 30th September, 1908..	6,634	4	10
				Total	152,003	19	3

(Signed) W. J. ALT.

[33196] No. 136.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of telegrams relative to affairs at Rubeaten.

India Office, September 24, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 136.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 26, 1908.

ADEN. Your telegram of the 19th August.

I approve of the reply which you have sent to the Bombay Government as to affairs at Rubeaten. Intimation to Sheikhs that Rubeaten belongs to Yafa presumably carries with it the "express surrender" of rights of Yafa to Juban, which, as arranged by Fitzmaurice, the wording of the *procès-verbal* was intended to avoid (*vide* his letter of the 30th April, 1905, paragraph 12). This should, if necessary, be pointed out to the Resident.

Inclosure 2 in No. 136.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 27, 1908.

ADEN. Please suspend action for the present on my telegram of the 26th instant as to Rubeaten.

Inclosure 3 in No. 136.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 5, 1908.

RUBEATEN. My telegram of the 27th August.

You may now proceed with action on my telegram of the 26th August.

[33313] No. 137.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, September 25, 1908.

PAR sa note du 12 de ce mois, le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères avait proposé de communiquer dès à présent au Sultan de Masecate, à titre d'information personnelle, une traduction Arabe de la Proclamation destinée à faire connaître à ses sujets la Sentence Arbitrale du Tribunal de La Haye relative au régime des boutriers Français.

L'Ambassadeur de France est chargé d'annoncer à Sir Edward Grey que son Gouvernement ne peut qu'approuver la proposition dont il s'agit.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 25 *Septembre,* 1908.

[33224] No. 138.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 583.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 17, 1908.

WITH reference to your No. 327 of the 15th August and your No. 341 of the 24th August on the subject of the Hindié Barrage, I have the honour to report that on the recent arrival here of Mr. R. Money, Messrs. Pearsons' engineer, I instructed the Chief Dragoman to introduce him to the new Minister of Public Works, who showed himself very favourably disposed. The present position of the matter is the following: The only other competitor is a German firm of Dusseldorf and Bremen. They, as well as Messrs. Pearsons, estimate that the work, if carried out on M. Cugnin's plans, will cost nearly double the amount that the Turkish Government had set aside. Mr. Money informed the Minister that his firm, while unable to guarantee work done on the French plans, are prepared with plans of their

own, drawn up after consulting Sir W. Willcocks, and estimated to cost considerably less than those of M. Cugnin. The Ministry of Public Works quite recognized that the latter's plans must be considerably altered, and has telegraphed to Bagdad with a view to his re-examining the site of the dam. The Minister was also thinking of inviting the German firm to tender on the basis of Messrs. Pearsons' plan, and adjudicating between the two without calling for further tenders.

In introducing Mr. Money to the Minister of Public Works, Mr. Fitzmaurice took an opportunity of discussing with his Excellency the general subject of irrigation in Mesopotamia and Sir W. Willcocks' projects for such work. He gave the Minister copies of Sir William's reports, after examining which his Excellency discussed the matter at the Council of Ministers, where it was decided, in principle, to employ Sir W. Willcocks, if possible, to report on and insist in the execution of irrigation projects in Mesopotamia. In response to a telegram of mine intimating the above to Sir W. Willcocks, the latter arrived here on the 10th instant, and entered at once into communication with the Minister of Public Works, who, in the light of Sir William's condemnation of M. Cugnin's plans, practically decided to abandon the latter, and requested Sir William to draw up a report for him on the whole question. In view of this change in the situation, Mr. Money has returned to England until Sir W. Willcocks and the Ministry of Public Works come to a definite decision as to the Hindié Barrage and, perhaps, other irrigation works in the Bagdad Vilayet.

The Grand Vizier informed me yesterday that the Ottoman Government's present intention is to employ Sir W. Willcocks in connection with the irrigation under a five years' contract, but nothing has yet been signed to that effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33229] No. 139.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 589. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 20, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting on the strike on the Aidin Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 139.

Acting Consul-General Heathcote-Smith to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 97. Confidential.)
Sir, *Smyrna, September 14, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency the following account of the Ottoman (Aidin) Railway strike; it is based to a great extent on letters sent by the General Manager, Mr. Barfield, to his London Council of Administration.

Mr. Barfield returned to Smyrna from England on the 28th August, and found that an agitation was going on among the men for better conditions of service; and that their demands had been printed in the form of a Circular in Greek.

The French Cassaba Railway had finished its strike on the previous day, the men's demands being mainly conceded.

Mr. Barfield, on arrival, confirming the action of the Traffic Manager, dismissed some eight clerks from the Audit Office, who had been the prime movers in the strike. It may be mentioned that speaking generally the ringleaders of the strike, and indeed the principal workmen, are either Italian or Greek subjects.

On Saturday, the 29th August, two lawyers called on Mr. Barfield, stating they represented the men, and handed over a copy of demands. The General Manager asked to see their credentials. They said they had none, but promised to obtain a written authorization. They urged a general increase of pay and the reinstatement of the men dismissed. On this Mr. Barfield promised to submit these demands to the Council of Administration.

Meanwhile, to avoid the strike breaking out, Mr. Barfield spontaneously raised the scale of pay of the firemen and drivers. Their pay, which had been better than the recent pay of the Cassaba drivers, was now made better than the new pay of the same class of men on the Cassaba. This arrangement was, however, rejected by the men.

News then came indirectly that the men had decided to strike, and on Monday, the 31st August, work was at a standstill. Mr. Barfield was unable to get into touch with the men, who held obstinately aloof.

However, Mouamer Bey, the member of the Young Turkey Committee who is charged with the settlement of strikes, saw the General Manager, and offered to do his best to arrange matters.

The position then on Monday, the 31st August, was that the men had struck, and had not even officially presented any demands. Later in the day, when the two lawyers above-mentioned came, Mr. Barfield found that one had resigned because the men had gone on strike unknown to himself and contrary to their understanding, while the second lawyer produced a letter which authorized him merely to press the men's demands. Once more, therefore, delay occurred, as Mr. Barfield insisted on treating only with responsible representatives of the men.

The Liberal Committee, headed by Dr. Nazim Bey, who at first was inclined to criticize Mr. Barfield as being too harsh and unyielding, had by this time become convinced of the irreconcilable attitude of the men, and promised to get drivers from the Cassaba; their promise was not fulfilled. Mr. Barfield, to make matters run more smoothly, had offered to take back the eight men originally dismissed, but the Committee said that there was no longer any obligation to take them back, and they offered to arrest any man interfering with the service.

The Committee, however, did nothing definite, and late in the day some railway officials persuaded a delegation of the men, who had by now thrown over their original two lawyers, to come to Mr. Barfield.

That evening an agreement was signed; certain points under discussion being left over pending for the decision of the Council.

The next day things were almost as bad as before. Only four engines were under steam and no goods traffic was possible, and those who were interfering with the men willing to work were not touched by the Government.

The strikers had begun to draw knives and behave threateningly; the Government continued its passive policy.

The Agreement of the 1st September being so much waste paper, Mr. Zurukzoglou, editor of the "Reforme" and "Imerissia," appeared as the men's delegate to carry on the second negotiations. The discussion lasted the whole of the 2nd September. During the day some strikers forcibly stopped a train, and on this Mr. Barfield consulted with Mr. Barnham, who, going to the Vali, insisted on a large force of soldiers being sent down to guard the railway, and also, as you are aware, telegraphed to your Excellency on the subject.

At midnight the second Agreement was initialled by the interested parties and Mouamer Bey, but the men repudiated it the next morning until Mouamer Bey, threatening them in the Committee's name, persuaded them to go back to work.

The impression was that had a large force been sent from the first and used if necessary, the men would have come to terms much sooner.

Unfortunately, a disagreement then broke out over the clause, by which certain of the employés were to work ten hours a-day; the Company insisted that this meant exclusively of the one and a-half hours for meals.

On Sunday, the 6th, the Liberal Committee wrote advising the General Manager to regard the ten hours' working day as eight and a-half, and so meet the men's demands. This Mr. Barfield said would be financially and otherwise impossible for the Company.

In the afternoon Mr. Barnham saw the General Manager and heard of the fresh demand and the insubordinate conduct of the men, who were acting very much as they chose. Mr. Barnham telegraphed to your Excellency the result of this interview.

On Monday, the 7th, Mr. Barfield was informed by Mehmet Medjdet Bey that the men were going on strike a third time. Medjdet Bey is the Acting Director of Political Affairs. Although a Government official he is a rabid Socialist, and has just started a newspaper called the "Workingman." In its last edition he congratulated the men on their victory over the Company, and stigmatized those who were willing to work during the strike as traitors. He seems an honest man, but he is a visionary and

an extremely dangerous one. Mr. Barfield explained that the question of the eight and a-half hours' or ten hours' work must be left to the Council of Administration.

Things dragged on in an unsatisfactory way, the men all showing a disposition to be insolent and work according to their own fancy.

On Thursday, the 10th, the men formulated their demands for an eight and a-half hours' day, or, failing this, the dismissal of all their chiefs. Mr. Barfield saw some delegates and told them that, pending the arrival of the Director and Secretary of the Council next week, they should be paid a full day for eight and a-half hours' work.

On Friday evening, the 11th, at midnight, Mr. Barfield came down to the Consulate and said the men had broken into some of the sheds. I was sent to get soldiers, and at 3·30 A.M. arrived at the station with some eighty men. The strikers had, however, already dispersed.

On Saturday Mr. Zurukzoglou came with a long list of fresh demands on the men's behalf. Mr. Barfield, seeing the inactivity of the Committee, the weakness of the troops as acknowledged by Mouamer Bey—their number is now declared at 400—and the impossibility of getting the Government to adopt the stern measures necessary, came to Mr. Barnham and asked him to take over the responsibility of running the line in his own name if these third negotiations fell through. Mr. Barfield considered that short of the presence of a man-of-war, it would be the sole means of bringing the Government to recognize the imperative urgency of adequately defending the Company.

However, in the afternoon, a representative meeting, at which Mr. Barnham and I attended, discussed the ways and means for five hours; this finally resulted in the signing of the third and last definite Agreement, in which relatively only unimportant points have been left to the decision of the Council.

The chief concessions obtained by the men have been a 15 per cent. increase on salaries up to 500 piastres monthly, and 10 per cent. for those above this. The ten hours working day is maintained, except for three months in winter, when it will be nine and a-half hours. It may be mentioned that formerly it was a ten and a-half hours' effective working day all the year round.

Those belonging to the permanent staff will not be dismissed because of lack of work.

Day labourers will be ranked as employed by the month after five years of good service.

The questions of a pension fund and insurance against accidents will be studied by the Council.

It is impossible to say how far this settlement may be regarded as final. The temper of the men is unusually difficult, and whereas the Government has the responsibility, the Committee have all the power; and the Committee have shown themselves ready to temporize and vacillate numberless times before taking any action which has even a remote chance of resulting in bloodshed. Their almost passionate desire to avoid bloodshed and act constitutionally, though undoubtedly praiseworthy in intention has rather blinded them to the practical side of the questions they are called upon to solve.

The General Manager calculates that the concessions already made will cost the Company from 11,000*l.* to 14,000*l.* a-year. That with the higher rates of wages it may no longer be possible to construct carriages here, which will entail wholesale dismissals, and that the chances of raising the necessary money for the Egirdir extension have become problematic.

All is now quiet on the railway, and work is following its normal course.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. E. HEATHCOTE-SMITH.

No. 140.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 26.)

(No. 590.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 20, 1908.

IN my despatch No. 533 of the 1st instant, I had the honour to report to you on the state of the vilayets inhabitated by Armenians; the situation, according to the reports which had reached me up to that time, was extremely unsatisfactory.

I am happy to be able to report a complete change in the state of affairs at the present moment.

At Kharput the reaction has subsided, though there is still a slight feeling of

uneasiness among the Armenians, though this appears to be gradually subsiding. The League, or people who are in complete sympathy with its aims, have taken matters into their hands and have procured the dismissal of most of the most corrupt and inefficient officials, including the Armenian Bishop, whose resignation was demanded by the crowd; but the prelate has already departed with, it is said, a considerable sum of money.

The Constitution was warmly received and celebrated at Malatia.

The Kurds of the Dersim seem to be surrounded and hard pressed in their mountain fastnesses, through the news from this region is uncertain.

At Diarbekir the reactionary party seem to have disappeared; a meeting of all creeds was held in the Armenian church to celebrate the Constitution, and some emissaries of the Beys of Haini, who have of late been terrorizing the town, who had come in to ascertain whether orders had not arrived for a massacre, returned amazed to report the phenomenon to their masters.

You are aware that very vigorous military measures are in progress against Ibrahim Pasha and his Milli Kurds; this episode is forming the subject of reports by the Military Attaché. It has produced an excellent effect through the provinces, only second perhaps to the dismissal of the famous Zekki Pasha from his command of the IVth Army Corps at Erzinjian, and his replacement by Abdullah Pasha. This step is equally welcomed by Moslems and Christians, for, with the help especially of the Hamidieh regiments of whom he was the main prop, he opposed all alike.

Erzeroum is entirely in the hands of members and adherents of the League; order is maintained perfectly, and all creeds are living in complete harmony with one another. Here, as at most other centres, the officers and troops and officials have sworn loyalty to the Sultan "so long as he is loyal to the Constitution." The local Committee has been definitely constituted, and supervizes the actions of the Government, though it does not unduly interfere in administrative details. Its members are respectable men of good standing, and it consists of eight Mussulmans, three Armenians, and three Catholics. At the beginning of this month a service was conducted by the Armenian Archbishop for the repose of the souls of those who had perished in the massacres of 1895, and a large crowd of Mussulmans attended, some of the leaders of which subsequently making speeches in honour of those who, they said, had fallen in the cause of liberty. They hoped that the past would be forgotten, and that henceforth Turks and Armenians would work together like brothers for the good of their common country.

I next pass to the blackest spot of all, the Bitlis Vilayet, the condition of which at the end of July seemed nothing less than hopeless.

The announcement of the Constitution was followed by a violent reaction, certain Moslem elements endeavouring to prove by very convincing tokens that a constitutional régime was unsuited to that part of the country, and they took steps for bringing about a massacre. The Acting Vali was well disposed, but of too weak a character to repress it, and certain officers, adherents of the League, took matters into their own hands, and, while seeing that the town and bazaars were properly protected, gave the Sheikhs and Notables to understand that they would allow no breach of the peace. Thus tranquillity was restored, so that a few days later it was possible to fête the Constitution publicly. Later, Feizi Bey was dismissed, and a military officer, belonging to the League, assumed his duties. Mutual confidence between Moslem and Christian kept increasing, while unprecedented peace and security began to prevail throughout the vilayet. The Armenian revolutionaries in the Mush district laid down their arms and came in, while the Kurdish hangers-on of the Government left the town and returned to their homes.

Finally, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, the Acting Vice-Consul at Bitlis, dated the 1st instant, confirming his previous reports in their entirety. You will notice that he dwells on the striking effect produced by the prompt and successful measures taken to recapture one single lot of cattle stolen from Armenians; and also that, seeing the new condition of things which is prevailing, hundreds of Armenians are returning to their homes from Russia, meeting on their way with a good reception from the Kurds.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 140.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Bitlis, September 1, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that since my last report of the 18th ultimo unprecedented peace and tranquillity have prevailed all over the vilayet, public security being assured more than it might be expected.

As I had the honour to state in my above-mentioned despatch, the twenty gendarmes sent from here to pursue the robbers of seven oxen of an Armenian at Teghut seized the oxen of Kurds instead and compelled them to point out the robbers, who were soon discovered, and the stolen oxen restored to the Armenians. This step made, indeed, a startling effect on the minds of the robbers. Since then no other robbery or plunder is reported.

Feizi Bey, Acting Vali here, originally the Mutessarif of Yairb, was dismissed on the 23rd ultimo, and recalled to Constantinople; and Lieutenant-Colonel Said Bey, the Military Commandant here, was appointed Acting Vali pending the arrival of Tahir Pasha from the Persian frontier.

With reference to my telegram of the 26th ultimo, Rupen, Kormen, &c., the leaders of Armenian revolution in Mush, have surrendered to the authorities with their bands, amounting to 150 "fedais," and have been received with military honours. Ferik Solih Pasha, who is dismissed now, had sent the military band to meet the leaders, who, followed by soldiers, were frantically cheered by a big crowd of Armenians and Kurds.

They are now in Mush, and are said to be undertaking the task of economic, moral, and intellectual revival of Armenians in Mush. The fraternization of the two races seems to be rather successful in Mush than here, though the reactionary party and the Kurdish oppressors in both places are annoyed at the liberty granted to Armenians.

Hundreds of fugitive Armenians are returning home from Russia, and are being very well received by Kurds on the road. Others are going to Constantinople and elsewhere, taking passport in one day or two, while two months ago the issue even of a umurur teskéré would take months and much bribe.

One marring incident happened four days ago here in the following circumstances:—

Three Kurds attacked at night another Kurd, their relative, and wounded him. Thanks, however, to the energetic steps of the police, the two assailants are arrested, and the public confidence apparently restored.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. S. SAFRASTIAN, *Dragoman.*

[32231] No. 141.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 591.)

Constantinople, September 20, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, reporting on the reception of the Constitution in Bagdad.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 141.

Major Ramsay to Government of India.

Bagdad, August 10, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador informing me that he had congratulated the Ottoman Government on the revival of the Turkish Constitution, and authorizing me to let it be known that the new movement would receive the full support of the British Government as long as it made for reform and good Government. On the 4th August I went to offer my congratulations

to his Excellency the Vali, and I have taken steps to make known the sympathy of His Majesty's Government with the new régime.

2. As far as Bagdad is concerned, the immediate result of the newly-granted freedom is that the office of Censor has been practically, if not technically, abolished; there is now absolute freedom of speech, and telegrams regarding political matters are accepted by the telegraph office without objection; there is a tendency, for the present at any rate, to look upon the members of the various religions as compatriots and brothers, and, as far as I can observe, the leaning towards nationalism has not induced any anti-foreign feeling. The younger portion of the population is excited but orderly, while the older people seem a little suspicious as to what such sudden changes may mean. It is not known here whether the troops at Yildiz, and in the IVth Army Corps under Zekki Pasha, have been won over to the side of the Young Turks, and until these two bodies of men have declared their intentions there seems to be reasonable cause for hesitation and fear.

3. The only incident worth reporting took place on the 4th August, when a large deputation of officers of the VIth Army Corps went to the office of Sidki Pasha, the Commander of the Corps, to ask him to explain why he had not published any information regarding the privileges that had recently been granted, and why there had not been illuminations and public rejoicings. The Commander-in-chief appears to have lost his head, and, fearing personal violence, he took refuge in his room and would not meet his officers. After some time the Vali appeared on the scene, and induced the Commander to come out, but it is said that the officers used very abusive language towards the Commander before the arrival of the Vali. The officers were informed of the orders that had come from Constantinople, and they then demanded some public demonstration and illuminations for three days. Soldiers were at once turned out, and they marched through the town with bands playing and shouting "Vive la liberté!" For three days the houses of the Vali and Commander-in-chief, as well as some other houses, were illuminated. It is said that after this incident some of the officers telegraphed to Constantinople demanding the dismissal of Sidki Pasha, and saying that if he was not dismissed by Constantinople he would be dismissed by the officers. It is said that this incident is largely due to private intrigues and enmity, which is probably true.

4. A club or Committee of Young Turks has been formed, and I understand that an Armenian doctor named Hagopian has been elected as honorary lecturer. This man was in gaol in consequence of certain revolutionary papers having been found in his possession about a year ago, and it is said that the Young Turk Committee brought pressure on the Vali to obtain his release. Dr. Hagopian, at the time of his arrest, claimed American nationality, but the claim was not admitted by the American Embassy. The Committee had meetings, but as far as I can learn no one has been able to assert for himself a commanding position, and the discussions have had more to do with such abstract subjects as the brotherhood of man rather than with measures of practical politics.

5. On the day of the officers' demonstration a prisoner named Abdul Razak was taken to the Vali's office, as he had promised to give the Vali some useful information. Seeing the disturbance, he managed to get taken back to the prison, where he said that the Sultan had ordered the release of all prisoners, and that the officers had to come to the Vali to enforce the order. On hearing this the prisoners made a united effort to break out of the gaol, but they were prevented from doing so by the police.

6. Kazim Pasha, a brother-in-law of the Sultan, as well as other political exiles, are talking of returning to Constantinople shortly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

P.S.—The Commander-in-chief is to be succeeded by Osman Pasha from Monastir, and pending his arrival, Zekki Pasha from Mosul will be in temporary command of the VIth Army Corps.

On the 8th or 9th there was a great demonstration at the Sarai demanding a prohibition of the export of wheat. The Vali will probably have to yield.

J. R.

[33422] No. 142.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 236.)

Gulahek, September 2, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 126 of the 21st May last, I have the honour to report that the question of the protection of Bahreinis in Persia has again been raised by a robbery committed near Yezd on a party of twenty-one Bahreini pilgrims returning from Meshed. I have informed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the occurrence, and requested him to cause the necessary steps to be taken for the punishment of the robbers and the recovery of the money stolen, which amounted to 5,255 krans.

Meantime also, as it appeared to me to be impossible for us to allow the victims, who look to us for protection, to remain at the Vice-Consulate at Yezd in a destitute condition, I sent instructions to Mr. Blackman, through His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan, to furnish them with a sum sufficient to enable them to reach the nearest British Consulate on their way to their homes, which will, I presume, be Shiraz. The money so advanced will be recoverable from the Persian Government, but meantime I propose to request the Indian Government to allow it to be charged in the Legation accounts.

I am taking this opportunity to urge again the Persian Government to send instructions to the local Imperial authorities to accept the representations of His Majesty's Consular Representatives on behalf of the Bahreinis in Persia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

[33587] No. 143.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of correspondence received from the Government of India relative to the complaint of the Sheikhs of Rubeaten against the local Turkish authorities.

India Office, September 26, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 143.

Extract from the weekly Newsletter of the Political Resident, Aden, dated August 22, 1908.

THE Sheikhs of Rubeaten have forwarded me three letters addressed to them by the Turkish Kaïmakam and Commandant of Turkish troops. In these letters the Turks claim Rubeaten as part of the Kaïmakamate of Rada, and order the Sheikhs to come in and pay homage. They further assert ignorance of the fact that Rubeaten has been declared to be under British protection.

The Turks are reported in some force on our border near Juban and Nawa.

The Rubeaten Sheikhs have been informed that they are under protection of the British Government, and that the matter has already been reported to Government for orders. This matter has already been referred to in paragraph 5 of my letter of the 8th August and by telegram.

Inclosure 2 in No. 143.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Poona, August* 18, 1908.

IN continuation of my telegram of 17th August.

Bombay Government consider that, under *procès-verbal* of 20th April, 1905, Rubeaten is unquestionably within our sphere.

Inclosure 3 in No. 143.

Extract from the weekly Newsletter of the Political Resident, Aden, dated August 8, 1908.

THE Sheikhs of Rubeaten and Sha'ib, in the Upper Yafa, have lately written informing me of the near approach of the Turks to their border. They appear to be afraid of incursions. They have been informed that the Turks are aware that they are under the protection of the British Government, and that they could remind the Turks of this fact if they tried to coerce them in any way.

[33585] No. 144.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd instant, relative to the Abu Musa Oxide Concession.

India Office, September 26, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 144.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 22, 1908.

ABU MUSA. Your telegram dated the 30th ultimo.

Your objection to employing Sheikh's brother is shared by His Majesty's Government. On the other hand, until question with German Government is settled, date of which cannot be forecast, it is impossible to approach British firm with proposals for permanent working of oxide. The obligation we are under to Germany is to use our good offices to make arrangements of a temporary nature for Wönckhaus to procure a limited supply of oxide, so that he may be in position to carry out contracts into which he entered before the lease was cancelled. The best plan will be, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, that some British firm, Strick for preference, should be got, as a purely temporary arrangement pending settlement of question of future permanent working, to undertake on the Sheikh's behalf the excavation, transport to coast, &c., of quantities of oxide necessary for purposes of Wönckhaus. In view of its essentially temporary nature, it seems desirable that the arrangement should be a local one, and should not be made in communication with Strick in this country. Please say whether this can be arranged by Major Cox. I approve proposal in your letter dated the 23rd July as to suits against Hassan being postponed.

[33641] No. 145.

Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, September 28, 1908.

Dear Sir Edward Grey,

I BEG respectfully to call your serious attention to the inclosed copy of a telegram I have to-day received from our General Manager, and which is also signed by Mr. Lindsay Eric Smith, one of my colleagues, and by our Secretary, who are now at Smyrna, all of whom, I believe, to be men not at all likely to be affected by panic.

The renewed strike to which they refer is in violation of an Agreement arrived at on the 12th instant between our General Manager and our employés; that Agreement, which embodies the utmost concessions which it is possible for us to make to the workmen's demands, was approved of and signed by His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna.

I should add that apart from the value of the property of this Company, there are stored in our warehouses at Smyrna goods belonging to British subjects of very large value.

Before the above-mentioned Agreements were signed, there was much violence and terrorization; some of the strikers placed themselves in front of the engines and refused to allow trains to proceed, and our terminus was only preserved by soldiers with fixed bayonets. As you will see by the inclosed telegram, we are informed that there is now no sufficient force available upon the spot for adequate protection, and in these grave circumstances I venture to appeal to you for all the assistance His Majesty's Government can give us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RATHMORE.

Inclosure in No. 145.

Extract from General Manager's Telegram, dated September 27, 1908.

OWING to outside intrigue and terrorization by a few of our men strike renewed yesterday without notice, traffic entirely ceased, and much dislocation of trade and employment will ensue. Fresh demands made daily, impossible concede; made urgent application here and at capital yesterday to obtain protection; this hitherto altogether inadequate; no sufficient force here. Whole situation very serious; our reply must be given. Strikers to-morrow anticipate serious consequences, as no control of bad element exists. Ten thousand remitted to-day.

[33613] No. 146.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 277.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 28, 1908.*

SMYRNA–AIDIN Railway. Strike has broken out afresh.

The following is the state of affairs as reported by the Acting Consul:—

The Company refuse to grant the demand of the instigators for the dismissal of the chiefs, while the instigators are terrorizing the workmen.

Violence is expected to-day, and the Company state that they will request presence of British man-of-war if a sufficient number of Turkish troops are not forthcoming. No action is to be expected on the part of the Commandant on account of his fear of exciting native population.

I cannot see that a man-of-war could at present be of any service. The Grand Vizier, to whom I represented the matter, had heard nothing of it but is making inquiries.

[33613] No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 251.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 28, 1908.*

YOUR telegram No. 377: Smyrna–Aidin Railway.

Urge Grand Vizier to take immediate and adequate measures to protect Company's property, and point out impossibility of interesting British capital in Turkey if an important British enterprise is, in spite of your representations, left without proper protection.

British property stored in railway warehouses at Smyrna probably worth over 500,000*l.*

[33697] No. 148.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 25th instant, relative to Turkey and Rubeaten.

India Office, September 28, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 148.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September 25, 1908.*

YOUR telegram dated the 5th instant: Rubeaten.

Following telegram, dated the 4th instant, received from Government of Bombay:—

"Resident, Aden, telegraphed 12th instant as follows:—

"'No express or implied surrender of Yafa's rights to Juban is involved by intimation made to Sheikhs that Rubeaten belongs to Yafa. Before the intimation was given *procès-verbal* was fully considered with paragraphs 11 and 12 of letter dated the 30th April, 1905, from Mr. Fitzmaurice. I purposely avoided raising the question of Juban, as no complaints of Turkish aggression have been received from Jubanis. Juban and Nawa have, presumably under orders from Sana, been quitted by Turks.'"

[33784] No. 149.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 29, 1908.*

SALONICA strikes. Your telegram No. 251 and my No. 277 of the 28th.

I learn from the Grand Vizier that the Vali has received special instructions, and that a battalion has been ordered from Salonica to Smyrna. His Highness hopes the strike will be finished to-morrow.